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Abstract 
This dissertation advances the study of civil war by addressing the means through which 
states’ police forces may affect the probability of civil war onset.  I improve upon extant work on 
civil war and state capacity by considering the ability of police to act autonomously from the 
state and operate as a distinct element of the state’s security sector.  The project consists of four 
substantive chapters.  One chapter addresses the role of police capacity in preventing civil war 
and determines that simple measures of police strength do influence the probability of civil war 
onset.  Also, anocracies require a greater number of police to prevent civil war.  The next chapter 
tests whether police repression could lead to civil war by creating grievances among the 
populace.  Tests of this hypothesis determine that while police repression can increase the 
probability of civil war, it is not as powerful a predictor as state repression overall. The third 
chapter looks at the effect of the mode of organization of police forces and contains two 
contrasting hypotheses.  The first proposes that police force centralization increases the 
probability of civil war onset by increasing the likelihood that the state and police view the utility 
of employing repression more favorably.  The other proposes that centralization reduces the 
probability of civil war onset by making the police more effective.  Nevertheless, neither 
hypothesis yields significant outcomes when tested.   The final chapter employs two case studies 
about the experience of police serving as military during a civil war.   I find that in both cases, 
police service in what are typically military functions did tend to make the police more 
repressive after the war, which contributed to reoccurrence by giving dissidents a cause around 
which to rally and by reducing the dissidents’ perceptions of the utility of non-violent means of 
protest.  I conclude the study with a summary of the major findings, suggestions for further 
study, and recommendations for policy makers. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The topic of the causes of civil war is highly contested,1 but an increasingly common 
explanation relates to state capacity (Hendrix 2010).  Even though the indisputably multi-faceted 
nature of state capacity makes its role in civil war onset contested in its own right (Soifer and 
Hau 2008), one aspect of state capacity that at least merits scrutiny in many studies relates to a 
state’s fundamental ability to manage violence throughout its territory (Evans, Ruescemeyer, and 
Skocpol 1985; Hendrix 2010).   
This ability is often conceptualized as coercive capacity, and is measured by size of the 
military (Hegre et al 2001; Sambanis 2004; Hendrix 2010).  It is probably un-contentious to posit 
that the military constitutes an important element of a state’s coercive capacity, but focusing 
solely on the military overlooks another equally important organization.  In the modern era, 
police have come to share space with the military as a coercive instrument in states’ security 
sectors.   By police, I mean the “custodians of the state’s monopoly on force” who have “primary 
formal responsibility for legitimate force to safeguard security” (Brewer et al 1996:xx; Reiner 
2000:7).  A fundamental, though not exclusive, distinction between the police and the military is 
that police have responsibility for maintenance of internal order, whereas the military is 
externally focused (Bittner 1972; Bayley 1985). 
Given the important role that police play in maintaining order (accepting that a civil war 
onset represents a breakdown of order), it is surprising that studies on the role of police capacity 
have not achieved an equivalent status to studies of the effects of military capacity.  This paper, 
for the first time, gives the role of police in civil war onset its proper due.  Civil war scholarship 
has not overlooked the role of police entirely, but existing scholarship contains flaws.  One 
shortcoming is a failure to treat police as an agent that can possess some degree of autonomy 
from the ruler.  Previous studies often characterize police as an instrument or reflection of the 
state and do not allow for consideration of the effects of police autonomy.2   Other studies 
conflate the effect of police and military forces on civil war − combining them into a broader 
                                                 
1 See Sambanis (2004), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), and Dixon (2008) for examples of the various competing 
explanations for civil war that find support in the quantitative literature. 
2 With the exceptions of Gurr (1968) and Hibbs (1973), no large N studies related to civil war treat police as an 
autonomous agent. 
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category of “security forces” or “coercive forces” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Toft 2010).   I 
argue that doing so is short-sighted because it overlooks the very distinct roles and missions of 
police forces and how they affect civil war.  Studies that do allow for the unique effect of police 
coercive capacity often rely on dubious proxy variables for police capacity like Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000) or military capabilities 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Davenport 1995).  The few studies that employ valid indicators of 
police capacity (Gurr 1968; Hibbs 1973) were relegated to the very limited datasets available at 
the time.  It should not be surprising that these few studies yield insignificant and conflicting 
outcomes.  Finally, a seemingly universal shortcoming of extant studies is that they do not 
consider attributes of police forces other than size, such as type of organization.   This 
shortcoming has the effect of treating every state’s police forces as similar in form and function.   
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, I argue that while police capacity may be 
related to other attributes of state capacity, it is not simply a proxy for state strength and merits 
attention for its own effect on civil war onset.  The obvious counterargument is that police 
capacity is just another indicator of state strength, and the empirical difficulties surrounding 
policing capacity suggest that scholars would be better off continuing to use widely available 
indicators of state strength like military or economic capacity.  This counterargument has a weak 
theoretical basis.  Police are worthy of study as a distinct institution for a number of reasons.  
First, the police, not the military, are typically the state agency with primary responsibility for 
maintaining order within society.  If a civil war represents a breakdown in order, then by logical 
extension the police must have played a role, if only by their failure to prevent it.  Second, the 
police are generally the most prevalent government agency within society and are therefore the 
face of the government to most of its inhabitants.  “The Police are to the government as the edge 
is to the knife” (Bayley 1985: 189).  Finally, the role of police in maintaining order and their 
unique presence in society combine to make a state’s police force uniquely situated to repress, a 
characteristic I present later as an important causal mechanism for civil war onset.   
In addition to improving upon the theoretical work relating police forces and civil war 
onset, I intend to advance the empirical treatment of police attributes.  In Chapter 2, I explore 
how police capacity can inhibit the onset of civil war, and I introduce a dataset I have created 
containing a superior measure of police capacity.  I also broaden the operationalization of police 
capacity beyond simple measures of size by considering other characteristics such as 
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organizational type.   In Chapter 3, I look at how police may misapply their inherent coercive 
capacity by engaging in repression, which may contribute to civil war onset by creating 
grievances.  In Chapter 4, I address how modes of police organization can allow the police 
differing levels of autonomy in satisfying the state’s demands to either engage in or refrain from 
repression.  Additionally, I address how modes of organization can influence the effectiveness of 
the police in deterring rebellion.  In doing so, I develop a database capturing levels of 
organizational centralization.  Though police forces and militaries occupy separate roles within 
the greater security sector, police often fight alongside the military once civil wars are underway.  
Chapter 5 looks at how a police force’s experience in performing what are typically military 
functions during a civil war may contribute to an increased police pre-disposition toward 
employing repression after the war, thereby increasing the probability of a reoccurrence of civil 
war. 
 
 While each of the aforementioned chapters has a distinct focus, there are a number of 
topics and concepts that permeate this study.  In the following sections, I address these more 
comprehensive topics.  The first of these is the concept of civil war itself. 
 
 What is Civil War and Why Does it Occur? 
 Definition of Civil War 
There is no universally accepted definition for civil war.  For instance, the quantitative 
literature exhibits multiple and often conflicting definitions of civil war (Sambanis 2004).  
Casualty thresholds are particularly contentious.   Scholars employ them to distinguish civil wars 
from lesser forms of internal political violence, but the imposition of any threshold inherently 
invokes the risk of excluding conflicts that just miss the cutline.   Even the few areas of 
agreement among the studies are problematic.  For instance, most definitions stipulate 
participation of the government as a combatant and the internality of the war within the territory 
of a sovereign state.  Nevertheless, even these simple requirements are problematic because civil 
wars can involve international participants aiding either side (Sambanis 2004).   In light of these 
definitional challenges and in an effort to not become tied to considerations of quantitative 
operationalization, I employ a conceptual definition of civil war as “armed combat within the 
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boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between two parties subject to a common authority 
at the outset of hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006).3   
 
  Civil War Onset 
 Stages of Civil War 
One way to analyze civil wars is through their stages of progression.   A common and 
useful framework for doing so is to divide civil wars into onset, duration, and termination 
(Kalyvas 2006).  I also add reoccurrence as a phase.  I treat reoccurrence as a form of onset, 
except that reoccurrence only happens in some cases of civil war termination.  In other words, all 
civil wars have an onset, but not all experience reoccurrence.  Because the focus of this study is 
police characteristics as a cause of civil wars, I limit myself to only consideration of civil war 
onsets and reoccurrences. 4 In the next sub-section, I describe some common theories of civil war 
onset and how police capacity should apply to them.  I offer a more focused discussion of the 
unique considerations for civil war reoccurrence in Chapter 5. 
 A common distinction in the literature is to characterize the causes of civil war as either 
related to “greed” or “grievances” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).   The former puts primacy on 
economic opportunism as the catalyst for civil war, whereas the latter places the onus on political 
explanations.  Another way to characterize the greed/grievance distinction is inherency and 
contingency (Eckstein 1980).  Inherency based explanations answer the question of “why not 
civil war?” Potential for civil war always exists, and nonoccurrence is temporary and only due to 
some impediment.  Contingency based explanations answer the question of “why” and assume 
that the occurrence of a civil war is due to some aberrant condition.   
                                                 
3 See also Appendix A - Description of Dependent Variables for ways different scholars employ to distinguish civil 
war from other forms of conflict. 
4 I must point out that I have elected to not address the effect of police on civil war duration/termination, mainly 
because police do not appear to have as substantial an effect on this phase as they do on onset and reoccurrence.  
That the police may have a lessened effect during these phases may stem from the military’s relatively higher 
importance in defeating rebellions.  By the time that internal conflicts have escalated to the level of civil war, states 
may have little choice except to employ the military as its primary fighting force. 
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 Two families of studies that draw upon the greed/grievance explanations focus on state 
capacity and government repression, and I contend that a state’s police force can affect the 
probability of civil war onset through both mechanisms. In short, government repression can 
serve as a source of grievance and state capacity can serve both as a disincentive towards 
aspiring rebels’ desire to challenge the state as well as source of grievance when the state fails to 
deliver adequate public goods.   The next two chapters of this study consider each mechanism 
individually.  Before doing so, however, discussion of a number of topics that pervade the 
remainder of the ensuing chapters is in order.   
 
 Spectrum of Internal Instability 
 I characterize civil war onset as the final step on a progression through increasing levels 
of insecurity, a process that applies to both greed and grievance based explanations for civil war.  
The table below depicts the steps.5  The lowest level of instability is “Normal Crime,” which is 
always present to some degree.  Though it exists as a challenge to order, in some sense “normal 
crime,” by definition is impossible to eliminate completely and states can only hope to contain it 
before it advances to a higher level of disorder.  Disorder may also exist in the form of strikes 
and large demonstrations in generally stable states.  The level of “disorder” represents the 
threshold between an acceptable level of insecurity and those higher levels that represent true 
threats to the state.   
  
                                                 
5 This table is adapted from one developed by Bayley and Perito (2012). 
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Table 1-1 Levels of state internal insecurity 
Level of Insecurity 
 (highest to lowest) 
Civil War 
Insurgency 
Subversion 
Disorder 
Normal crime 
 
 Dissidents can elect to escalate to higher levels of insecurity, either because they 
determine it can benefit their interests (greed based) or in response to government repression 
(grievance based).  The state can either accede to the dissidents’ demands, or respond with its 
own escalating levels of violence.  A grievance based explanation would suggest that state 
acquiescence should end the escalation because the source of the grievance would disappear.  On 
the other hand, a greed based explanation would suggest that state acquiescence may indicate a 
weak bargaining position and encourage greater demands from the dissidents.  Escalating 
reactions and counteractions by the state would have the opposite effect.  From a greed 
perspective, they should serve to convince aspiring rebels of the high costs associated with 
challenging the state.  From a grievance perspective, state escalation could exacerbate 
grievances, especially if state behavior becomes overly repressive.6 
                                                 
6  Thoms and Ron (2007) draw upon a similar typology in their description of the typical civil war as series of 
escalating challenges to the state by dissidents groups that invoke escalating repressive responses from the state, 
resulting in a “vicious cycle” that terminates in civil war (695-696).  Though he focuses the role of repression, 
Lichbach treats civil war as a series of escalating self-interested based actions and reactions between dissidents and 
the state.  Boix (2008) explains the greater prevalence of guerilla wars (insurgencies) in comparison to civil wars as 
a function in part of the cost considerations that dissidents take into account before expanding the conflict to civil 
war. 
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 What are Police and What Do They Do? 
 In addition to civil war, the other primary concept of interest in this study is “police.”  A 
useful starting point to understand the distinct effect that police forces can impart on the 
probability of civil war onset is an examination the meaning of the terms “police” and 
“policing.”  Though seemingly interchangeable, the two terms are conceptually distinct in that 
police are just one type of policing (Reiner 2000:1).  Some form of policing, defined as 
“activities intended to create conditions of conformity,” has been universal in all societies in 
which there has been potential for conflict and disorder (Reiner 2000: 7).  Virtually no society 
has existed without some form of policing (Bayley 1985: 10) since the maintenance of public 
order is the primary requirement for all states (Brewer et al 1996: 1).    
 On the other hand, the term police refers to a narrow subcategory of policing that has 
become a feature of all modern societies (Silver 2005: 10).  Police are “custodians of the state’s 
monopoly on force” (Brewer et al 1996: xx) and the “specialized body given primary formal 
responsibility for legitimate force to safeguard security” (Reiner 2000: 7).  Another way to 
define police is “people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations within the group 
through the application of physical force.”  Key terms in this definition that distinguish police 
from other groups are physical force, internal usage, and collective authorization (Bayley 1985: 
7).   
Common to all definitions is the denotation of police as an agent of the state.  In contrast, 
policing can be carried out by a diverse number of actors, both private and public (Reiner 
2000:3).  These distinctions between police and policing exist because policing refers to a set of 
practices that vary across time and place.  Thus, police as we know them today represent the 
form of policing that reflects the contemporary relationships between state and society 
(Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005:217-8).   In describing the relationship of the police to the 
state and society, I draw upon Levi’s (1997) definition of the state as “a complex apparatus of 
centralized and institutionalized power that concentrates violence, establishes property rights, 
and regulates society within a given territory while being formally recognized as a state by 
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international forums.”7  I define society as the people and social relations present in the territory 
governed by the state (Goodwin 2006:14).    
One way to view the relationships of the police, state, and society is to frame them as 
idealized types according to the opposing Weberian and Marxist perspectives of the state.  The 
Weberian perspective characterizes the state as “the human community that successfully claims a 
monopoly of legitimate force within a given territory” (Weber [1918] 2010: 23).  In general, the 
state structures society and thus, the police serve as an evenhanded bureaucratic instrument of 
the state that allows society to function in an orderly way (Evans, Ruescemeyer, and Skocpol 
1985).  According to Marxism, society structures the state since the state solely exists as an 
instrument of the dominant economic class.  Along with the army, the police are the chief tools 
of the dominant class to maintain order (Chilcote 1994: 157).   
While the Weberian and Marxist idealized types may be useful to aid in 
conceptualization of the relationships between state and society, their portrayal of the 
relationships as unidirectional are over-simplistic.  A more sophisticated perspective treats the 
relationship as more dialectic and complex.   Society structures the state, and the state structures 
society (Evans, Ruescemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1985).  The dialectic relationship that 
exists between state and society is also evident in the relationship of police to each.  Police do 
not have to exist as either “even handed protectors of order” (Weberian) or tools of the dominant 
class (Marxist).  Rather, the police can be both or neither depending on their relationship with the 
state and society.  Thus, police exist as an intermediary between the state and society - both 
influenced by and influencing each (Marenin 1985).  
 
 The “principal-agent model” (Ross 1973; Petersen 1993; LaFont and Martimort 2001) 
offers a useful way to portray the intermediary role of the police.  Though the model has its roots 
in economics, it has expanded into political applications (Waterman and Meier 1998; Miller 
                                                 
7 This definition is useful for distinguishing between the state and society, but it conflicts somewhat with the 
Principal-Agent Model.  The problem arises because when employing this model, I termed the “state” as the 
principal, whereas Levi’s definition would consider the state to include both the principal and its agent.   A more 
accurate description that better aligns with the tenets of the Principal Agent Model would use a different term than 
“state” for the principal.   Nevertheless, following Goodwin (2001), I will continue to refer the central authority as 
the “state” for the purpose of simplicity.   
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2005).  Put simply, the model stipulates that a principal contracts with an agent to perform some 
task (Peterson 1993), but agents enjoy an asymmetry of information on how well they perform 
the principal’s bidding.  Problems can arise when the agent shirks from performing the 
principal’s desired tasks due to an asymmetry of interests between the two, compounded by the 
principal’s inability to overcome the information asymmetry.    
I expand the basic principal-agent model to its multiple-principal corollary with the state 
and society serving as the two distinct and occasionally competing principals (Spiller 1990). 8   
My use of the multiple principal-agent model is based on the premise that police, the state, and 
society represent conceptually distinct organizations.  My decision to distinguish between the 
state (and police) and society is consistent with the “statist” school of thought (Krasner 1984) 
and conflicts with both the Marxist characterization of the state as an instrument of the ruling and 
dominant class and the pluralist characterization of the state as a marketplace filtering the 
demands and interests of competing groups and individuals (Chilcote 1994).  According to either 
of these opposing characterizations of state/society relationships, the state (and by extension, its 
agents) cannot possess interests separate from one or more elements of society.  While I admit 
that the boundary between the state and society is not as stark as my theoretical constructs 
suggest, I maintain that the “conceptual distinctions between them are worth preserving” 
(Goodwin 2006: 55), especially with regard to the impact of state capacity on internal conflict.  
 Though the police sociological literature does not explicitly employ the economic based 
language of the principal-agent model, the two fields display a remarkable level of conceptual 
overlap.  For instance, a common theme in the sociological literature is that the police are 
mediators between the state and society, while at the same time possessing interests of their own 
(Brogden 1982, Bayley 1985; Marenin 1996).  One can easily see similarities between this 
characterization of the relationships between the police, state, and society and the model that 
                                                 
8 Spiller (1990), drawing on Bernheim and Whinston (1986), addresses the role of government industrial regulatory 
agencies as an agent situated between the competing principals of Congress and private industry interests groups.  
According to this model, the regulatory agencies seek to achieve the highest payoff from industry and Congress, at 
the lowest level of effort by balancing the demands of both Congress and private industry In Spiller’s model, 
Congress provides payouts in the form of budget allocations and industry provides payouts in the form of post-
government employment. 
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Spiller employs if one simply replaces Spiller’s “regulatory agencies” with “police manager.”9  
 In all but the most dysfunctional countries, the state serves as the principal to the police’s 
agent.  The role of the police as agent is rooted in the state’s overriding interest in preserving its 
own existence, which requires a sufficient degree of public order (Brewer et al 1996; Levi 2002; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003).  Because the maintenance of order exceeds the ability of the 
ruler, it must constitute an agent to perform the policing function, who in modern times is most 
often a police force (Silver 2005).  The success of the police in fulfilling this function entails 
satisfying the demands of both the state and society without neglecting the police force’s own 
interest.  Viewed from a purely economic perspective, the police choose the mixture of strategies 
of consent and coercion that best balance the requirements of the state and society.  Police should 
seek to provide the state the minimally acceptable level of order while obtaining maximum 
material rewards − including rents − at the minimum possible level of efforts.  Autonomy from 
both the state and society becomes a means to an end insofar as it would allow the police more 
flexibility in pursuit of their interests.   
States as principals typically have two means to achieve control over agents: alteration of 
the structure of incentive programs and monitoring (Peterson 1993).  Incentive programs involve 
the provision of state resources to the police. For instance, the state appropriates the financial 
resources to allow the police to operate (Marenin 1985).  The state can also exert political control 
over the police through selection of senior police officials and direction to engage in certain 
activities (Bayley 1985).   
Monitoring involves two elements.  One is the capacity to monitor, which requires that a 
state have a means to determine whether the police are performing in accordance with the state’s 
wishes.  The most common state-based monitoring agents of police are courts and legislatures 
(Bayley 1985).  The courts can throw out those cases that it deems to have been prosecuted in an 
illegal manner.  Additionally, courts can even determine police conduct to be illegal, leading to 
prosecution of the police themselves (Bittner 1972).  Legislatures monitor police conduct by 
developing the laws that serve as the legal basis of police activity (Marenin 1985).  The second 
                                                 
9 This individual is the most senior police official who is responsible for mediating between the requirements and 
demands of external audiences and internally feasible solutions (Brogden 1982).  See also note 8 for a description of 
the Multiple-Principal Agent model. 
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element of monitoring is a willingness to supervise police conduct, though this element may be 
more a function of regime types than state capacity.  A state may have the means to monitor, but 
may not strictly monitor police conduct as long as the police deliver order.  This behavior should 
be more evident in states with autocratic governments, which we should expect to be less 
responsive to complaints from society. 
While the state is an intuitive candidate to serve as a principal, at first glance “society” is 
not.  Nevertheless, society constitutes a valid principal because its members can make demands 
on the police.  One way to view the relationship between the state and society is in the form of an 
exchange (Levi 1988).  In all but the most despotic states, elements of society demand that the 
state provide them a sufficient mix of public and private goods in return for allowing the ruler or 
regime to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2005).    One fundamental public and 
private good is public order.  Because the police are the primary agent responsible for providing 
public order, they cannot escape becoming either directly or indirectly caught up in society’s 
demands for order (Bayley 1985).    Society makes demands on police indirectly by channeling 
their demands through the state.  In fact, as police have taken on an increasingly professional 
persona in the United States and Great Britain, these forces have become more autonomous from 
the direct demands of their societies, thereby requiring citizens to make demands increasingly 
through political representatives (Bittner 1972, Brogden 1982, Kelling and Moore 1988).   
Nevertheless, society can still maintain direct accountability over police in a number of 
ways, both formal and informal.  In some states, societies form civil review boards with the 
express purpose of reviewing police activities. Additionally, mass media wields a significant 
influence on police behavior in states with high press freedom (Bayley 1985).  Finally, society 
retains some degree of control over the police via society’s willingness to allow the police to 
maintain order through consent rather than coercion.  A necessary condition for the police to 
maintain order by consent is that society views the police and the government as legitimate, and 
these views are linked to the prevailing attitudes towards what is legitimate and legal to do to 
maintain order (Brogden 1982; Marenin 1985; Vagg 1996).   
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 The Approach of this Study 
 As a final note before proceeding to the substantive chapters, I offer a discussion of the 
guiding principles underlying my approach to this study.  My central guiding principle is to 
engage in “explicit theorizing, grounded in axiomatic logic, from which empirical referents may 
be extracted…followed by rigorous empirical analysis in which operational assumptions and 
procedures for evaluating evidence are explicitly stated” (Bueno de Mesquita 1985: 134).  In 
keeping with this principle, this study predominantly employs quantitative methodologies.  The 
primary rationales for this decision are past practice and the nature of my analysis.  Since the 
major contribution of this paper is to incorporate new theories with new data, rather than 
improve upon existing methodologies, I accept the suitability of the methodology of numerous 
extant quantitative studies and draw upon them as exemplars.10  The second reason for my 
choice of a quantitative methodology stems from the nature of my analysis.  I am more 
concerned with the overall effects of my independent variables than their effects on individual 
cases.  Case studies offer too little inferential constraint to permit trustworthy theory testing 
(Achen and Snidal 1989).  Additionally, I am more concerned with the probabilistic rather than 
deterministic effect of my independent variables, and quantitative methods are more appropriate 
for this approach (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).     
 One area where qualitative case studies may have been useful is for exploring interactive 
effects, but the nature of my inquiry makes a quantitative methodology more suitable.  
Qualitative case studies can be superior for determining the necessary and sufficient impacts of 
independent variables, but this study is more concerned with the individual effects of interactive 
variables (Freidrich 1982: 827).  I deviate from my use of quantitative methodologies when 
testing one hypothesis and employ a qualitative, case study oriented methodology.  The reason 
stems from the difficulty in creating valid quantitative operationalizations of the key independent 
variables.    
 One of the ramifications of my decision to mostly employ quantitative methodology is 
that I limit myself to concepts that are suitable for quantitative operationalization.  My decision 
                                                 
10 Numerous examples exist of studies of civil war onset and reoccurrence that employ a quantitative methodology 
For onset, see Hibbs (1973), Hegre et al (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006), Fjelde and DeSoysa (2009), Kalyvas and Balcells (2010).  For reoccurrence see Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000), Walter (2004), Fortna (2004), Toft (2010) 
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to rely primarily on existing datasets only exacerbates this limitation because it restricts the time 
domain of the sample.  Existing databases only contain observations of civil war onsets from the 
1940 to 1990 timeframe,11 which has the effect of treating civil war as solely a late 20th century 
phenomenon. 12   I discuss in the potential impact of this time censoring in the Conclusion 
chapter.  On the other hand, restricting the time domain to the late 20th century does have the 
benefit of better aligning civil wars with my primary concept of inquiry.  As I noted earlier in 
this chapter, police as I define them are a relatively recent phenomenon, so the concept of 
policing may not even be valid for civil wars that occurred before World War II. 
 The other ramification of the cross-national time series research design I employ in most 
of my chapters is that it forces me to rely on general theories that I expect to be pertinent across 
the entire country-year sample.  As a result, many context-specific factors are lost.  Hence, any 
conclusions I develop will be probabilistic, rather than deterministic, especially for an event as 
susceptible to multiple causes as civil war.  Similarly, the principal-agent model that undergirds 
many of my hypotheses treats entities as rational actors– an approach that comes with a host of 
criticisms and caveats.13  The ramifications of my methodological choices reinforce the need for 
the use of detailed case studies by researchers who are more concerned with determining why a 
predicted outcome did or did not actually play out.  The conclusions I develop from the case 
studies in Chapter 5 only underscore this point. 
 With these caveats in mind, I proceed to the substantive chapters.  The first of these 
addresses how police capacity may reduce the probability of civil war onset.   This is not an 
especially original proposition, but one that I believe has not received proper theoretical or 
empirical treatment in the past. 
 
 
                                                 
11 The one exception is the COW database, which contains observations of onset going back to 1816, but all of the 
other variables begin no early than 1940.  See Appendix A for a more complete description of the COW dataset. 
12 For example, Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) determine that irregular war was more prevalent during the Cold War 
due to the support of the USSR for the rebels. 
13 Walt (1999) offers a cogent criticism of the shortcomings in the rational-choice method.  One example of a 
characteristic of the police that does not fit neatly into the rational choice framework is the need of individual 
policemen to feel they are contributing to society in a meaningful way (Marenin 1985). 
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Chapter 2 - Police Capacity and Civil War 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the proposition that the capacity of a state’s police force 
influences the probability of civil war onset is not novel.  Several prominent studies posit a 
theoretical relationship between police capacity and civil war onset; however, these studies 
exhibit a number of conceptual and empirical shortcomings.  The major conceptual shortcoming 
is conflating the police and military as two sides of the same coercive coin, with police pointed 
inward and the military pointed outward (Weiss 2011).  Such a conceptualization fails to take 
into account the very different relationship that police maintain with the state and society in 
comparison to the military.  Another consistent problem relates to operationalization of police 
capacity.  Some studies fold police capacity into state capacity more broadly, employing poor 
indicators such as GDP (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000), or military 
capabilities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Toft 2010).  The latter is doubly troubling because it 
reinforces the conceptual problems I mention above.  While these indicators could be valid, the 
authors never put the assumed relationship between their chosen indicators and the concept of 
police capacity to the test.  Other studies that do employ more valid indicators of police capacity 
rely on limited datasets with very small time domains that yield insignificant results (Gurr 1968; 
Hibbs 1973).   
I intend to improve upon the current state of scholarship relating police capacity and civil 
war by explicitly distinguishing police capacity theoretically and empirically from other 
attributes of state strength.  I distinguish police theoretically by treating them as an agent of the 
state, rather than an attribute or instrument.  Police occupy a distinct role in a state’s security 
sector due to a combination of their fundamental requirement to use force to maintain order and 
their unique relationship to and presence among society.  This approach requires that I consider 
police to enjoy some degree of agency and autonomy from the larger state apparatus.14  In other 
words, police capacity is not a direct reflection of state capacity, though both could be 
simultaneously weak or strong for different reasons.  As such, police capacity cannot be 
represented by proxy variables that measure other attributes of state strength such as GDP.  
                                                 
14 I rely upon Marenin (1985) for the observation that police autonomy varies among states. I address the role of 
police autonomy from the state more fully in the discussion surrounding my second set of hypotheses 
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Rather than rely upon similar dubious proxy variables, I distinguish police empirically by 
compiling a dataset that actually measures the size of states’ police forces.   
  
 State Capacity, Police, and Civil War 
 I build a theory relating police capacity to civil war by expanding upon extent theories 
relating civil war and state capacity more broadly.  Notwithstanding the empirical problems in 
the studies the preceding sections of this chapter described, the studies do provide a useful 
theoretical starting point for how state coercive capacity can affect the probability of civil war 
onset.   The literature on state capacity and civil war generally finds that greater capacity inhibits 
the outbreak of civil war in two ways.  One is through coercive capacity to deter or defeat violent 
threats to the state, and the other is by more efficiently monitoring the behavior of its citizenry 
(Hendrix 2010).  In a meta-study of the role of state capacity on civil war onset, Hendrix (2010) 
indentifies three primary, but competing definitions and operationalizations of state capacity.  
These are military capability, bureaucratic/administrative capacity, and quality and coherence of 
institutions.  Military capacity reflects the ability of the state to deter or repel challenges.  
Bureaucratic/administrative capacity refers to the ability of the state to monitor its population, 
and institutional measures are a proxy for regime characteristics.   
 In the following paragraphs, I argue that police capacity can affect the probability of civil 
war onset in the form of each of the three conceptualizations of state capacity Hendrix 
indentifies.  I begin by offering a definition of police capacity as it pertains to civil war.  Viewed 
in its role as an agent of the state, police capacity in general refers to the ability of the police to 
maintain order.  This is the one demand that all modern states (principals) impose on their police 
(agents) (Bittner 1972; Marenin 1985; Reiner 2000).  This demand represents the primary 
rationale for the designation of police forces as a state agency and serves to distinguish the police 
from other government agencies.  Only the police have the designation as the special repository 
for the state’s monopolization of force in its territory (Egon 1972; Brewer et al 1996; Reiner 
2000).  The state as principal rewards or sanctions the police on their ability to establish and 
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maintain order.15   Accepting that a civil war constitutes a breakdown in order and thus a failure 
of the police to satisfy the demands of the state (and society), police capacity in relation to civil 
war becomes the ability of the police to prevent society from progressing to a level of instability 
indicative of a civil war. 
 
I draw first on Hendrix’s concept of military capacity, which I redefine as “coercive 
capacity.”16  Coercive capacity relates to a state’s ability to project its power and impose order 
across its territory (Fjelde and DeSoysa 2009).  The capacity of a state’s police to effectively 
suppress violent resistance to the state relies mostly upon the Inherency school, which contends 
that groups will strive to violently resist the state in the absence of some viable opposition to 
doing so.  Weak state capacity to deter is not in and of itself a primary cause of civil war.  It is 
entirely plausible that a state’s inhabitants may remain peaceful despite an absence of state 
coercive capacity.  Nevertheless, an absence of state coercion can enable those who desire to 
challenge the state, regardless of their root motivation (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Moreover, 
weak state coercive capacity can allow a nascent rebel movement to develop unimpeded because 
state agents are unable to gather the intelligence necessary to discover the nascent rebel activity 
or defeat the rebels once discovered (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  In other words, states can more 
easily progress through the stages of instability described in Chapter 1.   
For police coercive capacity to impart a unique effect on the probability of civil war 
means it must affect civil war onset in a way that is distinct from other elements of the state, such 
                                                 
15 The primary objective of maintaining order may seem to contradict the prominent role that police forces fulfill in 
law enforcement.  This is likely because modern police organizations, especially in the United State and Great 
Britain, have come to view their role primarily as law enforcement, rather than order enforcement, despite the 
conflict that arises between this self conception and the amount of time and effort police actually allocate to law 
enforcement.  Egon (1972) and Bayley (1985) both find that police in the United States and Great Britain spent less 
than half their time on law enforcement related duties.  Egon attributes his finding in part to his conclusion that it is 
impossible for police to rely solely upon enforcement of the law to maintain order since no set of laws and 
regulations can be comprehensive and exhaustive enough to dictate police behavior in all circumstances.  As a 
result, police must rely on their special authorization to employ coercive force as an agent of the state in an effort to 
maintain order, bounded only by some general guidelines. 
16 I redefine military capacity as “coercive capacity” because the military is not the only member of a state’s security 
sector.    
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as the military.  This is not to say that the military does not play a role in coercive capacity.   
Should the level of instability within a state reach the level of civil war, the military will no 
doubt become the primary state agent responsible for defeating the rebellion because the military 
is uniquely trained and equipped for such a mission (Bayley and Perito 2012).  Nevertheless, the 
focus of this study is on what elements of state coercive capacity can influence the onset (and 
conversely the prevention) of civil wars.  In other words, what elements of state coercive 
capacity influence the probability that a state will transition from a lower level of instability to a 
civil war?  I contend that police coercive capacity should influence the probability of civil war 
onset in a way that is distinct from other attributes of state capacity for two primary reasons.  
First, police by definition are a states’ primary agency with authorization to employ force to 
maintain internal order.  The criticality of the police to maintain order is amplified by the second 
reason, which is the tendency of the police to be the most prominent and pervasive agent of the 
state among the population (Silver 2005: 14).   It is for these reasons that the police, not the 
military, should be the focus of the study of state coercive capacity on civil war onset.  Hendrix 
offers support for this contention by noting that military capacity may not be the most 
appropriate measure of coercive potential and suggesting that police capacity may be more 
important (2010: 277). 
 
In the following paragraphs I describe several ways in which police capacity, in the form 
of “actual capabilities” and “visible capabilities” can reduce the probability of civil war onset.  
To do so, I draw from Reiner (2000), who determines that police maintain order more generally 
through mobilization of sanctions, threat, and surveillance.  Before doing so, I must emphasize 
that coercion is not synonymous with repression.  Rather, coercion means compelling someone 
to do something against their will with threat of violence should the individual resist (Bittner 
1972).  For instance, arrest is a form of coercion in that police are physically restraining someone 
from continuing some illegal activity.  Should the individual resist, we would expect the police 
officer to employ an appropriate measure of coercion to subdue the individual.  Such behavior 
does not constitute an act of repression unless the police officer’s response was grossly 
disproportionate or arbitrary.17   
                                                 
17 I use Goldstein’s (1978) definition of repression when making this determination. 
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 Mobilization of Sanctions   
I conceptualize mobilization of sanctions as actual capabilities, meaning the ability of the 
police force to maintain order.  This element differs from threat in that coercive threat is 
perceptual; whereas mobilization capacity refers to the actual capabilities the police possess and 
can include hidden factors unknown to the rebels.  In the context of civil wars, actual capability 
refers to the ability of police to prevent internal instability from reaching the level of civil war.  
At the lowest level of instability, police can prevent a slide to civil war by arresting lawbreakers.  
The level of organizational development necessary for dissidents to conduct a civil war occurs 
most effectively in a lawless, permissive environment (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  Moreover, the 
police can also prevent simple lower levels of instability from escalating by containing events 
such as strikes and riots and preventing them from contributing to a general level of disorder 
(Bayley and Perito 2010). 
At the higher level of the spectrum of instability, police can contribute to maintaining 
order by defeating rebel attacks.  While police are not appropriately equipped to fight larger 
organized challenges to the state such as those that constitute an insurgency, police often do–
whether by their choice or by virtue of being prominent targets for the insurgents (Bayley and 
Perito 2010).  In such environments police capacity to maintain order refers to their ability to 
effectively contain an insurgency to prevent the rebel groups from reaching a level of 
organization capable of engaging in a civil war.   
 An example of the role mobilization of sanctions can have on civil war onset concerns 
the absence of a police force in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.  
This absence is one of the primary reasons that insurgents and terrorists have adopted the area as 
a base of operations (GAO 2008; Jones and Fair 2009).  Unlike other provinces in Pakistan, the 
FATA has never enjoyed a civilian police force.   Legislation dating from the British colonial era 
governing the administration of justice in the FATA prevents the imposition of police forces 
typically found in the rest of the country (Jones and Fair 2009).  Also, there is no national police 
force in Pakistan; policing is a provincial/regional function (Das 2006).  Policing functions in the 
FATA have fallen to the tribal police and the Frontier Corps, a government sanctioned tribal 
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paramilitary organization (ICG 2009; Innocent 2008).  These rudimentary police organizations 
have failed to impart any sense of order in the FATA.   
 The absence of any national Pakistani government coercive force in the FATA has 
allowed it to become one of the foremost examples of “un-policed spaces” in the world and a 
sanctuary for terrorists and insurgents who migrated there after being forced to leave their 
previous operating areas in Afghanistan and other parts of Pakistan (Chalk 2007).   The Pakistani 
military has repeatedly attempted to establish state control over the area, but their heavy handed 
efforts have been unsuccessful (ICG 2009).  Similarly, U.S. assisted efforts to improve the 
Frontier Corps have been unsuccessful, leading to recommendations that Pakistan must cede 
policing authority for the FATA to the police of the neighboring North West Frontier Province, 
which maintains a more professional and capable police force (Oxford Analytica 2007; Jones 
and Fair 2009). 
 
In keeping with these arguments, I offer the following hypothesis relating police capacity 
to civil war: 
 
H1a: Increasing police actual capacity reduces the probability of civil war onset 
 
 Threat and Surveillance 
The second means the police employ to maintain order is threat.  In keeping with the 
inherency argument for civil war onset, police forces must possess a sufficient level of coercive 
capacity to create the impression within aspiring rebel groups that violent resistance to the state 
is not cost-effective.  I conceptualize threat capacity as visible capability, which refers to the 
prospective rebels’ perceptions of the capability of the police to maintain order when faced with 
a violent challenge.  Visible capability differs from actual capacity insofar as visible capacity 
refers to the ability of the police to deter, whereas actual capability refers to the ability of the 
police to prevail.  Visible capability consists of the factors that aspiring rebels would take into 
account when determining the utility of violent resistance to the state.  It is difficult to specify 
which attributes that the aspiring rebels regard as important, but scholars tend to measure police 
capacity in part as a function of size (Bayley 1985), so I assume that dissidents would apply 
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similar criteria.  Dissidents should be able to measure the size of the police force rather easily, if 
not overall, then at least in terms of police presence observable in their local areas.   
It is difficult to include a case study on the deterrent quality of visible capacity since it 
occurs in the minds of the aspiring rebels, however, research on the effectiveness of police 
efforts to deter crime offers a plausible substitute.  While crime is clearly not directly analogous 
to civil war, both phenomena represent steps on the spectrum on internal instability, and involve 
a decision to challenge the authority of the state to some degree.  Using crime and police data 
from the state of Florida, Benson, Rasmussen, and Kim (1998) find strong evidence of a 
deterrent effect by testing the relationship between police resources (especially increases in the 
number of police patrols) and crime.  Those criminal activities receiving the most resources 
decreased, while those type of crimes that lost attention and resources tended to rise, suggesting 
that the criminal recognized that the risk of getting arrested had lowered.  
While I contend that police visible capacity affects the probability of civil war onsets 
cross-nationally, its effects are not uniform.   Visible capabilities should be conditional on 
regime type.  Hendrix’s other two conceptualizations of state capacity offer useful ways 
understand this conditional relationship.   Drawing on the institutional concept, the effect of 
government capacity on civil war is bound up both empirically and theoretically with regime 
type.  Empirically, civil wars are not as common in either strong autocracies or strong 
democracies, with democracies experiencing fewer civil wars than autocracies (Hegre et al 
2001).  Collective violence occurs most often in low democracy/low capacity states.  Regimes in 
these states lack the ability to regulate abuses by both their own agents and non-state actors.  
Additionally, due to a lack of democratic institutions, groups have limited non-violent venues for 
presenting claims.  In contrast, high capacity/low democracy regimes (such as autocracies) 
experience only moderate levels of violence because these states have the capacity to effectively 
suppress dissent and control coercive agents.  High capacity/ high democracy regimes experience 
the lowest levels of violence because these states can both effectively manage violence, and they 
have institutions to which dissenters can present their claims in a non-violent way (Tilly 2003).  
Similarly, states that exhibit higher government spending and trustworthy economic institutions 
are strongly associated with civil peace (Fjelde and DeSoysa 2009). 
Autocracies may need a less obtrusive police force because the aspiring rebels know that 
the state will observe no boundaries in responding to the violent threat.  On the other hand, a less 
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obtrusive police force may also be sufficient to maintain order in democracies for the converse 
reason that democracies tend to rule more based on consent than coercion, and therefore require 
fewer coercive forces to maintain order.  Anocracies enjoy neither advantage.18  Consequently, 
anocracies should need to maintain a police force with a relatively higher level of coercive 
capacity since anocratic states often can neither sufficiently dissuade nor peacefully co-opt the 
opposition (Tilly 2003). 
Regime effects may also manifest themselves through Hendrix’s concept of 
bureaucratic/administrative capacity to monitor society.  Anocracies may face the greatest 
challenges in indentifying threats to the state, a responsibility which typically falls to the police.  
The police’s ability to perform surveillance is one of the most significant distinctions between a 
state’s military and police force.  The requirement for the police to perform their task of 
maintaining order by constantly interacting among the state’s population in a dispersed manner 
gives them a unique opportunity to gather intelligence.  In contrast, the military tends to operate 
in large groups in a more heavy-handed manner (Bayley and Perito 2012).   
Surveillance alone will not prevent civil war; rather, it enables other state functions.  The 
police cannot effectively exercise their coercive functions, either through deterrence or actual 
coercion, without at least knowing who the perpetrators are.  A failure of the police to identify 
the aspiring rebels allows the dissident organization to develop unimpeded (Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Bayley and Perito 2012).  The converse can also be deleterious.  Overzealous arrests and 
persecution resulting from poor intelligence can aggravate grievances and reduce the legitimacy 
of the government– a topic I explore more fully in the next chapter. 
Inherent in effective police surveillance is a requirement that the police possess some 
monitoring capacity, whether it is physical presence or some more technical means.  For 
instance, common “beat-cops” may be able to detect obvious rebel activities.   Effective 
surveillance of this type requires that the police employ a sufficient density of coverage to detect 
such signs of incipient violent resistance.   
 Simple coverage may not be enough, however.  One has to assume that all but the most 
incompetent rebels would avoid such obvious activities, thereby requiring police to employ more 
elaborate and invasive surveillance methods such as penetration of the rebel organizations and 
                                                 
18 See Chapter 3 - Repression in Theory for a discussion of the role of regime type on repression. 
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cooption of members.  Studies of counterterrorism offer some insight on the efficacy of these 
more sophisticated methods of surveillance.  Lacquer (1987) concludes that co-option of terrorist 
members through clandestine penetration is the most effective means to destroy a terrorist 
organization, but cautions that this method may not be suitable for all regime types.  
Democracies face a particular problem with such methods due to the tendency of democratic 
governments to possess laws that restrict them from employing them.   
 Lacquer’s findings suggest that we should expect democracies to experience more civil 
wars due to the decreased ability of their police forces to monitor incipient rebel movements.  
Paradoxically, this does not seem to be the case.  Democracies almost never experience civil 
wars, so some other factors must be at play.19  Strategies of control may be one such factor.  
Police in democracies tend to maintain order more by consent than coercion (Bittner 1972).  The 
reliance on consent can increase the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of society, which in turn 
may increase the probability that inhabitants will report rebel activities.  For instance, Kalyvas 
(2006) finds that intelligence from locals inhabitants is critical to successful government 
termination of civil wars.  Kalyvas’s conclusions are similar to the premises underlying the push 
for “community oriented policing” in the United States.  This style of policing is intended to 
remedy the divide that emerged between police and society in the mid 20th century as police 
forces became more professionalized and centralized in an effort to root out corruption and 
politicization (Kelling and Moore 1988).  An unintended consequence of that effort was that the 
police lost members of society as sources of intelligence.  Police had come to respond only to 
emergency calls from a centralized dispatcher rather than to direct demands from society.   
Another reason inhabitants of democracies may be more forthcoming in reporting 
incipient rebel activities is that the average inhabitant faces a greater economic cost if the 
rebellion succeeds.  In democracies, the government distributes resources more in the form of 
public rather than private goods.  Should a rebellion succeed, the average citizen of a democracy 
stands a high chance that the new government (which presumably represents the disenfranchised) 
will reward its supporters with private goods at the exclusion of the average citizen (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al 2005).   In sum, the loss of surveillance capacity that democracies suffer due to 
their laws that restrict intrusive police surveillance may be more than offset by the willingness of 
                                                 
19 See the discussion earlier in this section for a description of the effect of regime type on civil war onset. 
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the average citizen to provide intelligence on incipient rebel activities.  Thus, highly autocratic 
regimes should have a greater surveillance capacity due to an absence of restrictions on police 
stridency in penetrating potential rebel groups.  On the other hand, democracies should enjoy an 
advantage in access to intelligence from their citizens due to the high costs that society would 
suffer if the civil wars succeeded.  Thus we should expect that surveillance capacity is weakest in 
the middle range of regimes.  Anocracies are restricted in their ability to penetrate society, but do 
not enjoy enough legitimacy in the eyes of their inhabitants to impel the inhabitants to fear the 
effects of a successful civil war.   
Bearing in mind the greater challenges anocracies face in monitoring and controlling their 
populace, I offer the following hypothesis depicting the conditional effect of regime type on the 
relationship between police threat capacity and civil war. 
 
 
H1b. Increasing police threat capacity reduces the probability of civil war onset, but is 
conditional on regime type.  Increases in police threat capacity in anocracies should 
exhibit a smaller effect. 
 
 
We should also expect that aspiring rebels would prefer to not limit their calculations of 
police capacity to solely considerations of measures of police coverage.  Determination of the 
police force’s competency in executing its police tasks would be even more beneficial.20  Ceteris 
Paribas, less competent police should have a lesser deterrent effect.   For example, Toft (2010) 
finds that the experience of undergoing security sector reform is a significant factor in reducing 
civil war reoccurrence because reform increases the perceived costs of violent resistance in the 
minds of would-be rebels.  A turn to bargaining models of interstate war can also shed light on 
how rebels may consider police competency.21  A general line of reasoning suggested by this 
field is that aspiring rebels are never sure of the states’ true coercive potential until they actually 
engage in violent resistance to the state.  Until that time, the would-be rebels are relegated to 
discerning the coercive potential from other activities.  One way may be to observe government 
                                                 
20 Competency could include factor beyond simple personnel strength such as training, equipment, etc. 
21 For instance, Fearon (1995) attributes the outbreak of war in large part to the existence of private information.  
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick (1997) explain how crises leading to war can serve as means for potential 
adversaries to ascertain their opponent’s true capabilities. 
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responses to other forms of violent resistance of lower magnitude than civil war.  Would-be 
rebels who observe police forces unable to deter or overcome instances of violent resistance by 
other groups should be more likely to view police forces as incapable, and therefore more likely 
to violently challenge the state.  Thus, I expect that increasing levels of political violence in a 
state reduce the threat capacity of that state’s police force.   
 
 
H1c: Increasing visible capability reduces the probability of civil war onset, but is 
conditional on previous levels of internal violence.  The effects of increasing visible 
capacity should diminish as levels of internal political violence increase. 
 
 
 Research Design 
 Having discussed the ways in which state and police repression should increase the 
probability of civil war, the next step is to test those relationships.  To do so, I employ a series of 
cross-national time series quantitative models.22  In the following paragraphs I describe my 
choices for my dependent and independent variables and conclude with a presentation of the 
models capturing the relationships among the various variables. 
   
 Dependent Variables   
 The dependent variable for this chapter is civil war onset.  Because multiple definitions 
for civil war exist within the quantitative literature, I test my hypotheses by drawing from five 
extant and commonly used databases for observations of civil war onset.  They are the Correlates 
of War Intra-State War Dataset (v4.0) (Sarkees, Reid and Wayman 2010), abbreviated as COW; 
the Sambanis (2004) dataset; the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset; the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP)/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2010 
                                                 
22 See Chapter 1 - The Approach for discussion of why I choose to use a quantitative methodology. 
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(Harbom, Lotta, and Wallensteen 2010; Gleditsch et al 2002), abbreviated as PRIO23, and the 
“Civil War Dataset”(Toft 2010), abbreviated as Toft.  A fuller description of these databases and 
how they compare is available in Appendix A.   
 
 Independent Variables   
 Operationalization of police capacity involves creation of indicators of threat and actual 
capability.  In the following sections, I consider each element separately, beginning with actual 
capability.  
  Actual Capacity   
 The two most generally used comparative measures of police capacity are number of 
police and government expenditures on police (Bayley 1985: 75).   Based on my own research, 
data on government expenditures specifically pertaining to police forces is not available in a 
sufficient quantity to support cross-national research.24 That leaves number of police as the only 
viable candidate, though it is not without its own challenges related to establishing equivalence 
on the meaning of police cross-nationally, a point to which I will return later. 25   Sizes of police 
forces exhibit some consistent trends worth noting.  Absolute size of police is highly correlated 
with states’ populations (Harrendorf and Smit 2010: 114).  On the other hand, the sizes of police 
forces have been increasing at a greater rate than their respective states’ populations − a 
phenomenon for which there has been no suitable explanation (Maguire and Shulte-Murray 
2001). 
 Consistent with past practice, I measure police strength by both police per capita and 
police density per geographic area (Hibbs 1973, Bayley 1985).  Data on individual states’ 
                                                 
23 The PRIO dataset includes “Minor Armed Conflicts” entailing 25 or more battle deaths and “War” entailing 
greater than 1000 battle deaths.  I employ conflicts according to the lower threshold in an effort to impart greater 
variety into the observations of onsets. 
24 Farrell et al (2001) offer a method for how to do so for a single year, but it is too ponderous to employ over many 
years. 
25 Hibbs (1973); Bayley (1985); McGuire and Schulte-Murray (2001); and Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby 
(2010) all discuss the utility of police strength as an indicator of police capacity.   
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population is readily available from the Correlates of War (COW) National Military Capabilities 
(NMC) (v4.0) dataset (Singer 1987).  I derive area data from two sources.  I rely upon the World 
Bank World Development Indicators for data for 1961-2010.  I rely upon the World Handbook of 
Political Science Indicators (Taylor and Hudson 1973) for area data for 1950-1960.   The 
optimal measure of police capacity would capture variation within states, but such data on the 
distribution of police capacity within states is not available to an extent to support large N, cross-
national analysis.  
  There is no comparable, comprehensive source of data like the World Bank publications 
or the COW NMC that provides data on police strength, which leads me to compile a composite 
dataset.  The largest source of data on police strength currently available is the United Nations 
Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS).   Conducted by 
the UN Office of Drug Control, these surveys collect self-reported data from UN member states 
on police strength and a number of other criminal justice related topics.  The UN has 
administered ten waves of surveys, beginning in 1970, and has just issued the questionnaire for 
the eleventh and most recent survey.26  Meaningful data on police strength is available for the 
years 1970, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1990,1994,1995,1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
and 2002.  The number of states responding to the surveys varies from 30 to 50.  Early surveys 
simply measured total number of police personnel, defined as personnel in:  
“public agencies whose principal  functions are the prevention, detection and 
investigation of  crime  and  the  apprehension  of  alleged offenders.   Police may or may 
not form part of the national security force of the particular country.”27 
 
Later surveys revised the definition of police and provided the following guidance to 
respondents: 
 
 “Police are personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, 
detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. If the 
police are part of the national security force in your country, please try to focus your 
replies as much as possible on the civil police rather than on the national guard or local 
militia. If there are many local forces, please provide data on those forces if possible. If 
police or law enforcement personnel fulfill prosecutorial functions, that fact should be 
                                                 
26 All of this data is available at the UNODC website at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-
Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html 
27 The variable description of “police” comes from the Codebook for the Dataset of the 1st and 2nd United Nations 
World Crime Surveys. 
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noted…. Data concerning support staff (secretaries, clerks etc.) should be excluded from 
your replies.”  
 
Surveys conducted after 1990 separate police into “sworn officers” and total police, but I 
continued to employ total police as the indicator of police capacity since it is the only measure 
that is consistent across all surveys (Harrendorf and Smit 2010).  Merging the responses from all 
of the surveys results in 1022 country-years of data on police strength on 137 different countries.  
The number of responses per country ranges from one to 16. 
 While the CTS does offer the largest source of police strength data, it is not without 
problems.  The data is uneven, and many states responded only sporadically, thereby making 
meaningful longitudinal analysis difficult.  For example, the United States’ series of submissions 
contained values for police strength that oscillated as much as 50% between subsequent surveys - 
leading McGuire and Schulte-Murray (2001) to recommend dropping observations of the United 
States when using the CTS data.   
 Prior to the publication of the CTS, the most prominent dataset on police strength came 
from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd ed. (Taylor and Hudson 
1973).28  Taylor and Hudson define internal security forces as encompassing “police forces at all 
levels of government and such paramilitary internal security forces as gendarmeries, active 
militias and active national guards.”  This work provides data on the strength of internal security 
forces for 121 states for the years 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965, though not all states provided 
data for all four years, resulting in 268 country-years of internal security forces strength.    
 Creating a composite datasets derived from the CTS and the World Handbook greatly 
benefits my study.  It allows me to increase the sample size beyond the CTS by more than 25%, 
as well as increase the time domain from 32 years to 52 years.  My ability to consider such a 
combination theoretically and empirically valid rests on the degree of equivalence between the 
definition of “internal security forces” from the World Handbook and “police” from the CTS.29  
The major difference hinges on the inclusion or exclusion of militias and national guards.  
 Despite the imperfect fit between the two datasets’ definitions for police, I consider it 
                                                 
28 Both Bayley (1985) and Hibbs (1973) specifically mention this handbook as the most suitable source for data on 
police strength available at the time. 
29 The fact that the World Handbook includes gendarme forces should not be a problem since gendarmes are police 
forces and should have been included in the CTS survey responses. 
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acceptable and treat them as equivalent.  The drawback, of course, is that the World Handbook’s 
inclusion of militias and national guards runs the risk of biasing the size of the police forces 
upward.  The optimal solution to the problem would be to subtract the size of the militias and 
national guards from the total internal security force, but accurately replicating the work of 
Taylor and Hudson would be difficult.  As a mitigating step, I drop the United States from my 
sample because the United States is unique in the size of its national guard (Bayley 1985: 44).30   
 While the CTS and World Handbook provide the majority of the data on the sizes of 
police forces, two other sources can fill in remaining gaps in data.  The World Police 
Encyclopedia (Das 2006) provides a description of the police forces for 193 states.  Common to 
many of these descriptions is an enumeration of the total size of the states’ police forces.  Das 
does not provide an explicit definition for police.  Instead, the authors of each individual state’s 
entry provide their own meaning for police.  This work also does not provide time series data.  
Rather, the police force size descriptions depict a point in time, typically in the late 1990s. 
 The second supplemental source is the World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems 
(Newman, Bouloukos, and Cohen 1993).  This work contains descriptions of the criminal justice 
systems of 45 different states, including descriptions of the sizes of police forces.  The work 
follows the UN definition of police as "public agencies whose principal functions are the 
prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders." 
Similar to the World Police Encyclopedia, this work only provides point data on police strength, 
typically for the early 1990s.  I add police strength data from these sources when either makes 
specific reference to the size of a police force at a specific time.   
 
 Having discussed the attributes of police strength as an independent variable, the next 
step is to marry this variable with my dependent variables – civil war onset.  I prefer to employ 
country-year data, but many of the country-years with a civil war onset simply have no 
corresponding police data.   Missing police capacity data causes all of the five datasets to 
experience greater than a 90% reduction in the sample size of civil war onset-years.  See Table 
B-12 for a depiction of the reduction in sample sizes.  Additionally, many states that do have 
                                                 
30 McGuire and Schulte-Murray (2001) recommend dropping the United States anyway due to the erratic nature of 
its police strength data in the CTS. 
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police strength data have only one data point of police strength in the time period proximate to 
the onset.  The result is that there not enough data to capture variation in police capacity in the 
years leading up to war.   
 As a mitigating step, I employ five year intervals (quinquennials) instead of one year 
(annual) intervals.  I compute a quinquennial value of police strength as the average of the 
available yearly values of police strength.  Using quinquennial time periods reduces my overall 
sample size by 80%, but the gain in the number of onsets with corresponding police strength data 
greatly offsets the loss in aggregate sample size.  See Appendix B - Effect on Sample of 
Including Police Capacity for the updated sample sizes.   
 This coding choice leaves the issue of how to best code ongoing wars unresolved.  
Scholars who employ CNTS models have split on the most effective way to code ongoing civil 
war years (Sambanis 2004).  One school of thought treats ongoing war years as “0.”31  The risk 
of this modeling choice is that years of war are coded the same as years of peace, which can have 
the effect of diminishing the impact of the causal factors.  For instance, if some phenomenon 
leads to civil war onset, one would expect the phenomenon to still be in effect during the 
duration of the civil war.  By coding these ongoing years as zero, the effect of the phenomenon 
becomes statistically associated with a peace year.  The other school of thought instead codes 
ongoing civil war years missing data.32  Country years only receive a score of “0” after the war 
terminates.  Any new civil war onset that occurs before the previous war concludes receives a 
score of “1,” and subsequent years are treated as missing until the final civil war concludes.  The 
advantage of this method is that it does not diminish the effect of the causal phenomenon like the 
first method does.  The drawback of the method is that it reduces the sample size, though any 
reduction appears to be negligible since civil wars are rare events and do not generally last long. 
 The only clear instance wherein a quinquennial should be coded as missing data is when 
the war spans all five years that constitute the quinquennial, which is very rare.  More frequent is 
the case wherein some years of the quinquennials are ongoing and some years as peace-years.  
Whether to code such quinquennials as “ongoing” or “peaceful” is so arbitrary that any derived 
benefits from treating ongoing years as missing become dubious.  Consequently, I code a 
                                                 
31 Examples of this school include Fearon and Laitin (2003), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), and Fjelde and DeSoysa 
(2009). 
32 Examples of this competing method are Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Hegre et al (2001). 
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quinquennial as a “1” if a civil war onset occurred during the time period and as a “0” if no civil 
war occurred during the quinquennial.  My coding choice does not allow for additional onsets 
during the time period, but any bias effects from this choice are minimal since quinquennials that 
experience additional onsets are relatively uncommon for most datasets.33     
  
   Bias Effects   
  Since my choices for indicators of police capacity substantially reduce my sample, it is 
necessary to determine if any bias resulted, and no substantive systemic bias appears to be 
present.  To make this determination, I rely upon two phenomena that are strongly related to civil 
war onset: democracy and development.34  I analyze how the values of means and standard 
deviations of these variables change from those derived from the original dataset compared to the 
values of the means and standard deviations derived from the restricted dataset.  I limit analysis 
to data from the years 1945-1999 since this interval is present in all onset databases.  See 
Appendix B - Bias Effects of Including Police Capacity Data for statistical results. 
 In comparison with the original sample, the restricted sample is slightly biased toward 
countries with higher Polity scores (-0.6 to 2.2), but still within the range considered to represent 
an anocratic regime type.  Additionally, both samples exhibit nearly identical variance for Polity 
scores.  The means of the development scores of both samples are virtually the same.  The only 
substantial difference with regard to development is that the constrained sample has slightly 
higher within country variation (5 versus 4), indicating a bias toward developing countries – a 
phenomena empirically associated with a lower risk of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2004; Hegre 
and Sambanis 2006).   
  
                                                 
33 If I do not allow for additional onsets within a quinquennial, the COW reduces from 105-98, Doyle and Sambanis 
from 135-125, Fearon and Laitin from 100-97, and Toft from 108-93.  The greatest decrease occurs in the PRIO 
dataset, which reduces from 314 to 249 onsets. 
34 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the effect of democracy on civil war onsets.  Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find 
that one common measure of development (the log of energy consumption per capita) has a significant negative 
effect on the risk of civil war onset. 
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  Threat Capacity   
 Threat capacity refers to the ability of the police to cause aspiring rebels to view the 
threat of police coercion as credible.  This perception results from a combination of visible 
capabilities and the record of success of previous government efforts in prevailing over violent 
dissidence.  Potential rebels should view previous government failures to curtail internal violence 
as an indicator of weak government coercive capacity.   
 I operationalize visible capabilities as police presence, which is a function of police per 
area and per population (Bayley 1985).  The problem with this choice is that it makes the 
indicators of visible capacity identical to the indicators of actual capacity, meaning that one set 
of indicators reflects two different concepts.  I mitigate this problem by qualifying the impact of 
visible capacity.  Visible capacity should be conditional on regime type.   Both autocracies and 
democracies should require police forces with less visible capacity to prevent the onset of civil 
war.35  I model the conditional effect of regime type as a dummy variable indicating a state has 
an anocracratic regime type, interacted with the police capacity score.   I consider a state to be an 
anocracy when it has a Polity IV score (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010) between -5 and 5.  The 
Polity scores are available for nearly all country-years in my sample, so its inclusion induces no 
bias.  I create a quinquennial score by coding the dummy as the modal score for the 
quinquennial.  I also include the dummy variable as a constituent term.36    
 I also consider threat capacity to be a function of the level of success the state has 
attained in prevailing over violent dissidence in the past.  Aspiring rebels should learn from 
previous groups’ efforts how effectively the state might respond to future acts.  I operationalize 
previous government efforts by the level protest from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project 
(2009) “Anti-Regime Rebellion” scores.   This variable is an ordinal measure of violent anti-
regime behavior by minority groups ranging from 1 for “low level political banditry” to 5 for 
“protracted civil war.”  A limiting factor of this measure is that it only represents activity by 
minority ethnic groups.  As a result, states without significant minority groups are excluded.  
Nevertheless, this exclusivity is also an advantage in that it reduces the risk of endogeneity with 
                                                 
35 See the Threat and Surveillance section of this chapter for a description of the role of regime type on civil war 
onset. 
36 I include constituent terms based on the recommendations of Kronmal (1993), Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005), 
and Clark, Gilligan, and Golder (2006). 
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civil war onsets.37  The MAR already depicts quinquennial scores, so there is no need to convert 
it. The temporal domain is 1940 to 2000, so it encompasses the other variables.  The number of 
countries that have MAR data per quinquennial varies from 43 to 120, with a mean of 88.  I 
employ the lagged value of the rebellion score to minimize issue of endogeneity and to allow for 
a period of time for learning to occur (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
  Bias Effects 
 A drawback of the inclusion of the MAR variable is that it reduces the sample even more 
substantially because not all states in the onset samples have corresponding MAR data.  I test for 
the effect of sampling bias that may result from including the MAR variables using the same 
methodology I employed for police capacity, and no meaningful bias appears to be present.  
Including MAR scores increases the mean Polity score from -0.5 to 1.5, which indicates a slight 
but most likely insubstantial bias towards democratized countries.  There is no bias effect in the 
variance of Polity scores, nor is there systemic bias on development scores.  See Appendix B - 
Supporting Information for Chapter 2-Bias effects of including the MAR variable for statistical 
results.   
 Controls 
  
Candidates for control variables for this chapter must be theoretically and empirically 
related to police capacity to deter rebellion as well as civil war onset.38  I consider the following 
                                                 
37 There is a risk that instances of increasing political violence tends to lead to civil war, and that civil war leads to 
increased political violence.  I tested the correlation the MAR rebellion score and the incidences of civil war onset in 
the five databases and found only low levels of correlation (less than 0.5). 
38 Selection of control variables involves two steps: selecting control variables to ensure the independent variable of 
interest is not spurious and inclusion of control variables to improve the fitness of my models (Aneshensel 2002).  
With respect to the first consideration, control variables to identity spuriousness must be correlated with both the 
independent variable of interest and the dependent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Aneshensel 2002; Ray 
2003).  Moreover, there should be a theoretical basis for this relationship, rather than just an empirical regularity 
(Ray 2003).  The second step in determining controls is to select those that improve the fit of the overall model.  
Appropriate types of these variables must add to the explanatory power of the model while not substantially 
reducing the explanatory power of the key independent variable.  Typically, these variables depict an alternative 
explanation for the dependent variable, not related to the hypothesis under scrutiny. 
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variables candidates for controls to identify a spurious relationship between police capacity and 
civil war onset.  In keeping with my choice to employ quinquennial data, I compute 
quinquenanial values for the control variables using techniques I explain individually for each 
control variable.    
 
 Extractive Capacity.  Though I propose that police capacity has an independent effect on 
civil war onset by deterring rebels, it may also serve as an indicator of a state’s extractive 
capacity, which studies have concluded is of the most significant aspects of state capacity for 
preventing the outbreak of civil war (Fjelde and De Soysa 2009; Hendrix 2010) as well as 
producing an effective police force (DeRoun and Sobek 2004).   States must compel their 
citizens to contribute tax revenue, and police forces are typically an important element in 
enforcing compliance (Tilly 1985; Levi 2001).  Additionally, police cannot operate without 
adequate levels of government resourcing (Bayley 1985).  I operationalize extractive capacity 
with the Relative Political Capacity (RPC) measure.39  I compute the quinquennial value as the 
average RPC values per quinquennial. 
 Bureaucratic quality.  Police capacity may also be in some part a function of a state’s 
bureaucratic quality and organization.  Police forces that do not receive regular pay or other state 
resources are less effective (Englehart 2009).  Bureaucratic quality also affects a range of other 
goods the state provides its inhabitants that can forestall challenges to the state (Fjelde and De 
Soysa 2009).  I employ a measure of regime instability as an indicator of bureaucratic quality 
under the premise that political change can cause instability.  The instability reduces the 
coherence of a state’s institutions, which can lead to a loss of legitimacy by the regime and 
induce dissatisfied groups to struggle against it (Hegre et al 2001).     
Drawing on Hegre and Sambanis (2006), I model the effect of regime change as 2(durable/0.5) , 
where durable is a variable from the Polity IV dataset that measures the number of years that 
have transpired since an institutional change that leads to a minimum of three points change on 
the Polity score.40  I employ the minimum yearly value of the quinquennial for my measures of 
                                                 
39 Hendrix determines that the ratio of taxes to GDP (tax ratio) is a better measure, but the data on RPC is more 
readily available. 
40  Hegre and Sambanis draw on the work of Hegre et al (2001), who model the effects of regime change as a decay 
function of time, measured by e (-year since regime change/0.5).  Their source of data is Polity IIId.  Their findings are 
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durable, rather than the mean.   The reason is that in some cases wherein a regime change 
occurs, preceding values were as high as 100, which would mask the effect of the regime change 
or peace onset if I computed the mean score.   
Military capacity.  If, as I propose, police capacity enters into aspiring rebels’ strategic 
calculus of the utility of challenging the state, then a state’s military capacity should also be a 
major determinant as well.  In fact, rebels may give more consideration to the capacity of the 
military because of the greater lethality militaries typically possess in comparison with police 
forces.  Military capacity could also act indirectly through police capacity by enhancing the 
ability of the police to deter challenges.  Rebels may be aware that the military would reinforce 
the police in responding to challenges to the state if necessary.  To model the effect of military 
capacity, I include measures of military capacity in the form of the number of military personnel 
per capita and per area.41 I compute the quinquennial values for military capacity as the mean 
value for the quinquennial. 
   Omitted Candidates.  Two other possible candidates for control variables are measures 
of development and regime type, which other studies indicate are powerful explanations for civil 
war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).  Nevertheless, I exclude measures of development as a control 
variable because the theoretical relationships between them and civil war onset are unclear.  
GDP can encompass many theoretical casual relationships, thereby introducing the risk of 
conceptual over-determination (Hendrix 2010).  I do not employ measures of regime type as 
control variables because I include a regime variable as an interaction term in the model of 
Hypothesis 3b.  Additionally, many of the causal mechanism that link democracy to more 
effective police are captured by the bureaucratic quality measures (Hendrix 2010). 
 Because valid control measures should be correlated to some degree with key explanatory 
variables, I conduct tests of correlation among them all (Aneshensel 2002).  Military per area and 
police per area are highly correlated (.8), but their per capita counterparts are not.  To validate 
                                                                                                                                                             
supported by Fearon and Laitin (2003).  Hegre and Sambanis (2006) determine a similarly negative effect on onset 
using their model.  Since all authors utilized essentially the same model on the same data, I employ the function 
developed by Hegre and Sambanis because they use the most recent data.   
 
41 I include military per capita measures in models that include police per capita measures, and military per area 
measures in models that include police per area measures. 
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my decision to exclude measures of development, I also included them in the correlation test as a 
rudimentary means to identify spuriousness in my key independent variables (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994; Aneshensel 2002), and no meaningful correlation is present.  See Appendix B - 
Supporting Information for Chapter 2-Correlation matrices for full results. 
  
 
 Models42  
 Since I treat the dependent variable of civil war onset as a binary outcome, I run a cross-
national time series (CNTS) style binary dependent variable regression (Sambanis 2004; 
Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).  I vary from common practice in the literature in that I 
employ a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) using a probit link with a decaying time 
function and robust standard errors rather than a more typical CNTS logit/probit.  I do so for two 
reasons.   First, the GEE better incorporates unit effects than simple logit/probit.43  Second, the 
GEE is superior at accounting for time and spatial correlation (Zorn 2001).44  I choose probit 
over logit solely for simplicity of computation of predicted probabilities. 
 
 The models below depict hypothesis 1a.  All variables are measured in quinquennials 
(t=5).   
                                                 
42 See Appendix B - Description of Variables Contained in the Capacity Models for a description of the variables 
contained in the models. 
43 Civil war is a complicated phenomenon, and the risk that I have omitted some variable that captures unit effects is 
high.  I could also employ a probit with unit effects, but since I am more concerned with the overall effect of my 
explanatory variables rather than the effect of a single unit, GEE is more appropriate than random effects (Zorn 
2001: 475). 
44 I expect time dependence since others (Hegre et al 2001; Fearson and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) 
have demonstrated that temporal proximity to a previous civil war is an indicator of a subsequent civil war.  My use 
of a decaying time function as a statistical control has the added benefit of controlling for the effects of temporal 
autocorrelation.   That the risk of a civil war onset is higher in the years following a previous civil war is a fairly 
well accepted phenomena (Hegre et al 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).  Nevertheless, 
this time effect violates the assumption of independence of observations (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) that is 
integral to the probit technique I employ.44   The findings on special correlation are less conclusive (Hegre et al 
2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006), but the use of the GEE accounts for it regardless. 
  
36 
 
 
 Model 1.a.1:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per capita)it + β2 (extractive capacity)it   
   +  β3 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β4 (military per capita)it 
 
 Model 1a.2:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per area)it + β2 (extractive capacity)it   
   +  β3 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β4 (military per area)it 
 
These models depict hypothesis 1b. 
 
 Model 1.b.1:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per capita)it + β2(anocracy)it  
   + β3(anocracy * police per capita)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   +  β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per capita)it 
 
 
 Model 1.b.2:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per area)it + β2(anocracy)it  
   + β3(anocracy * police per area)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   +  β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per area)it 
 
 
The models below depict hypothesis 1c: 
 
 
 Model 1.c.1:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per capita)it + β2(past civil strife)it  
   + β3(police per capita * past civil stife)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   +  β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per capita)it 
 
 
 Model 1.c.2:  onsetit = onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per area)it + β2(past civil strife)it  
   + β3(police per area * past civil stife)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   +  β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per area)it 
  
 
 Results 
The following sections contain the results of tests of the hypotheses relating police 
capacity and civil war onset in the form of both predicted probabilities and marginal effects.  The 
choice of which form to present stems from which best depicts the hypothesis under analysis 
(Green 2010).   I determine predicted probabilities by varying the key independent variables 
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while holding all other independent variables at their means.45  Because the models employ 
quinquennial data, the outcomes actually reflect the probability that a civil war onset will occur 
during a five year period.  Since the derived standard errors of the coefficients in the probit 
models do not directly correspond to probabilities of prediction, I generate 95% confidence 
intervals for my computed probabilities (Gujarati 2009 and Porter).  I consider the results to be 
statistically significant when the lower confidence interval is not close to zero.  The exact 
threshold varies with the model, as I explain in the subsequent paragraphs.  The marginal effects 
graphs employ 95% confidence intervals as indicators of statistical significance (Brambor, Clark, 
and Golder 2006).  I consider the results of the marginal effects tests to be statistically significant 
when the confidence intervals do not include zero.  As a result of the high number of indicators I 
employ for repression and civil war onset, I cannot include all the graphs of outcomes in the 
body of this chapter.  Instead, I only include a small number of graphs that are illustrative of 
trends.  I offer the remainder in Appendix B - Outcome Graphs for Police Capacity Models.   
 
 Results for H1a: Increasing police actual capacity reduces the probability of civil war 
onset 
 The table below depicts the outcomes from testing this hypothesis with the two indicators 
of police capacity.  The columns contain the two indicators of police capacity, and the first row 
depicts their hypothesized effect on the probability of civil war onset.  As the second row shows, 
the outcomes of tests of the effects of simple measures of police capacity on the probability of 
civil war onset exhibit consistent and statistically significant negative effects on the probability 
of civil war onset.  The third row indicates which portion of the range of the independent 
variable exhibits the most statistically significant results, as indicated by the lower confidence 
bound of the interval not being close to zero and relative narrowness of the confidence interval.  
The following sections provide more detail on the information depicted in the table. 
 
                                                 
45 Though common in the past, this technique of employing the means of non-focus independent variables, “the 
average case” been criticized by Hamner and Kalkan, who advocate for the use of an “observed value” approach.  
The crux of their criticism is that the average case is not necessarily representative of any actual observations in the 
sample, an occurrence that can lead to overstated outcomes. .   
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Table 2-1 Outcomes of Testing Hypothesis 1a 
 Indicators of police capacity 
Police per capita Police per area 
Predicted effect on probability of 
civil war onset 
Decrease Decrease 
CW datasets with concurring results All All but Toft 
Range of values of independent 
variables with highest statistical 
significance 
Lower Lower 
 
 
Using police per capita as the indicator, all databases exhibit the decreasing effect that I 
predicted.  Using the police per area measure, all databases except for Toft exhibit a decreasing 
effect on the probability of civil war onset.  Use of the Toft database yields predicted 
probabilities uniformly close to zero, with no region exhibiting statistical significance.  Low 
values of both police per capita and police per area exhibit the most statistical significance.  The 
graphs below depict outcomes for both indicators using Sambanis onset data and are indicative 
of the general trends.46   
 
Figure 2-1 Effects of Measures on Police Capacity on the Probability of Civil War Onset 
 
 
                                                 
46 In an effort to more effectively depict the region with significant outcomes, the graphs only reflect the range of the 
respective indicators from their lowest to their 99th percentile value.  Both indicators contain outliers in the highest 
percentile, the inclusion of which would greatly compress the scale of x axis. 
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In light of these generally statistically significant findings, I can conclude with confidence that 
increases in police capacity in the form of police per capita and police per area decrease the 
probability of civil war onset, though this finding is only valid for the lower 75th percentile of 
values of each.  High values of police per capita and police per area both result in predicted 
probabilities that are close to zero, but a lack of statistical significance renders this latter finding 
unreliable.   
As a check of my decision to employ quinquennial data, I run the same models using 
annual data for all variables instead.  The figure below depicts a comparison of the differing 
outcomes, using Sambanis onset data.   
 
 
Figure 2-2 Comparisons of predicted probabilities using quinquennial and annual data 
 
 
The left-most graph depicts predicted probabilities using police per capita, and the right most 
graph depicts predicted probabilities using police per area.  For both graphs, solid lines indicate 
quinquennial data and dashed lines annual data.  It is evident that the use of quinquennial data 
(indicated by the curves with solid lines) leads to higher, more statistically significant predicted 
probabilities, though only at low values of each indicator of police capacity.  What is more, the 
use of three of the five databases with police per capita leads to increasing probabilities of civil 
war for annual data, and decreasing probabilities using quinquennial data, though the annual data 
is not statistically significant.  I attribute the differences to missing data problems emanating 
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from the mismatches within the annual data I addressed earlier.  See Appendix B - Comparison 
of annual and quinquennial time domains for a full list of comparison graphs. 
 
 Results for H1b: Increasing police visible capacity reduces the probability of civil war 
onset, but is conditional on regime type.  Increases in police capacity in anocracies 
should exhibit a smaller effect. 
 
 The following table contains my analysis of this hypothesis for both indicators of police 
capacity, interacted with a dummy variable indicating a state maintains an anocratic regime type.  
The columns are the two measures of police capacity.  To summarize the results, the first row 
indicates that I predict increases in police capacity should decrease the probability of civil war 
onset.  The second row shows that tests of my predictions found support with all onset databases 
when states were non-anocratic.    Row three reflects that the use of only two databases support 
my prediction when states are anocracies.  Row four is the prediction of the marginal effect of 
increases in police capacity implied by this hypothesis, conditional on whether a state is an 
anocracy.  Row five indicates the police per capita measures provide some support for this 
prediction, but police per area measures do not.   In the following paragraphs I describe these 
findings at greater length. 
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Table 2-2 Effects of Visible Capacity on the Probability of Civil War Onset 
 Indicators of visible capacity 
Police per capita Police per area 
Predicted effect on probability 
of civil war onset from 
increasing values 
Decrease Decrease 
CW datasets with concurring 
results for non-anocracies 
All all but Toft47 
CW datasets with concurring 
results for anocracies 
Sambanis, PRIO All but Toft48 
Predicted change in marginal 
effect of police capacity when 
states are anocratic   
Reduce  Reduce 
CW datasets with concurring 
results 
All49 None 
 
The following graphs depict these outcomes.  Solid lines indicate anocracies and dashed 
lines all others.  The thin lines represent predicted probabilities, and the heavier colored lines 
represent regions of values of the independent variables yielding relatively high levels of 
statistical significance.  As the graphs portray, increases in police per capita values reduce the 
predicted probability of civil war for non-anocracies, but the effect of increases in police per 
capita in anocracies is not consistent.  With the use of some databases, increasing police per 
capita actually increases the probability of civil war onset.  On the other hand, increases in police 
per area appear to reduce civil war regardless of regime type.  For both indicators the more 
statistically significant results occurred in the lower 75th percentile of observations.  The figure 
below depicts these outcomes.   
 
  
                                                 
47 Predicted probabilities are all close to zero with the use of the Toft database. 
48Use of the Toft database yields an increase in predicted probabilities, but the results demonstrate low statistical 
significance. 
49 The conclusion comes with caveat the results when the anocracy=1 do not yield statistically significant results. 
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Figure 2-3 Predicted probabilities of civil war onset as police capacity measures increase, 
conditional on regime type 
 
 
 
 
 The same hypothesis can also be re-construed in terms of marginal effects.  Written as 
such, I expect that increases in police capacity should lead a more substantial reduction in the 
probability of civil war onsets in non-anocracies.  Thus, H1b implies that: 
 
The marginal effect of police capacity is negative for all values of anocracy, but this 
effect is strongest in non-anocracies (anocracy=0). 
 
 I compute the marginal effect as one unit increases from the mean values of the two 
indicators of police capacity at different values of anocracy, setting all other independent 
variables at their means.  Since anocracy is a dummy variable, its only pertinent values are “0” 
and “1.”  The graphs below employ Sambanis onset data and are illustrative of results from using 
other databases. 
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Figure 2-4 Marginal effect of police capacity as states become anocratic 
 
 
The graphs reveal that the police per capita measure of police capacity yields a substantively and 
statistically significant marginal effect when anocracy=0 (non-anocracies).  Moreover, the 
marginal effect reduces substantively at anocracy=1 as predicted, but is not statistically 
significant.  The use of measures of police per area does not yield statistically significant results 
at any value of anocracy. 
 Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012) suggest that the converse effect of conditional variables 
may also be relevant.   Transposing the interactive variables from the previous test involves 
computation of the discrete change of anocracy as police capacity varies, however, hypothesis 1b 
does not specify how the discrete change of anocracy may vary at different values of police 
capacity.  Consequently, I simply predict that the discrete change of anocracy should always be 
positive for all values of police capacity.   
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Figure 2-5 Discrete change of anocratization as police capacity increases 
 
 
As the graphs above depict the effect varies depending upon the police capacity indicator.  Using 
police per capita, the discrete change of anocratization is positive as predicted, though 
statistically significant results only occur in the lower 75th percentile of police per capita values.  
The discrete effects when using police per area measures are substantively and statistically 
insignificant. 
 On the whole, I find moderate support for hypothesis 1b, though results were strongly 
contingent on the specific indicator of police capacity.  Measures of police per capita yielded 
mixed results for predicted probabilities, but produced some statistically significant outcomes for 
marginal effects and discrete changes.  Measures of police per area yielded more consistently 
statistically and substantively significant predicted probabilities, but did not result in statistically 
significant marginal effects. 
 
 Results for H1c: Increasing police visible capacity reduces the probability of civil war 
onset, but is conditional on previous levels of internal violence.  Police are less effective 
in preventing civil war when past levels of violence are higher. 
 
 The following table reflects the results of my analysis of the effect of increases in visible 
capacity, as captured by both indicators of police capacity, interacted with the MAR score of 
internal violence.  In short, I predict that increases in police capacity should decrease the 
probability of civil war (marginal effects are negative), but the marginal effects should diminish 
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as the levels of internal violence increase.  As rows two and three indicate, increases in police 
capacity according to either measure generally reduce the probability of civil war onset.  
Predictions of the marginal effect of police capacity do not find support.  As row five indicates, 
increases in levels of violence do not appear to affect the marginal effect of police capacity on 
the probability of civil war onset.  On the other hand, there is some support for the conditional 
effect of increases in police capacity on the marginal effect of internal violence when police per 
area serves as the indicator of police capacity.  I describe these findings in greater detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Table 2-3 Effect of Increasing Visible Capacity on the Probability of Civil War Onset, 
conditional on previous internal violence 
 
 Indicators of visible capacity 
Police per capita Police per area 
Predicted effect on probability 
of civil war onset 
Decrease Decrease 
CW datasets with concurring 
results for low levels of violence 
All all but Toft 
CW datasets with concurring 
results for high levels of violence 
COW, Sambanis, 
PRIO 
COW, Sambanis, 
PRIO 
Predicted change in marginal 
effect of police capacity as levels 
of previous violence increase   
Reduce  Reduce 
CW datasets with concurring 
results 
None None 
Predicted change in marginal 
effect of levels of previous 
violence as police capacity 
increases  
Reduce  Reduce 
CW datasets with concurring 
results 
COW, PRIO COW, PRIO 
 
 The graphs below are illustrative of the major finding relating police capacity to civil war 
onset, conditional on levels of internal violence.  The upper graphs indicate two predominant 
trends.  First, increases in police capacity decrease the probability of civil war.  Second, civil war 
is more likely as previous levels of internal violence increase.  This latter finding is not 
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surprising and is consistent with previous studies.  The lower left graph depicts the outliers 
wherein increases in police per capita, in the presence of high levels of internal violence, actually 
increases the probability of civil war onset, in direct contrast to my predictions.  For both 
indicators of police capacity, the predicted probabilities with the highest statistical significance 
occur at the lower end of the independent variables. 
 
Figure 2-6 Predicted Probabilities of police capacity, conditional on regime type 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1c can also be viewed in terms of marginal effects.  Rewritten as such, H1c 
becomes the following two hypotheses: 
 
The marginal effect of police capacity is negative for all values of past violence, but its 
effect is strongest at low values of past violence.  
 
The marginal effect of political violence is positive for all values of police capacity, but 
its effect is strongest when police capacity is low 
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Tests of the first marginal effects hypotheses yield no statistically significant results.  The graphs 
below depict the marginal effect of a one unit increase from the means of the two police capacity 
measures as the lagged MAR score increases, using Sambanis onset data.   
  
Figure 2-7 Marginal effects of police capacity, conditional on previous violence 
 
 
 
 Conversely, transposing the interactive terms does yield statistically significant results for 
some databases for the marginal effect of one unit increases in the values of the police capacity 
indicators as the lagged MAR score increases, as depicted in the following graphs.  Use of the 
police per capita measure with the COW and PRIO onset databases yields positive marginal 
effects that are statistically significant at low values, but the marginal effects do not diminish as 
predicted.  The left-most graph in the figure below depicts this outcome for the PRIO onset data.  
On the other hand, the use of police per area measures with COW and PRIO onset data does 
yield predicted results.  Marginal effects are positive and reduce to zero as police per area 
measures increase for low values of police per area.  
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Figure 2-8 Marginal effect of previous violence, conditional on police capacity 
 
  
 These outcomes lead me to conclude that hypothesis 1c is unsubstantiated, mostly due to 
a lack of statistically significant outcomes.  While the marginal effects of lagged MAR scores 
yielded outcomes with the predicted sign, few of the onset databases generated statistically 
significant results.  The marginal effect of measures of police capacity yielded conflicting 
outcomes dependent upon the specific measure of police capacity, though a few outcomes were 
statistically significant. 
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 Conclusion   
 This chapter addressed the relationship between police capacity and civil war onset.  I 
argued that police can, independently of other government agents, reduce the probability of civil 
war onset through both mobilization of sanctions and threat.  I operationalized mobilization of 
sanctions as actual capacity and threat as visible capacity.  The difference between the two is that 
the latter lies in the minds of the aspiring rebel.  I distinguish visible capacity operationally by 
offering the qualification that the effect of threat should be conditional on regime type and levels 
of previous internal violence.  The marginal effects of increasing police capacity should be 
smaller in both anocracies and in states that experience higher levels of past internal violence. 
 Actual capacity.  I found strong support for my hypothesis that increasing actual police 
capacity reduces the probability of civil war onset.  Increases in per capita and per unit area 
measures of police strength both exhibit a statistically significant decreasing effect on the 
probability of civil war onset, though the statistically significant region is limited to the lower 
75th percentile of values of the indicators of police capacity. 
 Visible capacity.  I find little support for the hypothesis regarding the conditional effect 
of regime type on police capacity, based primarily on a lack of statistically significant results for 
the marginal effects of police capacity.  Moreover, results were strongly contingent on the 
specific indicator of police capacity.  Use of police per capita measures demonstrated contrasting 
effects on the probability of civil war onset, depending on the onset database utilized.  While the 
discrete change of anocratization was uniformly positive and statistically significant for the 
lower 75th percentile of police per capita values, tests of the marginal effects of increasing police 
per capita did not yield statistically significant results.  Measures of police per area did yield 
consistent statistically and substantively significant predicted probabilities.  Predicted 
probabilities decreased with increasing police per area regardless of regime type, and predicted 
probabilities were higher in anocracies for any given value of police per area.  On the other hand, 
use of police per area with tests of the discrete change of anocratization generally produced 
statistically insignificant results, though the one onset database that did yield significant results 
was in the predicted direction.   
 I find little support for the conditional effect of previous levels of internal violence on 
police capacity to reduce the probability of civil war onset.  Increasing lagged MAR scores did, 
for any given value of police capacity, increase the probability of civil war onset, but that finding 
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is consistent with past scholarship and does not reveal much about police capacity.  The marginal 
effects of increasing lagged MAR scores were mostly statistically insignificant, though the use of 
two databases did yield significant results for both measures of police capacity.  Use of both the 
COW and PRIO onset databases result in positive marginal effect for low values of police 
capacity, which is consistent the predictions of hypothesis 1c, but is not novel as explained 
above.  My hypothesis suggested that the marginal effects of police capacity should decrease as 
lagged MAR scores increase, but none of the tests of the onset databases yielded statistically 
significant results. 
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Chapter 3 - Repression and Civil War 
 The previous chapter addressed how police capacity can affect the probability of civil 
war onset.  Critical to the ability of the police to prevent civil war onset is a capacity to employ 
sufficient coercive capacity to dissuade would-be rebels from challenging the state.  
Nevertheless, police capacity can be a double-edged sword.  The police can utilize their inherent 
ability and responsibility to employ coercive force to such an extent that it constitutes repression.  
This chapter addresses the effects of such police behavior on the probability of civil war onset.  I 
propose that police use of repression should increase the probability of civil war onset by 
inducing grievances among the population.  The following section offers a theoretical 
explanation of why this phenomenon should occur. 
 Repression in Theory 
 A discussion of the relationship between repression and civil war should begin with a 
definition of repression.  A common conceptual definition for repression among extant studies on 
the role of repression on civil war is:50   
 
“state actions manifested through official regulatory measures designed to discriminate 
grossly against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to 
existing power relationships or key governmental policies because of their perceived 
political beliefs”(Goldstein 1978: xvi). 
 
The extant literature indicates that on the whole, acts of repression increase the risk of civil war 
(Thoms and Ron 2007; Dixon 2009).  The theoretical foundation for a relationship between 
repression and civil war rests primarily within the grievance based, collective action family of 
explanations for civil war onset.  This family generally contends that government use of violence 
can intensify the opposition by activating latent grievances until they surpass a threshold that 
induces the opposition to employ collective violence against the state (Gurr 1980; Goodwin 
2001; Thoms and Ron 2007).  Civil war is the end point of a predictable pattern of dissent that 
                                                 
50 Englehart (2009) makes this observation. 
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progresses from protest to civil violence to civil war.  At each stage, the state responds with 
repression, which increases opposition until civil war results (Regan and Norton 2005).51   
Much like it appears to do for civil war onset, repression may also play a role in civil war 
reoccurrence.  The very experience of undergoing a civil war may induce states to employ 
repression more frequently in the aftermath in an effort to forestall another civil war.  Moreover, 
combatants may have become accustomed to using repression during the conduct of the war, and 
past use of repression is one of the strongest indicators of future use (Davenport 2005).   
Similarly, regime use of repression during a civil war can increase the salience of group 
boundaries, which is an important pre-condition for the creation of violent opposition groups 
(Gurr 1980). 
While a strong case for the relationship between repression and civil war exists, the 
relationship appears to be multifaceted, which may explain Davenport’s (2007) finding that acts 
of government repression appear not to exhibit a consistent pattern with respect to dissident 
violence – a phenomenon he coins the “Punishment Puzzle.”  For instance, the effect may be 
time dependent.  Increased repression may lead to increased internal violence in the short term, 
but decreased violence in the long term (Hibbs 1973).  The effect of repression may vary 
depending upon the dissident behavior.  Regan and Norton (2005) find that acts of repression are 
one of the strongest predictors of civil war onset, but repression serves to decrease non-violent 
protest.52  The level of repression may influence civil war in a curvilinear fashion.  Moderate 
levels of repressiveness tend to lead to greater political violence than low or high levels (Muller 
1985).  As a result, dissident groups operating in a regime that employs moderate levels of 
repressiveness should exhibit the highest levels of violent behavior.  Dissidents in such 
environments should view violence as a feasible alternative since the state neither offers non-
violent venues for dissenters to pursue their interests nor sufficiently dissuades dissent.   
 
                                                 
51 Appendix C - Description of CIRI and PTS Datasets contains tests of two common repression indicators on the 
probability of civil war onset.  These tests find strong support for causal relationship between increasing levels of 
state repression and the probability of civil war onset. 
52 Regan and Norton find that repression is a stronger predictor than political discrimination, GDP per capita, the 
existence of extractable resources, population, regime type, and ethnic fractionalization. 
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I must note that a prominent study disputes the aforementioned body of research relating 
repression and civil war.  Collier and Hoeffler (2004) determine that acts of government 
repression appear to have low power in comparison with other causes of civil war.  A deeper 
analysis of these authors’ findings, however, indicates that the contrast between their findings 
and the other aforementioned authors may be not as stark as it appears.  The reason is that Collier 
and Hoeffler do not actually test for the effects of government repression according to 
Goldstein’s definition.  Instead, Collier and Hoeffler test the effect of political repression, as 
indicated by Polity III scores.53  This measure indicates the degree of political inclusiveness of a 
regime, not how much it “grossly discriminates” against its citizens.  Regime exclusiveness is 
not a suitable proxy for repression since states with both high and low polity scores both exhibit 
low levels of repression.  Neither democracies nor autocracies tend to need to employ repression 
to maintain order (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 1993).   
 
 Police as a Repressive Instrument 
While many authors have addressed the association between state repression in the 
aggregate and civil war, studies relating police repression and civil war are much less common.  
This is somewhat surprising due to the inherent capacity of police forces to employ repression 
stemming from their function as a coercive instrument of the state (Reiner 1999).  The state’s 
requirement that its police possess a capacity to employ force to maintain social order and foster 
economic development has the paradoxical effect of also providing the police the capacity to 
engage in repression.  This paradox is not relegated solely to despotic regimes.  Even in 
democracies, policing is embedded in a social order characterized by conflict between those that 
control the social order and those who oppose it (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005: 218).     
Discerning the role of police repression on civil war requires distinguishing repression 
from coercion.  The threshold between coercion and repression may represent the difference 
                                                 
53 The Polity III (Jaggers and Gurr 1996) dataset consist of indicators of political authority and regime  type  for 177  
members  of  the  international  system. Variables include two indicators of regime  type  (autocracy  and  
democracy)  and  eight indicators   of   political   authority  (regulation  of  executive recruitment, competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness  of executive   recruitment,  monocratism,  constraints  on  the  chief executive, 
regulation of political  participation,  competitiveness of political participation, and centralization of state authority).  
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between police behaviors that simply maintain order and police behaviors that instigate violence.  
We should not expect that acts of coercion society views as legitimate would lead to the level of 
collective action necessary to engender violent dissent.   On the other hand, repression can 
represent an aberration from preferred norms of behavior and could engender sufficient 
collective action to transform latent grievances into active violent dissent.   
All police forces draw their authority from some mixture of coercion and cooperation, 
even in democracies (Brewer et al 1996).  Yet, civil war is rare, suggesting there may exist some 
socially acceptable level of police coercion that would not serve as the impetus for violent 
resistance to the state.   In fact, both the state and society expect the police to employ coercion in 
pursuit of the maintenance of order.  As such, coercive capacity should constitute an important 
element of “actual capacity,” which the previous chapter indicated exhibits a statistically and 
substantively meaningful effect on the probability of civil war onset.  If police use of coercion 
alone induces the state’s inhabitants to rebel, then increasing police actual capacity should 
increase the probability of civil war, rather than decrease it as the previous chapter indicated.   
 This is not to say that repression is the distinct province of the police.  They are just one 
of several government agencies capable of employing repression.54  The most obvious 
alternative is the military – the agency that frequently constitutes the police force’s partner in a 
state’s security sector (Toft 2010).  In fact, a weakness in previous studies has been to conflate a 
state’s police and military forces when addressing their effect on repression (Hibbs 1973; 
Davenport 1995).  What is more, the military may represent a highly effective instrument to 
carry out state policies of repression due to the military’s typically greater lethality and 
deployability in comparison to the police (Bittner 1972).   
 I propose that while other agencies can undoubtedly employ repression, police repression 
should impart an independent effect on increasing the probability of civil war onset.  I base this 
argument on two considerations.  The first is the central role that the use of coercion plays in the 
rationale for the existence of police forces.  Police by definition possess the capacity to repress, 
regardless of whether they choose to do so.  Their ability to employ force to maintain order on 
                                                 
54 Other government agencies with a record of employing repression include prison officials, intelligence officers, 
and paramilitaries (Conrad and Moore 2011).   
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behalf of the state is the defining characteristic of a police force.55  The second reason stems 
from the relative pervasiveness of the police as the face of the state within society (Silver 2005).  
In other words, if a state’s inhabitants are to experience a level of repression sufficient to lead to 
civil war, then police should have a high likelihood of constituting the agency responsible for 
conducting the repression.    Consequently, I offer the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: Increasing acts of police repression increase the probability of civil war onset. 
 
 Robben (2005) provides a telling example of how police repression in Argentina helped 
mobilize violent resistance to the state.  Police repressive actions during a month long period in 
1969 proved to be the major instigator for Argentinean student and labor movements to align 
their movements as well as accept violence as the most appropriate response to the police 
behavior.  In 1969, Argentina was under the rule of the second military dictator since the 
overthrow of Peron in 1955.  Peron won the presidential election 1946 espousing a populist 
message and drawing much of his strength from labor unions and other economic non-elites.  
Following his ouster, his supporters (Peronistas) continued to agitate for Peron’s successor 
dictators to reenact Peronist style policies.   
At the same time, younger college students were becoming politically active due to 
dissatisfaction with the paternalism of the military dictatorship.  The student activists were not 
overtly Peronist.  They came from a generation that had missed the violence associated with the 
coup against Peron.  Nevertheless, a series of repressive in the mid 1960s acts drove them and 
the Peronista labor movement together in violent common cause.  Sensing the growing political 
unrest of the university students, President Onganía took control of all Argentinean universities 
and forbid students from engaging in political activities.    On July 29, 1966, to protest Onganía’s 
actions, a group of students and faculty barricaded themselves inside a building at an 
architectural university in Buenos Aires.  Federal police responded and demanded that the 
students leave.  When the students refused, the police stormed the building and ousted the 
students.  In an event that became known as the “Night of the Long Sticks,” or “la Noche de los 
                                                 
55 See Chapter 1 - What are Police and What do They Do? for an explanation of the role of police with regard to 
coercive force. 
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Bastones Largos,” the police forced the protestors to walk a gauntlet while the police beat them 
with rubber batons.   
News of the police actions swept through Argentina and provided a common cause 
around which students and the Peronista labor movement could rally.  It also served to radicalize 
the students and foreshadowed two later significant insurrectionary events.   The first was the 
Rosariazo on May 21, during which students and labor movement members protesting unpopular 
government policies in the town of Rosario clashed with police on horseback.  The police 
attempted to disperse the rally with tear gas, causing the protestors to respond with violence.   
The police eventually gained control at a cost of two of the protestors’ lives and many wounded.  
The Rosario event was just a stepping stone to the more significant pitched battles between 
protestors and police during protests that occurred from May 29-30 in the town of Córdoba.  In a 
crowd that numbered near 50,000, student protestors joined striking laborers to mark the deaths 
of a number of protestors over the last month.  By this time, the protestors had come to expect a 
violent response from police and had stationed snipers on the rooftops overlooking their 
members.  Over 4000 police and 5000 members of the military attempted to break up the crowd.  
The conflict waged for two days before the government was able to re-establish order, resulting 
in the deaths of at least 16 protestors and hundreds of wounded.  The magnitude of the violent 
protests caused President Onganía to invoke a state of martial law that remained in effect until 
1973.  The government response erased any hope the protesters may have held regarding the 
utility of non-violent means to address their grievances, thereby setting the stage for a pattern of 
dissident terrorism and government repressive reactions over the next decade.   
 
 Police Repression Compared to Repression by Other Government Agents 
 The previous section discussed the ways in which police repression should impart an 
independent effect on the probability of civil war onset.  In doing so, it acknowledged that police 
are not the only government agency capable of indulging in repression.  In fact, the databases 
this study employs later in this chapter recognize a number of other government agents with a 
record of repression, such as intelligence agents and paramilitaries (Conrad and Moore 2011).  
The military in particular is especially well equipped to conduct repression.  Accepting the 
proposition that repression by any of these government agents can create grievances that can lead 
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to civil war onset, the question remains whether acts of repression by any one agent have a 
greater probability of creating the grievances that contribute to civil war onset.  I argue that all 
acts of state repression are not equal, and that police repression should matter most.  The 
remainder of this section describes how police acts of repression should lead to a greater 
probability of civil war than acts by other government agents because increases in police 
repression are most likely to create grievances. 
 Though I made the point earlier that police are uniquely suited to repress due to their 
distinct mission and relatively high pervasiveness within society, this characteristic does not 
explain why police acts of repression should matter more.  If greater police repression only 
increases the probability of civil war onset because police have more opportunities to repress in 
compared to other government agents, then specific characteristics of police do not matter.  Who 
represses becomes less important than how often. 
 Instead, police repression should matter more because police repression represents a more 
profound deviation from social norms than does repression by other agents.  Previous studies 
have described how repression and culture are related.  States tend to act most repressively when 
dissidents violate norms of behavior, perhaps because society is more tolerant when faced with 
this kind of threat (Davenport 1995).    A reasonable assumption is that the reverse may also be 
present.  Norms may also influence how the recipients of repression respond.  State repression 
that represents the most egregious violation of social norms may be most likely to instigate the 
sufficient levels of collective action necessary for violent challenges to the state. 
 Police conduct should represent a more profound violation of cultural norms principally 
because society should have developed the strongest and deepest norms for police repressive 
behavior in comparison to norms of behavior for other government agents.  Thus, police 
pervasiveness not only gives the police more opportunities to repress, it also gives society the 
most opportunity to develop expectations for police conduct.  A corollary to this line of 
reasoning is that high, but consistent levels of police repression should not be as important 
because society should have become accustomed to the police repressive conduct.  Latent, 
accumulating grievances become less important than changes in the degree or quality of the 
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grievances.56  Thus, the effects of within-country increases in police repression are more 
important than increases among countries because norms do not translate well across states 
(Landman 2006; Morgan 2009). 
 A comparison between society’s expectations for the police and military can illustrate 
how society should view them differently.  As mentioned, both the police and military are co-
participants in states’ security sector (Toft 2010), and the use of force is fundamental to both 
organizations’ responsibilities.  Nevertheless, society’s expectations for their police and military 
forces’ employment of force should differ.  States expect their militaries to employ 
overwhelming force to protect their sovereignty.  Militaries tend to apply overwhelming force 
with relatively low regard for collateral damage, so society should be under no illusion that their 
military would exercise restraint if the military should respond to an internal threat to the state 
(Bittner 1972; Crelinsten and Schmid 1992).  
 Society’s uncertainty over norms for interaction with the military, combined with 
societies knowledge of the military’s lethality and traditional mission of defeating external 
threats should reduce the probability that any military repressive acts would constitute a violation 
of societal norms.  At the same time, the relative scarcity of military members operating within 
society should inhibit society from developing robust expectations for military repressive 
conduct.  Because the military focuses on external threats (Lutterbeck 2004), the duties of the 
military should not require that they routinely interact with their state’s inhabitants.  As a result, 
society is unable establish norms from repeated interactions with the military.   
 Society’s uncertainty about norms of interaction with the military does not apply to the 
police.  For one, the police are more pervasive among society.  Additionally, the relationship 
between the police with society is different than between the military and society.  Whereas 
society expects that the military is trained and equipped to employ maximum force, society 
generally expects police to operate with some degree of restraint in performing their requirement 
to maintain order (Crelinsten and Schmid 1992).  Acts of police repression are especially 
egregious according to this model because the repression transforms society from a principal to a 
target.  This relationship does not apply in the same way to the military.  While the military is 
                                                 
56 This line of reasoning draws on the findings of Gurr (1968), who proposes that increases in grievances are more 
important that the than its absolute levels. 
  
59 
 
undoubtedly an agent of the state, the military’s actions in performing its requirements are not as 
obvious to the state’s inhabitants.  If the police fail to perform their requirements, then society 
should be able to recognize in increase in disorder.  On the other hand, a failure of the military to 
protect state sovereignty would be much less immediately evident to society.  It is also much less 
likely.  Whereas lower levels of internal disorder that fall within the typical province of the 
police are common, war and violent conflict are relatively rare events (Bayley and Perito 2012). 
 Though the discussion above centered on differentiating the police from the military, the 
latter is just one of several government agents capable of employing repression.  Nevertheless, I 
extend the same argument concerning to all other government agents as well.  One would not 
expect that any non-police agencies would exercise either the responsibility for maintenance of 
order or the presence among society sufficient to establish norms of behavior anywhere near 
approaching that which the police can.  
  
 With these considerations in mind, I offer the following hypothesis: 
 
H2b: An increasing proportion of government acts of repression conducted by the police 
increases the probability of civil war onset. 
 
  
 Repression Research Design 
 This chapter employs a research design very similar to the design I employed in 
Chapter 2.   It differs only in that a greater availability of data allows me to employ annual data, 
rather than quinquennial data as I did in chapter 2. 
 Dependent Variables 
  I retain the same datasets for civil war onset for use as dependent variables that I 
discussed in the previous chapter.  See Appendix A - Description of Dependent Variables for a 
description of the dependent variables.   
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 Independent Variables 
 My conceptual definition for police repression is an extension of Goldstein’s (1978) 
definition of repression, with the stipulation that police repression consists only of those acts of 
repression conducted by the police.  My two hypotheses relating police repression to civil war 
onset consider the effects of police repression alone and police repression as a proportion of 
overall government repression.   
  
 Police Repression 
I develop my own datasets for police repression because no extent datasets measure it 
explicitly.   For instance, the two most prominent datasets within the repression literature, the 
Cingrinelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset ver 12.10.11 Physical Integrity Index 
(Cingrinelli and Richards 2011) and the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Wood and Gibney 2010) 
only measure aggregate repression by all government agents, thereby making it difficult to 
discern the specific impact that police repression might create.  See Appendix B - Description of 
CIRI and PTS Datasets for more about these datasets.  
 I developed measures of police repression by drawing from two event-related datasets.  
The first source is the Ill-Treatment & Torture (ITT) Specific Allegation (SA) data, a subset of 
the ITT Data Collection Project (Conrad and Moore 2011).  The ITT consists of specific 
allegations of torture and ill-treatment, listed by the state and the dates during which the 
allegation occurred.  Data is available for more than 16,000 allegations of torture that occurred 
from 1995-2005.  The major advantage of the ITT SA dataset over the CIRI and PTS is that it 
also provides information on the “Agency of Control” responsible for conducting the specific 
allegation − one of which is the police.57  I consider the ITT’s definition of torture consistent 
with the definition of repression I employ for this paper.58  As such, I treat police torture as a 
suitable indicator of police repression.  The obvious counterargument is that torture does not 
                                                 
57 Other AOCs include prisons, the military, intelligence agents, immigration and detention officials, paramilitaries, 
and “unstate” when coders could not determine a specific agency. 
58 The ITT utilizes the UN Convention against Torture, which in part is “any act by which severe pain and 
suffering…is intentionally inflicted.” I consider instances of torture according to this definition to be uncontentious 
examples of repression.   
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represent the entire universe of acts of repression.  In other words, all torture is repression, but 
not all repression is torture.  I intend to mitigate the possible deleterious effects of excluding 
other forms of repression by creating a second dataset, which I describe more thoroughly in a 
subsequent section. 
 The event-style organization of the ITT data requires revision to incorporate into the 
time-series, cross-sectional format I employ.  Consequently, I operationalize police torture as the 
aggregate number of acts of police torture that occur in a given country-year.  To do so, I 
reformat the ITT data so that each event receives a score of “1” for each year it encompasses.  
For events that spanned multiple years, I scored the event as having occurred in the start year, the 
end year, and any years between.  For example, an allegation of police torture in the United 
States that lasted from 1995-1997 will yield a score of “1” for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997.  
Since many states had years in which numerous allegations of torture occurred, I create a sum of 
all incidences of torture that occurred during each particular country-year by police, as well as a 
second score of torture committed by all government agencies.  Returning to my previous 
example, during 1995 the United States endured 52 incidences of police torture and 53 
incidences of torture by all other agents.  Country-year scores for police torture range from 0 to 
179 and for torture by all agents from 0 to 321.  Because the scores exhibit sufficient variation, I 
can treat them as continuous variables. Employing this methodology yields 1696 country-years 
of observations (many of which are “0”).  The number of states with observations vary from 153-
155 per year.   
  
 The second measure of police repression derives from the “10 Million Dyadic Events,” 
(King and Lowe 2003a; King and Lowe 2003b), which draws upon the Integrated Data for 
Events Analysis (IDEA) project (Bond et al 2003).  The IDEA is a compilation of event data 
culled from the Reuters Business Briefing by an automated software system known as the 
VRA® Knowledge Manager, which generates social, economic, environmental, and political 
events data.  The VRA codes events according to the source and target actors as well as the type 
of event that transpired.  Important to this study is that “police” are one of the actors in the IDEA 
dataset.  Information is available for events that occurred from 1990-2004 for over 260 states and 
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related territories, yielding the 10 millions events that King and Lowe employ as the title to their 
project.59 
 I convert the event data to country-year totals.  This methodology involves aggregating 
the total number of events that constitute the concept of interest by country-year.  Since I am 
interested in police repression, I treat acts of police repression as those events wherein police are 
the source of the activity.  The IDEA dataset includes 257 different types of events, ranging from 
the benign such as “apologize”, to the severe such as “military occupation,” however; 
“repression” specifically is not one of them.  Using Goldstein’s definition of repression as 
screening criteria, I consider the following IDEA events to constitute acts of repression.60   
 
Table 3-1 IDEA Repression Events 
IDEA Event 
Assassination 
Beatings 
Bodily punishment 
Criminal arrests and detentions 
Hostage taking and kidnapping 
Torture  
Political arrests and detention 
 
 Because the 10 Million Dyadic events does not include data for all countries, I run into 
the dilemma of whether I should code missing data as a zero or leave it as missing.61  As a 
                                                 
59 One difference between the IDEA and the ITT is that the IDEA only records events as point data - by month or 
day depending on level of accuracy available.  As such, IDEA events cannot span multiple years like events from 
the ITT can. 
60 Each of these events has observations in which police are the source actor. 
61 For instance, if Canada has a year in which no repression was recorded, that year should most accurately be coded 
a zero since it is plausible that no repression occurred in Canada that year.  On the other hand, an absence of 
  
63 
 
solution, I code police repression as a zero for a given country year if any recorded event is 
present in the database for that same country-year, under the assumption that if media can record 
any event, it should be able to record instances of police repression.62  Conversely, I code a 
country-year as missing data if that same country-year has no other recorded IDEA event.  
Following this methodology yields 2723 country years of observations, including zeros. 
 
 Police Repression as a Proportion of Overall Repression 
I operationalize the proportion of repression conducted by the police as a ratio of police 
repression to acts of government repression conducted by other government agents.63  For the 
ITT database, this variable would consists of a ratio of acts of torture conducted by police to acts 
of torture conducted by all other government agents.64  For example, in the United States in 
1995, the coding scheme I employ generated 52 acts of police repression and 53 acts of by all 
other agents, yielding a ratio of 0.981.   
Employing a ratio variable also helps control for scale effects.  It is a reasonable 
assumption that, all other things being equal, more populous countries should experience a 
higher number of acts of repression simply because there are people to serve as propagators and 
victims of repression.  This consideration is the major reason I choose not to simply include total 
acts of repression as a statistical control variable.  Doing so would indeed capture the conditional 
                                                                                                                                                             
recorded events of torture in authoritarian regimes that restrict the media should not be coded as zero and should 
instead remain missing data because the absence of a score is more likely due to an absence of an observer. 
62 Bhasin, Murdie, and Davis follow a similar methodology. 
63 An alternative method to capture the interactive effects of police repression and total repression would be to 
simply include each term additively since the probit model I employ is inherently interactive (Berry, DeMeritt, and 
Esarey 2010).  Nevertheless, I include constituent terms based on the guidance of Freidrich (1982) and Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder (2005).   
64 A drawback of including a ratio term is that country-years with values of zero become missing data because a 
ratio cannot have a denominator of zero.  This exclusion can have the effect of biasing my sample towards countries 
that have at least a score of one or higher for number of acts of repression for any given year.  The effect is minimal 
on observations derived from ITT data, but more substantial on data derived from IDEA data.  For instance, 30 of 
122 onsets from the PRIO data change to missing when ratios are included. 
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effect of varying values of total repression on the relationship between police repression and the 
probability of civil war onset, but would not account for scale. 
 I also create a ratio value using IDEA data.  In the case of the IDEA, this ratio consists of 
a measure of acts of police repression compared to a measure of acts of repression by all those 
government agents depicted in the table above.  Much like I did for the ITT data, I create a 
measure of country-year sums for repression by all other government agents using IDEA data.  I 
do so by following the same methodology I did for compiling IDEA recorded instances of police 
repression.  I consider the following IDEA sources to be government actors: 
 
Table 3-2 IDEA Repressive Actors 
Actor 
Government Agent 
Judiciary 
Health Care Agents 
Military 
National Executives 
Legislators 
Officials 
Peace-keeping forces 
Police 
Sub-national officials 
True Agents 
 
 Because the repression measures have such short time domains, the sample size reduces 
significantly.  See Appendix C - Effect of Inclusion of Repression Variables on Sample Sizes of 
Onset Databases.   
 As a check of multicollinearity among the repression measures I developed (are they all 
just measuring the same phenomenon?), I calculated  the correlation among the ITT and IDEA 
measures of police repression, the respective measures of police repression and repression by all 
other government agents, and repression by all agents.  I find no strong correlations between 
police repression and repression by other government agents for either the ITT or IDEA 
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database.65 See Appendix C - Correlation Matrix for Candidates for Control Variables  for 
correlation results. 
 Controls 
  
 Candidates for control variables for hypotheses in this chapter need to be empirically and 
theoretically related to both repression and civil war onset.  I consider the same set of candidates 
for use with both hypotheses in this chapter because each contains civil war onset as a dependent 
variable, and the independent variables only differ in regard to which government agents conduct 
the repression.  Both police repression and government repression more broadly rely upon the 
same causal mechanism of creating a level of grievance sufficient to induce collective action 
against the state; I just propose that police repression is particularly suited for it.  With these 
considerations in mind, I test the following variables for use as controls for spuriousness.   
 Time since the last civil war (peace years).  Previous studies have indicated that the 
experience of having undergone a previous civil war is a strong predictor of both repression and 
civil war.  States tend to repress more in post civil war environments (Davenport 2005).  
Similarly, states face a higher probability of civil war outbreak in the time period follow a 
previous civil war (Hegre et al 2001;; Hegre and Sambanis 2006) because the grievances that led 
to the previous civil war are lingering (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  To model the effect of 
previous civil wars, I employ a decay function of 𝑒−�
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟
8
� that Hegre et al (2001) 
found to generate statistically significant results on the probability of civil war onset.  I compute 
individual measures of this variable for each onset database.  This variable also helps corrects the 
violation of the assumption of independence of observations (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) that 
is integral to the probit technique I employ.66     
                                                 
65 Another choice for thee denominator of the ratio term is total repression by all governemt agents (total 
repression), including police, which would yield a police repression ratio ranging from zero to one.  While 
conceptually acceptable, measures of total repression were highly correlated with police repression (0.8 for IDEA 
and 0.83 for IIT), leading me to reject this variable. 
66 Another method to correct for temporal dependence is to use of cubic polynomials, which is superior to the use of 
time dummies and easier to use than cubic splines (Carter and Signorino 2010).  Though I agree in principle with 
these authors in their use of a hyperbolic function to capture the effects of time, the decay function I have chosen 
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Regime effects.  Regime characteristics affect both repression and civil war onset.  
Anocracies tend to repress more (Davenport 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport 2004) 
and experience a higher number of civil wars.  In order to capture the effect of anocratic regime 
type, I employ a variable that measures the square of the Polity IV score.  I also employ a 
measure of the Polity IV score itself because the effect of regime type is not perfectly 
curvilinear.  Democracies still repress less than autocracies (Davenport 2004). 
Threats to regime.  Threat, repression, and regime type may be inextricably mixed.  
States repress in response to threat, which in turn causes the opposition to challenge the state 
even more (Thoms and Ron 2007).  To control for the effect of threat on repression and civil war 
onset, I employ the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Revolutionary War Magnitude Scale. 
Excluded candidates.  One of the most common and consistently statistically significant 
explanatory variables for both repression and civil war onset are measures of development, most 
notably GDP per capita (Hegre et al 2001; Davenport 2007).  Nevertheless, I exclude this 
measure as a control variable because the theoretical relationships between it and both repression 
and civil war onset are much less certain.  Scholars have yet to develop a good understanding of 
why more affluent states repress less (Davenport 2007).   
In an effort to check for spuriousness of my chosen key repression independent variables 
(including excluded variables),  I compute correlations among them and all the aforementioned 
candidates for control variables.67  The only high (>0.7) correlations exist among different 
                                                                                                                                                             
captures essentially the same behavior with only one term, rather than three as in cubic polynomials.  A drawback of 
this approach, and any measure of peace duration, is left censoring.  Four of the five datasets I employ begin in the 
1940s, which has the effect of omitting the influence of any civil wars that occurred before the 1940s.  Hegre et al 
(2001) acknowledge this problem, but admit there is not much that scholars can do about it − though they employ 
the much larger COW dataset.  The solution of Hegre et al is to start all states with a score of “0” until the state 
experiences a civil war, though they conclude that this choice runs the risk of underestimating the effect of time.  I 
will follow Hegre et al in the spirit of falsifiability and parsimony because the alternative to their method is to treat 
the first years that a state enters a dataset as the first peace year, which runs the more egregious risk of 
overestimating the effect of time.  States that never experience a civil war received a value of “0” for this variable. 
67 Because of the bivariate nature of my dependent variables, I cannot rely on analysis of changes to regression 
coefficients from including control variables to determine spuriousness (Karlsen, Holm, and Breen 2011).  Rather, I 
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dependent variables and among the different time decay functions, none of which are ever in the 
same regression.  Of note, neither GDP nor the log of GDP are highly correlated with any other 
variables, which is further support for my decision to exclude them as control variables.  See 
Appendix C - Correlation Matrix for Candidates for Control Variables for full results. 
 
  
 Models. 
 I again apply a GEE model with a probit link for the same reasons I explain in chapter 2. 
See Appendix B - Description of Variables Contained in the Capacity Models for a full 
description of the variables contained in the models.   
 
 The first models test the effect of police acts of repression on the probability of civil war 
onset.   
Model 2a. Onsetit = β0 + β1 (police repression)it + β2 (peace_years)it  
+  β3 (lag of threat)it  + β4 (square of Polity IV)it  
+  β4 (Polity IV)it  
 
 
 The next set of models also includes measures of police repression from the ITT and 
IDEA databases, but this time using a ratio of police acts of repression to overall government 
acts of repression.  Because the variable representing the proportion of repressive acts conducted 
by the police is a ratio, it constitutes an interaction.  Consequently, I also include its constituent 
terms of the ratio, as evident in the models below.68  I use the inverses of the ITT and IDEA 
measures of total repression as constituent terms since they form the denominator term in the 
ratios (Kronmal 1993).  I test both models against all five datasets for civil war onset.   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
employ theory and correlations since spurious variables must be correlated with the more valid additional variable 
(Anneshensel 2002). 
68 I include constitutive terms based on the recommendations of Kronmal (1993), Brambor, Clark, and Golder 
(2005) and Clark, Gilligan, and Golder (2006). 
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 Model 2b.  Onsetit = β0 + β1 (proportion of police acts of repression)it  
+ β2 (police repression)it + β3 (
1(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠)it)  
+ β3 peace_yearsit  +  β4 (lag of threat)it  + β5 (square of Polity IV)it  
+ β6 (Polity IV)it  
 
  
 Sufficient data exists for these models to allow me to code ongoing war years as both 
“zero” and “missing, however, I treat ongoing war years as missing to prevent endogeneity.  The 
experience of enduring a civil war is one of the strongest predictors of state use of repression 
(Davenport 2007), which raises the possibility of reverse causation during ongoing war years –
civil war would increase repression.  Treating ongoing years as “missing” reduces the risk of 
endogenity by removing those potentially endogenous country-years from the sample. 
 Results 
 This section presents the results from testing the aforementioned models.  I analyze the 
results using predicted probabilities and marginal effects.  I determine predicted probabilities by 
varying the key independent variables while holding all other independent variables at their 
means.  Since the derived standard errors of the coefficients in the probit models do not directly 
correspond to probabilities of prediction, I generate 95% confidence intervals for my computed 
probabilities (Gujarati 2009 and Porter).  I consider the results to be statistically significant when 
the lower confidence interval is not close to zero.  The exact threshold varies with the model, as I 
explain in the subsequent paragraphs.  The inclusion of a ratio term prevents me from using the 
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) technique for computing marginal effects.  Instead, I have to 
rely on visual inspection of the slopes of the predicted probabilities curves.  As a result of the 
high number of indicators I employ for repression and civil war onset, I cannot include all the 
graphs of outcomes in the body of this chapter.  Instead, I only include a small number of graphs 
that are illustrative of trends.  I offer the remainder in Appendix C - Outcome Graphs for 
Repression Models. 
 
 Results for H2a: Increasing repression increases the probability of civil war onset 
 The table below depicts the results of testing this hypothesis using the indicators of police 
repression.  As a point of comparison, the table also includes columns depicting the results of 
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testing measures of total acts of repression per country-year according tro the ITT and IDEA 
databases.   I predict that increasing values of all indicators of  repression should increase the 
probability of civil war.  The second row depicts the trends of the predicted probabilities, which 
strongly correspond to the hypothetical predictions.  Nevertheless, as the final row indicates, 
these predicted probabilities come with low degrees of statistical significance.  The following 
sections provide a more detailed discussion of these findings.   
 
 
Table 3-3 Outcomes for H2a 
 Indicators  
ITT police 
repression 
IDEA police 
repression 
ITT total 
repression 
IDEA total 
repression 
Predicted effect on 
probability of civil war 
onset 
Increase Increase Increase Increase 
CW datasets with 
concurring results 
All All Nearly all69 All 
CW datasets yielding 
statistically significant 
results 
COW 
 PRIO 
PRIO COW  
PRIO 
COW  
PRIO 
 
 
 
 Effect when using ITT and IDEA police scores 
The use of both the ITT and IDEA derived measures of police repression have a 
uniformly increasing effect on the probability of civil war onset, though in most cases the 
predicted probabilities exhibit low levels of statistical significance.  The figures below are 
indicative of the general trend. 
  
                                                 
69 One exception results from the use of the Fearon and Laitin database and ongoing years coded as zero. 
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Figure 3-1 The Effect of Police Repression on the Probability of Civil War Onset using 
Sambanis onset data 
 
 
 
  The two exceptions occur with the use of PRIO data for both indicators of repression 
and the use of COW data with the ITT measure.  The finding with the COW data appears to 
result from some unusual combination of the independent and dependent variables since 
predicted probabilities approach “1,” so I treat it as an outlier.  The finding with the PRIO data 
suggests that repression may be more strongly related to lower levels of internal violence the 
PRIO onset database captures.  
 Because the uses of both ITT and IDEA measures of police corruption yield generally 
statistically insignificant results, I cannot conclude that increasing police repression increase the 
probability of civil war onset, though it may increase the possibility of lower levels of internal 
conflict 
 
 Alternate Tests 
 As a proof of principal of the previous scholarship, I also test whether repression more 
broadly increases the probability of civil war onset using a number of measures of repression. 
The first set of tests use the Cingrinelli-Richards (CIRI) Humand Rights Dataset ver 12.10.11 
Physical Integrity Index (Cingrinelli and Richards 2011) and Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Wood 
and Gibney 2010).    Tests using the CIRI and PTS datasets yield statistically significant, positive 
effects for all onset databases.  See Appendix C - Outcome Graphs for Repression Models for a 
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full description of these tests as well as the CIRI and PTS datasets.  These outcomes suggest that 
repression more broadly does contribute to the probability of civil war onset.  The second proof 
of principal tests employ measures of total government repression, using the IDEA and ITT 
databases.    Outcomes of these tests were very similar to those for the police repression 
measures.  The use of all onset databases exhibited increasing trends, but with the exception of 
the use of the PRIO database, there were few regions of statistical significance.  I attribute the 
lack of statistical significance chiefly to lack of data.  Both the ITT and IDEA databases had 
relatively short time domains.  The following graphs are indicative of outcomes using the other 
onset databases. 
 
Figure 3-2 Effect of increasing total repression scores on the probability of civil war onset 
using Sambanis 
 
 
  
 Results for H2b: An increasing proportion of government acts of repression conducted 
by the police increases the probability of civil war onset 
  
 The table below is a summary of the outcomes of tests of the repression models.  The 
columns reflect the specific indicator of police repression.  Row 1 shows that I predict that 
increasing values of both ratio indicators should lead to higher probabilities of civil war onset, 
but as evident in row 2, I only find consistent support with the use of ITT data, and in fact use of 
the IDEA data most often yields outcomes that contradict my hypothesis.  Row 3 describes that 
for a given value of repression ratio, higher values of total repression should increase the 
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probability of civil war onset since it would indicate higher aggregate levels of total repression, 
similar to those tested in the previous section.  Row 4 indicates that all databases yield outcomes 
that support this prediction.  Row 5 describes that the marginal effect of an increase in the 
repression ratio should be greater at lower values of repression by all other agents.  In other 
words, increasing police repression should matter more in the presence of low levels of 
aggregate repression.  The reason is that under such circumstances, the increase in police 
repression would represent a greater aberration from typical police and state agent behaviors.   
Row 6 portrays that the predicted effect is evident when using the ITT ratio with all onset 
databases, but for only one database when using the IDEA ratio.  I provide more detailed 
discussion of the results depicted in the table in the following paragraphs.   
 
Table 3-4 Results of Regression Using Police Repression 
 Indicator 
ITT ratio IDEA ratio 
Predicted effect on 
probability of civil war 
onset 
Increase Increase 
CW datasets with 
concurring results 
All COW70 
Predicted effect on 
probability of CW onset 
of increasing total 
repression by all other 
agents 
Increase Increase 
CW datasets with 
concurring results 
All All 
Predicted marginal 
effect on repression 
ratio of increasing total 
repression by all other 
agents 
Decrease Decrease 
CW datasets with 
concurring results 
COW 
Fearon and 
Laitin 
PRIO 
Toft 
Fearon and 
Laitin 
                                                 
70 In contrast to my prediction, the use of the Sambanis, PRIO, and Toft datasets result in a decreasing effect on the 
predicted probabilities of civil war onset. 
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 Results when using ITT and IDEA Ratios  
   I attempt to parse out the effect of police repression more specifically by employing a 
variable that measures a ratio of police repression to repression by all other government actors 
using  both ITT and IDEA data.71  As seen in the two left-most graphs below, the use of ITT data 
yields a generally increasing effect with all onset databases, though regions with statistical 
significance vary.   For the most part, areas of statistical significant only occur at higher values 
of repression by all other actors.   This same consistency was not evident when using IDEA data.  
Some datasets exhibited the decreasing trends like with ITT data, but others exhibited a 
contradictory outcome of decreasing predicted probabilities of civil war onset as the repression 
ratio increases.72  The two right-most graphs below depict the two contrasting outcomes.  The 
IDEA data also differed in that areas of higher statistical significance occurred for lower ratio 
values.   
 
  
                                                 
71 Though I treat the ratio as the independent variable, I cannot compute predicted probabilities by simply varying 
the ratio because doing so would require me to simultaneously vary both its constituent elements simultaneously.  
Instead, I generate predicted probabilities by holding one of constituent terms constant while allowing the other to 
vary with the ratio term.  I vary the police repression score from 0 to 1.  I treat the inverse term of the total 
repression score (denominator of the ratio) as constant and run separate tests for its 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles 
values.  I compute the police repression scores (numerator in the ratio) by dividing the variant ratio score by the 
inverse of the fixed total repression score.   
 
72 The Sambanis, PRIO, and Toft datasets yielded decreasing effects for all values of repression by all other actors, 
and the Fearon and Laitin database yielded a mixture, with only high values of repression by all other actors 
resulting in an increasing effect. 
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Figure 3-3 Effect of increasing the repression ratio on the probability of civil war onset 
 
 
 
 
  
 Effect of Total Repression by All Other Actors 
As predicted, for a given value of both repression ratios, higher levels of repression by all 
other government actors increases the probability of civil war onset.  This finding is not 
surprising given the extant literature on the role of repression towards civil war onset.  This 
relationship more strongly supports hypothesis 2a, which covers repression more broadly, but I 
discuss it here because it results from tests of the ratio models.  I omit the graphs because the 
pattern of outcomes is nearly universal.   
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 Marginal Effect of Repression Ratio.   
 I expect that marginal effects of an increasing ratio of police repression should be highest 
at low levels of repression by all other actors because, under that condition, the police behavior 
would represent a greater departure from typical government agents’ behavior and therefore be 
more likely to generate grievances.  Visual inspection of the predicted probability graphs above 
suggest that marginal effects vary depending on repression dataset.  Use of ITT data yields a 
consistent trend of higher marginal effects as the measure of repression by all other actors 
increases, which contradicts my hypothesis.73   This trend is evident in the two left-most graphs 
above, wherein predicted probabilities increase more rapidly at greater values of repression by all 
other actors.  I can draw no conclusions from the use of IDEA data.  No trend is evident when 
using the IDEA ratio, as seen in the right-most graphs in the figure above.   
 
 In light of the aforementioned outcomes, I find only weak support for hypothesis 2b.  The 
use of the ITT data yielded a statistically significant, increasing effect on the probability of civil 
war onset with most onset databases, but use of IDEA repression did not.   Moreover, use of the 
IDEA data always yielded a decreasing effect with some onset databases.  Increasing repression 
by other actors generally increases the probability of civil war onset occurred as predicted, but is 
not novel.  Additionally, changes in the marginal effects the repression ratios as repression by all 
other actors was either unclear, or contradictory.  
                                                 
73 I make this determination by comparison of the slopes of the various predicted probability curves for different 
values of repression by all other actors.  I do so because my choice to employ a ratio as my independent variable of 
interest precludes me from employing the Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) method for computing marginal 
effects.  Because my method is much less mathematically precise, I only draw conclusions when the differences in 
marginal effects are explicit. 
  
76 
 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter offered two hypotheses.  The first proposed that increasing levels of police  
repression increased the probability of civil war.  The second hypothesis proposed that increasing 
levels of police repression in proportion to repression by all other government actors (repression 
ratio) should also increase the probability of civil war onset.  I test each hypothesis on five 
different onset datasets, using a number of indicators of repression. 
 I find little support for the hypothesis relating police repression to civil war onset.  
Though the predicted probabilities increase as expected, only the use of the PRIO onset database 
yielded statistically significant results.  This outcome suggests that police repression may be 
more important to lower orders of internal violence.74    
 I find mixed support for the hypothesis concerning police repression in proportion to 
repression by all other government actors.  When using ITT data, an increasing police ratio 
increases the probability of civil war onset, with statistically significant outcomes occurring at 
higher values of the repression ratio.  On the other hand, the marginal effects appear to be higher 
as repression by all other actors increases.  This outcome does not contradict hypothesis 2b 
directly, but it does suggest that the capability to conduct repression and create grievances is not 
exclusive to the police. The use of IDEA data for the repression ratio generates conflicting 
findings, depending on the onset database.  Some onset databases exhibit trends of increasing the 
probability of civil war onset, and some the opposite.   The differing outcomes between using 
ITT and IDEA data may be due in part to the nature of the measures.   The IDEA measure is 
more inclusive than the ITT measures, which only includes torture.  On a scale of severity of 
personal integrity violations, torture is only exceeded by assassination or execution.  Perhaps 
only egregious acts of repression by police represent a severe enough deviation from typical 
behavior to induce the collective action necessary for a state’s inhabitants to violently challenge 
the state. 
  
                                                 
74 The PRIO database employs 25 battle deaths as a threshold, whereas the other databases employ much higher 
thresholds, such as 1000. 
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Chapter 4 -  Police Organization and Civil War 
In a previous chapter I addressed the role of police capacity on civil war onset.  I did so 
through the theoretical lens of coercive capacity, which I operationalized primarily through 
measures of police density.  In this chapter I expand beyond measures of coercive capacity as 
simply a function of size by also considering how the mode of police organization can affect the 
probability of civil war onset.  In doing so, I tie together the ideas of all three preceding chapters.  
I draw upon the tenets of the principal-agent model I described in Chapter 1 for determining the 
demands that the central state authority places on the police, as well as the autonomy the police 
may enjoy in electing whether or how well to carry out these tasks.  I combine these factors with 
the role of police repression I covered in Chapter 3 to explain how certain organizational types 
should be more likely to employ repression.  Finally, I draw upon the ideas of police capacity 
from Chapter 2 and describe how certain types of organization should be more effective in 
deterring violent challenges to the state. 
  
 Police Organization in Theory 
In the following sections, I offer two competing hypotheses on the effect of police 
organization on the probability of civil war onset.  I describe each causal mechanism separately, 
ending with a hypothesis.  The first hypothesis relies upon the grievance school, which contends 
that some egregious state activity is necessary to induce a state’s inhabitants to violently 
challenge it.  I describe how police repression can serve as this egregious activity, and how more 
centralized police organizations could abet police repression.  In the second hypothesis, I draw 
upon a greed based explanation for civil war onset, which holds that a state’s inhabitants are 
inherently rebellious, and only the threat or practice of state coercion can prevent violent 
challenges to the state.  I explain how police centralization should allow police to exercise their 
coercive capacity more efficiently.  Before elaborating on each hypothesis, however, I draw from 
a seminal study for descriptions and definitions of police organizational types. 
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 Bayley’s Description of Police Organization 
Bayley (1985) has conducted one of the most comprehensive analyses of police 
organizational types.  According to Bayley, modern police tend to exhibit an organization that 
accords with a four way typology related to the degree of centralization of command as well as 
the number of police commands, as depicted in Table 4-1 below.  Centralization occurs when 
“operational control can be given routinely to subunits from a single center of control” (54).  
This is not to be confused with autonomy, which refers to “the capacity of the police to influence 
the contexts and conditions of their own work” (Marenin 1996: 315).  Police may be highly 
centralized, but autonomous from the central state authority.  Conversely, decentralized police do 
not necessarily enjoy more autonomy from political authority; the locus just shifts from the state 
to some lower level polity.  In the language of the principal-agent model, the state as principal 
changes location and diffuses. 
 
Table 4-1 World Classification of Police Types 
   Centralization 
   Centralized Decentralized 
# 
of
 C
om
m
an
ds
 
Single 
Sri Lanka   
Singapore   
Poland N.A.75 
Ireland   
Israel   
Multiple 
Coordinated 
France Great Britain 
Finland 
The 
Netherlands 
  Canada 
  India 
  Germany 
  Japan 
Uncoordinated 
Italy Belgium 
  Switzerland 
  United States 
* Adapted from Bayley (1985) 
                                                 
75 Bayley has deemed it logically impossible for a police force to exist that consists of a single, but decentralized 
command.  By its very nature of being decentralized, such a police force would submit to multiple centers of 
authority, and therefore could not constitute a “single” command.   
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 Elaboration on some of the countries depicted in the table can help explain the meanings 
of the classifications.  In Sri Lanka, an example of a highly centralized police force with a single 
command, the Inspector General of Police has authority over all police manning the 2,600 police 
stations in the country.  There are various intermediate police authorities in charge of stations 
and districts, but all have a direct line of authority to the Inspector General.  At the other end of 
the extreme is the United States, wherein 99% of police officers operate under the authority of 
local governments (Das 2006). 
Bayley also distinguishes whether countries possess single or multiple police forces 
(“commands” in Bayley’s language).  Number of commands is distinct from centralization and 
simply refers to the number of police forces within a given state.  Multiple centralized police 
forces can exist, and multiple forces may also be subdivided into whether they act in a 
coordinated or uncoordinated manner.   Finland and Italy exemplify multiple, centralized police 
forces.  There are centralized insofar as a state level minister is responsible for policing in both 
countries.  They exhibit multiple commands because both countries maintain multiple police 
forces that are not subordinate to each other, as in Sri Lanka.  They differ, however, in that all 
police in Finland are under the authority of the Minister of Interior, whereas one of the major 
police forces in Italy, the Carabinieri, report to the Ministry of Defense (Das 2006). 
 
 With a useful description of police organization types in hand, the next step is to explore 
how these types should affect the probability of civil war onset.  In the next two sections, I offer 
two contrasting hypotheses on the relationships between centralization and civil war onset.   
 
  Grievance and Police Organization 
A grievance/contingency based explanation for the effect of police organization on civil 
war would rest on the premise that some type of police organization would be likely to instigate 
inhabitants of a state to overcome their obstacles to collective action and respond with violence.  
The results I obtained Chapter 2 suggest repression can serve as the intermediate process linking 
police organization and civil war onset.  Thus, the question of whether the type of police 
organization has an independent effect on civil wars boils down to whether, ceteris paribas, a 
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certain type of police organization would be more likely to repress or not.  In this sub-section I 
describe how centralized police forces are more likely to engage in the level of repression 
necessary to induce the collective action necessary for civil war onset. 
I do not argue that mode of police organization effects individual police officers’ 
inclination to engage in repression.  There is little theoretical reason for individual police officers 
in a decentralized force to be more restrained in the use of force than their counterparts in a 
centralized force.  It is reasonable to expect that police in all types of organization should 
consider engaging in repression for the same reasons.  Instead, I argue that repression is most 
likely to occur in states with centralized police forces because it creates conditions that allow the 
interests of the state and police in employing repression to be more likely to be aligned when 
rebels challenge the state.   
A grievance based hypothesis relating police organization to civil war onset relies on the 
premise that, under certain circumstances, states will repress their inhabitants.  This is not to say 
that all states will constantly repress their people.  All the repression databases employed in 
previous chapters of this study illustrate that levels of repression vary both within and across 
states.  Rather, in terms of the principal-agent model, a state as principal will attempt to direct its 
agents to employ repression when the use of repression serves the interest of the state in 
preserving its rule.  Thus, I impose the restriction that the ensuing models and estimations only 
apply to circumstances in which the state has a strong interest in conducting repression.   
The one circumstance that nearly always causes the state to engage in repression is when 
it faces a threat to its authority.  A “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” appears to exist that 
stipulates that, when challenged, states generally respond with some sort of repressive actions 
(Davenport 2007).  Two common and interrelated explanations for this behavior are regime 
characteristics and threats.  Threat-based explanations tie increasing state repression to escalating 
internal threats against the regime.   Regime based explanations explore which types of regimes 
are associated with varying levels of repression.   For instance, democracies and autocracies are 
both less likely to employ repression than anocracies.  Threats manifest themselves in several 
ways with differing outcomes depending upon regime type.   That anocracies appear to carry out 
more acts of repression may not be completely attributable to regime type.    Anocracies may 
employ repression most frequently because this type of regime tends to experience the greatest 
levels of threat (Regan and Henderson 2002).    Nevertheless, variation on the use of repression 
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exists both between and within democracies and autocracies.  Democracies employ repression 
the least but, this behavior only seems to apply to states with the highest levels of democracy 
(Davenport 2004; Davenport and Armstrong 2004).    Among the threat and regime 
characteristics, however, threat appears to be the major determinant of whether states respond 
with repression (Regan and Henderson 2002).   A high magnitude of violent dissent trumps 
regime type.   Occurrences of violent dissent and civil war appear to be the most significant 
factors for whether a state will employ repression for all but those countries with the lowest 
restrictions on civil liberties and lowest propensities to employ violence against their citizens 
(Davenport 2004).   
Type of threat may be an additional factor and is also related to regime type.  Deviance of 
dissident activities from accepted cultural norms has the greatest effect on whether democracies 
and anocracies will employ repression, whereas the variety of threats the dissidents employ has 
the greatest effect on whether autocracies employ repression (Davenport 1995).  Conflict 
frequency affects whether states employ repression regardless of regime type, but is of less 
importance than the aforementioned factors (Davenport 1995, King 1998).   
 
The following table depicts my estimations of the probability of repression when taking 
into account the interests of the police and state.76   I base my estimations on the principal-agent 
model, which suggests that police choose the mixture of coercion/cooperation that best balances 
the requirements of the state and society.  The success of the police in fulfilling this function 
entails satisfying the demands of both the state and society without neglecting the police force’s 
own interest.77   
  
                                                 
76 My use the term “state” refers only to the highest level of polity and is distinct from any sub-national polities.  I 
have omitted consideration of society as principal under the assumption that with few exceptions, it is never in the 
interest of society for the police to repress. 
77 See Chapter 1 for a description of how this model applies to police. 
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Table 4-2 Probability of Repression when taking into account State and Police Interests  
  State Interest in Repression 
  Yes No 
Po
lic
e 
in
te
re
st
 in
 
R
ep
re
ss
io
n 
Yes I. High IV.  Uncertain 
No II. Low III. None 
 
 Quadrant I indicates that repression should be most likely when both the state and the 
police share interests in employing repression.  I argue that this situation occurs most often in 
states with centralized police forces.   My line of reasoning rests on the two premises that the 
state level of government bears ultimate responsibility for defending its sovereignty, and that the 
typical response of a state to violent challenges is to engage in repression (Rotberg 2004; 
Davenport 1995).   Consequently, the central state authority should constitute the level of 
government that experiences the highest pressure to direct police to employ repression in 
response to those threats.  A centralized police force enables this pressure because it places the 
onus for monitoring the police with the level of government that has the strongest incentive to 
view repression as a desirable response to violent challenges to its authority.  I expect this 
arrangement to lead to greater overall levels of police repression for several reasons.  First, there 
are fewer institutional hurdles preventing the shared interests of the police and state in employing 
repression from manifesting itself in actual repressive acts.  By definition, centralized police 
forces have the state as the principal, so authority over the police is not diffuse.78   Another 
reason is that a common characteristic of a centralized force is a strong chain of command that 
links the chief individual responsible for internal security (often the Minister of the Interior) all 
the way to the basic patrolman. 79   While this extended chain of command may increase 
opportunities for information asymmetries between individual police officer conduct and the 
                                                 
78 Though sub-national polities may exist, their influence on the police is minimal. 
79 This observation is based on my readings of the descriptions of states’ police force as part of my effort to 
determination modes of organization. 
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state’s wishes, the benefits of centralized structures should offset the asymmetry, especially in 
comparison to less centralized police forces.  Lastly, having a centralized police force also places 
the police under the same level of government that controls the military – a situation that I argue 
in the next chapter can contribute to greater police use of repression.   
 Quadrant II represents the situation wherein the state has an interest to engage in 
repression, but the police as the coercive agents do not.   Reduced repression would result when 
the police are able to shirk the demands from the state to engage in repression.80  I argue that 
such conditions are more likely to occur in states with decentralized police force because the 
diffusion of principals inherent in decentralized police structures allows the police to more easily 
shirk the state’s calls to engage in repression.  By definition, decentralized police forces have a 
sub-state polity as a principal, which allows the more numerous sub-state principals the ability to 
generate their own preferences, which may or may not accord with the state.   
 I rest my argument that increasing decentralization leads to a fewer incidences of police 
repression on the observation that civil wars often do not engulf the entire territory of a state 
(Cederman 2006), thereby leaving certain portion of the state unaffected by the threats and 
physical destruction of the war.  I expect that police forces that operate in unaffected areas have 
less incentive to engage in repression because they face lesser threats.  For instance, the police 
may view the state’s directive to act more repressively as unduly risky.  Unlike the state rulers, 
the police must operate in a relatively dispersed manner throughout the populace, and the police 
may fear that repression could provoke a violent backlash.  Moreover, in a decentralized police 
force we would expect that the preferences of the police and their associated sub-state authorities 
should be more symmetrical.  Both should be subject to similar dissident threat levels, or lack 
thereof, so the police would be less likely to shirk the principal’s preferences.  As a result of their 
shared interests, decentralized police forces that operate in unaffected areas and their associated 
sub-state political authorities should be more able to resist generalized calls from the central state 
government to engage in indiscriminate repression.    
One should also observe a similar effect of decentralization when treating society as the 
principal.  I expect that societies in states with decentralized police forces should experience less 
                                                 
80 According to the tenets of the Principal-Agent model, shirking occurs when the state fails to adequately 
incentivize the police to engage in repression or cannot monitor police behavior. 
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of a principal-agent problem in restraining their police from engaging in repression than those 
societies with centralized police forces.  This is not to say that society cannot serve as a principal 
for any police organizational form.  Police are still agents of the state, so society should be able 
to influence the actions of the police through the intermediary of the state regardless of police 
type, as long as the societies exist in states with an accountable regime types.  The difference for 
decentralized police forces is that they by definition consist of many police forces that answer to 
many societies within a given state.  This arrangement should therefore entail less of a principal-
agent problem with society.  First, the asymmetry of information should be lower.  While the gap 
in technical knowledge between the police and society would remain, societies with 
decentralized police forces should be more aware of police activities because the individual 
decentralized police forces should be smaller.  I would also expect that the police and society 
would be more likely to share similar attitudes about the acceptable use of repression.  The 
asymmetry of preferences between the society and decentralized police forces should be lower 
because both would face similar threats, which should have the effect of reducing the impact of 
acts of police repression.  Societies facing significant threats appear to more tolerant of 
repression (Davenport 2005), and thus less likely to develop grievances from police behavior.  
Additionally, members of decentralized police forces should be more likely to originate from the 
local community, and would therefore be more likely to maintain familial or cultural/ethnic ties 
to it.  This local affiliation could manifest itself in a greater shared understanding of what 
constitutes acceptable repression.81   
 
Quadrant IV represents an interesting condition wherein the police have an interest in 
repressing, but the state does not.  It is my belief that the conditions described in Quadrant IV 
have no clear relationship with police organizational type. The principal-agent model would 
suggest that the combination of interests portrayed in quadrant IV could occur because either the 
state has no interest in restraining the police from engaging in repression, or because the state 
lacks the monitoring capacity to restrain the police.  From a theoretical perspective, the mode of 
police organization should not matter if the state has no interest in restraining the police.  More 
                                                 
81 The contrasting example would be a gendarme force (which is normally centralized) that may operate well outside 
its home base with few social or physical ties to the community (Lutterbeck 2004). 
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important would be regime type, and Bayley (1985) has demonstrated that centralized police 
forces are not exclusive to regime types that fail to honor human rights.  On the other hand, if the 
state does have an interest in restraining police use of repression, police can only do so when the 
states is unable to effectively monitor police activities.  Again, police organizational type should 
have little theoretical impact on states’ monitoring capabilities.  The inability of a state to 
monitor its agents is a characteristic of a weak or failing state (Rose-Ackerman 2004).  State 
failure is a powerful explanation for civil war and would trump any consideration of police mode 
of organization.82 
 Quadrant III.  The circumstances of quadrant III should not contribute to civil war onset 
regardless of the mode of police organization.  When neither the police nor the state has an 
interest in engaging in repression, I do not expect repression to constitute a plausible causal 
mechanism for civil war onset.   
 
The consolidation of police in Uganda in the 1960s offers an example of police 
centralization abetting state repression.  At the time of independence in 1962, Uganda did not 
have a completely centralized police force.  The Ugandan independence constitution allowed for 
the continued existence of a number of semi-autonomous kingdoms, each possessing their own 
police forces (Das 2006).  The responsibility for the remainder of the country fell to the Ugandan 
National Police−a centralized force (Das 2006).  Notwithstanding the constitutional provisions, 
                                                 
82 At first glance, it would appear that this combination would be more common in states with decentralized police.   
Shirking (in this case being police use of repression) would seem to increase as the police forces become more 
decentralized due to increased information asymmetry and competing principals.  Moreover, the sub-state polity 
may view threats as more severe than the central state authority.  Consequently, interests between decentralized 
police and its state as principal would diverge, thereby exacerbating the agency problem and complicating the 
principal’s efforts to direct the behavior of its agent.  Thus, the circumstances of quadrant IV should more prevalent 
in decentralized police forces.   While this line of reasoning seems plausible, I contend that any increased repression 
would be localized, and the overall effect of the decentralized police force should actually reduce the aggregate level 
of repression.  The reason is that the resulting repression should be more specific to the area for which the 
decentralized police force is responsible and therefore less likely to surpass the threshold of inducing the level of 
collective action necessary for the onset of a civil war.    
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the status of the independent kingdoms was an area of continuous dispute in the years following 
independence because the central state authorities thought it encouraged tribal autonomy.   
A subsequent president sought to reign in the autonomous regions, in part by eliminating 
their police forces.   Following his election in 1966, Prime Minister Obote suspended the original 
constitution and replaced it with one that granted him greatly increased powers and revoked the 
semi-autonomous status of the kingdoms (Hills 2000; Toft 2010).  As part of the move away 
from the federal system of rule, the police that served the independent kingdoms were dissolved 
or absorbed into the Ugandan National Police (Das 2006).  Simultaneous with the structural 
centralization of the police, Obote increasingly employed the national police to eliminate 
political dissent – a move that offers strong support to the premise that centralization enables the 
interests of the police and state to align more readily.  While the previous organizational model 
provided Obote with a significant number of centralized police under his direct authority, the 
consolidation of the police from the semi-autonomous kingdoms seems very likely to have 
streamlined the process for Obote to stifle dissent (Das 2006). 
 
 
 In light of the aforementioned discussion on the relationship between police organization 
and civil war onset, I offer the following hypothesis: 
  
H3a: Increasing centralization of police organizations increases the aggregate level of 
repression the state experiences, which increases the probability of civil war onset 
 
 Having addressed the ways in which police organization should affect the probability of 
civil war onset through the intermediate process of repression, the next step is to explore the 
alternative hypothesis that centralization reduces the probability of civil war onset by increasing 
police effectiveness.   
 Greed and Police Organization 
 The effect of police organization on civil war, using greed/opportunity based 
explanations, hinges on the basic question of whether, ceteris paribus, one type of police 
organization is more effective in deterring aspiring rebels than others.  Numerous studies, 
including Chapter 2 of this paper, have put forward weak government coercive capacity as an 
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explanation for both civil war onset (Tilly 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 
2003) and reoccurrence (Toft 2010).  Accepting that the police are a coercive instrument of the 
state with the ability to suppress incipient civil wars, which form of police organization 
possesses greater coercive capacity?   
I offer that a centralized police force is more effective for the following reasons.  First, a 
centralized police force, which by definition is controlled by the central state authority, is able to 
better draw on the greater resource base of the state, compared to police that are agents of some 
sub-state polity.  Government expenditures on police forces is one of the best indicator of police 
capacity (Bayley 1985: 75), and state level governments have greater capacity to extract revenue 
than do sub-state polities.  Second, centralized police forces should be better able to create 
economies of scale in their training and other support facilities.  Thus, for any given resourcing 
level, a centralized police force should be better trained and equipped.  Third, centralized police 
forces are better able to draw upon the service of state intelligence agencies than decentralized 
forces.  These services are important because the ability of government forces to discriminate 
among combatants and non-combatants is a critical factor in both the onset (Goodwin 2003) and 
duration of civil war (Kalyvas 2006).  A counter-argument is that decentralized police forces 
should have a better understanding of the local environment since members of decentralized 
police forces are more likely to have originated from the same area they police.  Moreover, 
police in centralized forces are often posted simply based on manning requirements with no 
consideration of the individual policeman’s origin.  While this counterargument is intuitively 
plausible, the information gathering advantage of decentralized police forces should be offset by 
the consideration that civil wars often originate in remote and inaccessible areas (Fearon and 
Laitin 2004), which presumably would be lightly policed, regardless of the police force’s 
organization. 
A final advantage of centralized police forces relates to the superior capability they 
provide the state to shift police resources to problem areas.  Centralized police forces generally 
answer to either a Ministry of Interior or to the chief executive in the case of small forces in 
lightly populated states.83  As a result, the ruling authority may more easily shift centralized 
police forces to areas requiring greater policing, under the premise that there are simply fewer 
                                                 
83 This statement is based on my own observations while creating my police organization dataset. 
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bureaucratic hurdles to redeploying a state controlled police force than one controlled by a sub-
state polity.   For example, the President of the United States could not easily shift New York 
City Police officers to deal with unrest in Chicago, but the President of France could reposition 
forces from Paris to Marseilles if necessary due to the centralized organization of French police. 
The greater deployability a centralized police force offers the state is especially 
pronounced for states with Gendarme forces.  Based on their traditional mission, these forces are 
less territorially aligned than patrolmen/constable police (Bayley 1985: 41).  Consequently rulers 
of states with centralized gendarme police forces should possess the greatest capability to 
redeploy police forces, and therefore, the greatest capacity to suppress and deter incipient rebel 
movements.   
 Examples of states centralizing their police forces in an effort to increase their 
effectiveness abound, especially since the latter half of the 20th century.84  The trend is most 
common in Europe.  Iceland (1972), the Netherlands (1993), and Sweden (1965) all replaced 
their municipal police forces with state police in a bid for greater efficiency and uniformity.  
Nevertheless, it is not exclusive to Europe.  The Philippines consolidated their police into a 
centralized state force in 1975 to establish uniformity, enhance coordination across its disparate 
islands, and minimize police involvement with local politicians.  Nicaragua also underwent 
centralization.  When the Sandinistas overthrew the Samoza regime in 1979, they abolished the 
National Guard units that were responsible for policing.  In the absence of a police force, levels 
of crime increased greatly across Nicaragua, leading the Sandanista government to create a 
national police force to establish and maintain order.   
Nevertheless, the capacity of a state’s police force may reach a point where organization 
no longer matters.  In this case, either superior numbers or some other aspect of police capacity 
may take precedence over whether the police are organized centrally or not.  By logical 
extension, we should observe a diminishing effect of centralization on civil war onset and 
reoccurrence as capacity increases.  In light of these considerations, I offer the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H3b: Increasing centralization of police decreases the probability of civil war onset, 
though the marginal effect decreases as police capacity increases. 
                                                 
84 These summarizes are a compilation of Das (2006) and Kurian (1989). 
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 Research Design 
In the following section, I present my research design for testing my organization based 
hypotheses.  I first offer a description of the dependent and independent variables common to all 
models.  I then address the variables and models specific to each hypothesis in a sub-section 
dedicated to each. 
 Dependent Variable 
 I continue to employ the same five datasets that I have in previous chapters.85  See 
Appendix A - Description of Dependent Variables. 
 
 Primary Independent Variable: Centralization of Police 
I draw from Bayley (1985) and employ a typology of police organization that considers 
police forces to be “centralized” or “decentralized.”86  Because no nation possesses a purely 
decentralized police force, I distinguish between centralized and decentralized forces according 
to the level of government that wields authority over the majority of the police responsible 
maintenance of order.  Using this criterion allows for states with primarily decentralized law 
enforcement agencies to also possess centralized policing agencies with special functions.87  For 
example, the Unites States, which Bayley denotes as the quintessential decentralized police 
force, also possesses centralized federal law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Marshal Service.  Moreover, many U.S. states possess their own police or 
highway patrols.  My choice of the law and order coding criterion allows me to confidently 
consider the United States to have decentralized police forces because the FBI and U.S. Marshall 
Service have specialized functions that do not consist primarily of the maintenance of order.  
                                                 
85 I differ only in that, for reasons related to reducing endogeneity in one set of models, I only employ the datasets 
that treat ongoing war years as “missing.”  I address this decision more fully in a subsequent section. 
86 See Table 4-3 for police organization types.  I had originally intended to sub-divide decentralized police forces 
into moderately centralized and decentralized, but there was not enough variation in civil war onset for states with 
decentralized police forces, so I kept Bayley’s two categories. 
87 See Chapter 1 - What are Police and What do They Do? for a discussion of law enforcement functions. 
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In keeping with this typology, I deem a state to possess a highly centralized police force 
if the majority of its police principally responsible for order maintenance, who Bayley and Perito 
(2012) term as “core police,” answer to the highest central state authority.  I deem a state to 
possess a decentralized police force when the police principally responsible for order 
maintenance answers predominately to a sub-national polity (such as states, provinces, 
municipalities etc.)   Finally, I add a category for instances wherein no organized police force 
exists within a state.  Examples of states in this category would include states that rely on 
traditional, non-governmental means for policing such as tribal authorities, as well as states that 
have experienced failure.  The table below depicts these categories.   
 
Table 4-3 Types of Police Organization 
Degree of Centralization  
Highly Centralized 
Decentralized 
None 
 
My primary sources for assigning police to organizational categories are the World Police 
Encyclopedia (Das 2006), the World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems (Newman, 
Bouloukos, and Cohen 1993), and The World’s Police (Cramer 1964).  These volumes provide 
narrative descriptions of police organizations for 193, 45, and 113 states, respectively.  The most 
recent data is generally available from the Das volume, which covers the time period up through 
the 1990s.  I assign a police force to one of the three categories when one or more of the police 
reference volumes provide an explicit description of the level of government that oversees the 
police, as well as a clear denotation of the date for which the description is pertinent.  I consider 
data that does not meet these criteria to be “missing.”  Once I assign a state’s police force to a 
category, I carry it forward in time unless I determine that a clear change in the level of 
government with accountability over the police occurs.  With few exceptions, determination of 
the predominant organizational model of core police in the aforementioned references is 
uncomplicated.  For one, the majority of states have centralized police in the time period since 
World War II.  Additionally, those states that do possess a predominately decentralized police 
force are conspicuous in the references’ descriptions of their organizational form.  For example, 
Germany (and West Germany before unification), possesses a decentralized police force because 
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the majority of its core police reside at the sub-national level of the German state.  This is not to 
say that national law enforcement agencies do not exist in Germany, just that the national 
agencies do not constitute the core police.  In the instances wherein a clear description of the 
predominant organizational mode of core police does not exist, it becomes missing data.  
Because my coding procedures result in ordinal measures, I rely upon a common 
methodology and model them as additive dummy variables (Winship and Mare 1984).  I treat 
“decentralized” as the baseline.    While I create a category of “none” for police organization, I 
drop all observations in this category because the principal-agent relationship that underpins my 
hypotheses is not valid when there is no government principal at all.88   This choice results in 
some loss of data, but observations of “none” are very rare, so the effect of the loss is 
negligible.89   
 
 In the next two sub-sections, I discuss variables and modeling considerations that are 
specific to the individual hypothesis. 
 
 Research Design for Grievance based Hypothesis 
The sample domain for testing the grievance based, police organization hypotheses 
entails considerations that are distinct from the other hypotheses in this study.  Because the 
models and assumptions underpinning the grievance based hypotheses operate under the 
limitation that the actors will operate in the predicted manner only in the presence of threats, the 
optimal sample would only include those observations wherein the state faces what the ruler 
perceives to be a plausible threat.  Rather than attempt to include some form of statistical or 
sample technique to control for the presence of threat90, I take the opposite tack and include the 
                                                 
88 Additionally, observations of states with no police force are highly conflated with state failure, which is in turn 
highly associated with civil war and repression.  By including observations of states with no police force, I run the 
risk of conceptual overlap with state failure, which could subsume any other explanation. 
89 Only 161 of 15,979 are “none.” 
90 A statistical control measure could have been some measure of internal threat.  A problem with this type of 
control is that it is not theoretically related to centralization, so spuriousness should not be present because there is 
no reason to think that centralization occurs as a result of threat (Bayley 1985).  In the absence of such spuriousness, 
inclusion of a threat control variable would only increase the goodness of fit of the overall model, while not 
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same full sample as I do in the other tests throughout this study.  This decision is conservative 
insofar as employing a full sample should diminish any real causal effect as long as 
centralization does not increase the probability of civil war through some other causal 
mechanism.  Any substantively and statistically significant results that do emerge will have done 
so in the presence of increased random variation. 
 
 Intervening Variables 
 My first hypothesis (grievance based) relating mode of police organization to civil war 
onset posits repression as an intervening casual process.  To operationalize this process, I rely 
upon repression indicators I develop in Chapter 2.  I employ the ITT and IDEA indicators of 
police repression because they capture the concept of interest, however, I omit the ITT ratio and 
IDEA ratio indicators because the inclusion of the ratio terms is mathematically problematic.91  I 
include the CIRI and PTS indicators as points of comparison because they generated the most 
substantively and statistically significant results in tests of the effects of repression on the 
probability of civil war onset.   
 Controls.   
 Because my grievance based models involve an intervening process, I employ two sets of 
control variables – one for repression as the dependent variable and one for civil war as the 
dependent variable.   
                                                                                                                                                             
affecting the relationship among centralization and civil war onset (Aneshensel 2002; Ray 2003).  A sample control 
technique would entail only testing the sub-set of observations wherein threat the ruler considers to be plausible is 
present.  From a methodological perspective, this technique is highly desirable (Achen 2002), but requires 
identification of the proper sub-sample, a step I consider to be more problematic than simply including the entire 
sample as I have chosen to do. 
91 The problem stems from the fact that the ratio terms are actually interactive terms.  The intervening role for which 
I have employed repression would cause me treat the ratio variables as a dependent variable, meaning it would be an 
interactive term, which I could not regress properly since I would have to also include its constituent terms on the 
left side as well. 
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 Controls for the Effect of Police Organization on Repression (Repression as DV) 
 Candidates for control variables must be theoretically related to police organization and 
repression.  One of the few consistent predictors of police organization is regime type.   
Authoritarian regimes tend to possess centralized police organizations, but not all states with 
centralized regime types are authoritarian.  On the other hand, decentralized police forces are 
more likely to exist in states with non-authoritarian regimes, though not all non-authoritarian 
states have decentralized police forces.  Where the variation among decentralized police forces 
does exist is the level of coordination among that exists between a state’s separate forces.  For 
example, both the United States and Canada possess decentralized police forces, but the level of 
coordination among their respective forces differs greatly.  Canadian forces exercise a higher 
level of coordination between Canadian municipal police and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) – a national level police force.  In contrast, the United States does not even 
possess a true state level law enforcement agency, and localized police forces tend to be 
overlapping and uncoordinated.  An example is the absence of formal command relationship 
between municipal police forces and county sheriffs’ departments (Bayley 1985).  I model 
regime type by the Polity IV score. 
   
 Controls for Effect of Repression on Civil War 
Modeling limitations require me to employ centralization as a proxy for increased state 
and police willingness to employ repression, which are the independent variables in step 2 of the 
Grievance based models.  Candidates for control variables should therefore be theoretically and 
empirically related to both increased willingness to employ repression and civil war onset.  Since 
this consideration is similar to those for selection of control variables in Chapter 2, I include the 
same candidates for controls as I do in that chapter.   
 
 Models92 
 Since my hypothesis contains an intervening process, I must portray it with two 
equations.  The first equation depicts the effect of increasing centralization on repression (Step 
                                                 
92 See Appendix D -  Description of variables contained in organization models. 
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1), and the second equation depicts the effect of increasing repression on the probability of civil 
war onset (Step 2).  Below is a model of Step 1. 
 
Model 3a.1 Repressionit  = β0 + β1 (centralization)it + β2(regime type)it  
 
I continue to employ a GEE estimation with a ordinary least squares (OLS) link and robust 
standard errors for the reason I explained earlier.93  I do not test step 2 (the effect of repression 
on civil war onset) since doing so would simply repeat the work of Chapter 3 of this study. 
 The second way I model the hypothesis is to employ a technique that allows me to test 
both steps simultaneously.  I select this method rather than the mathematically simpler method of 
comparing the results of sequential tests of steps 1 and 2.94  While the sequential method is 
appealing in its simplicity, it is only appropriate if the error terms of the two regression equations 
are uncorrelated (Paxton, Hipp, and Pyatt 2011).  Thus, there could be no omitted variables that 
affect both repression and civil war onset.  Given the number of causal factors that repression 
and civil war share, satisfying this requirement is unlikely.95   
 Because I expect the my two equations will have correlated error terms, I can treat them 
as “Seemingly Unrelated equations”(Zellner 1962) as long as there are no simultaneity or 
feedback mechanisms.  In other words, the onset of a civil war cannot increase repression, which 
in turn cannot affect police organization.  I am fairly confident that the latter relationship is not 
present since police organization is generally time invariant (Bayley 1985), especially in the 
short 50 year time domain I utilize.  In contrast, there is some evidence for the former.  Levels of 
threat are the strongest determinant of state use of repression, with civil wars being the most 
significant factor (Davenport 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002).   I attempt to mitigate any 
effect of this endogeneity by portraying ongoing war years as “missing.”96   
                                                 
93 See section Chapter 2 - Models for a justification of the GEE estimation technique. 
94 The second test is that basis of chapter 2. 
95 Examples include level of democracy, state strength, and development. 
96 Under a time series-cross sectional design, increased state use of repression resulting from the onset of a civil war 
should manifest itself during the ongoing war years.  By treating ongoing war years as “missing,” I eliminate the 
corresponding increased repression scores from the sample.96  This technique does not entirely eliminate the 
endogenous effect in the years following termination, but my t control variable accounts for this by capturing the 
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  Because I have modeled civil war onset as a bivariate dependent variable, common tools 
for conducting seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) are not appropriate.97  As a result, I 
employ the “conditional mixed process (cmp)” technique (Roodman 2009), which does allow for 
a probit function as long the equations otherwise meet the “seemingly unrelated” criteria.98  
 
Figure 4-1 Three Step Model of Organization, Repression, and Civil War 
 
 
Though I assert that the causal pathway is centralization → repression → civil war, 
ideosynchracies with the cmp command prevent me from directly computing the predicted 
                                                                                                                                                             
decaying effect of a previous war.  See Chapter 2 - Models for a discussion of the effects of the two methods for 
modeling ongoing war years. 
97 The STATA “surreg” command only works for recursive equations wherein all dependent variables are 
continuous. 
98 A drawback of the cmp technique is that is does not offer many of the advantages of the GEE command I use 
elsewhere.  However, I deem the benefits that the cmp offers in capturing the joint estimation of both steps to be 
greater than the loss efficiency from not using GEE. 
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probabilities of civil war onset as a function of changing the level of centralization.99  I 
overcome this problem by making police organization an independent variable in both equation 1 
and 2, as seen in the preceding figure and the model below.  Doing so allows me to observe the 
change in predicted probabilies of civil war onset from increasing centralization while still 
capturing the joint effects of centralization on both dependent variables. 
 
Model 3a2.  Repressionit  = β0 + β1 (centralization)it  
+ β2(regime type)it  
  
 Onsetit = β0 + β1 (centralization)it + β2 peace_yearsit  
+  β3 (lag of threat)it  + β4 (square of Polity IV)it  
+  β4 (Polity IV)it  
 
  
 Research Design for Greed based Hypotheses 
  Independent Variables 
 I employ the same police organization variables for greed based models that I did for 
grievance based models, however, I use quinquennial values for these and all other variables in 
the greed based models because I include police capacity measures in the models.100  I compute 
the quinquennial organization score as the organization type that is predominant during the five 
year period.101 
  Interactive Variables for Greed based Hypothesis   
 My greed based hypothesis relating police organization to civil war onset proposes that 
centralized police forces are more effective in deterring rebel movements, but this effect should 
diminish as overall police capacity increases.  I depict this diminishing effect by interacting 
                                                 
99 The problem stems from using a dummy variable for centralization.  The cmp command will not allow me to 
compute predicted probabilities from varying values of the centralization variable unless I include it in the “Step 2” 
equation.   
100 See Chapter 2 - Research Design for an explanation of how I compute police capacity as quinquennial values. 
101 Though a tie in type of organization is theoretically possible, there are no instances in any quinquennial wherein 
an organizational type does not appear at least three times. 
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police organization with measures of police capacity.  I rely upon the same measures of actual 
police capacity I employed in Chapter 3 – namely, police per capita and police per area.   
 
  Control Variables  
The greed hypotheses involve consideration of how police centralization affects police 
capacity to deter challenges to the state.  This relationship is very similar to what I propose in 
chapter 2, so I employ the same variables for models of greed hypotheses as I do in that chapter. 
 The drawback of using quinquennial values is that, by definition it reduces the overall 
sample size by 80%.  With regard to this study, my choice to use quinquennial data has the effect 
of reducing the onset sample size by at least 60%, but I consider the value of garnering more 
matches between onsets and organizational data to offsets the costs of the smaller sample size. 
 
  Models 102  
  Because I do not posit an intervening process for repression in these hypotheses, I can 
model the hypotheses as a CNTS probit. All variables in these two models are measures in 
quinquennials (t=5). 
 
 Model 3b.1  Onsetit = β0 + β1 (centralization it)(police per capitait)  
   + β2 (centralization)it + β3(police per capita)it  
   + β5 (extractive capacity)it +  β6 (bureaucratic quality)it  
    + β7 (military per capita)it 
 
 Model 3b.1  Onsetit = β0 + β1 (centralization it)(police per areait)  
   + β2 (centralization)it + β3(police per area)it  
   + β5 (extractive capacity)it +  β6 (bureaucratic quality)it  
    + β7 (military per area)it 
 
  
                                                 
102 See Appendix D - Description of variables contained in organization models. 
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 Results 
 In the following section, I provide descriptions of the results I obtain from the 
aforementioned models.  I subdivide the results according to whether they correspond to the 
greed or the grievance hypotheses. 
 
 Results for Grievance Hypotheses (H3a Models) 
 
 I divide the explanations into steps.  Step 1 is the effect of police organization on 
repression.  Step 2 captures the effects of repression on civil war onset.  The simultaneous model 
captures both steps. 
 
 Results from Tests of Model 3a.1 (Step 1) 
 
  Table 4-4 depicts the outcomes of a GEE regression on the various repression indicators, 
both with and without observations from United States for reasons I explain subsequently.   The 
baseline mode of organization is “decentralized.”  The results of using the CIRI and PTS data are 
not statistically significant, though the sign of the coefficients of the centralization dummy 
variable are consistent with my hypothesis that increasing centralization leads to higher levels of 
repression, as indicated by the PTS scores, and greater respect for physical integrity, as indicated 
by the CIRI score.     
 The use of the police specific repression indicators exhibits a contradictory effect wherein 
increasing centralization leads to lower levels of repression, though outcomes are only 
statistically significant with the full country sample of IDEA data, as indicated in column 6 of 
the table below.  I suspect that this contrasting outcome is due to systemic bias in the way IDEA 
measures repression since the IDEA relies upon media reports and is sensitive to bias related to 
both media access and the small number of countries with decentralized police forces.103  The 
ITT score does not rely upon media reports in the same way, but the use of ITT data did not 
generate any statistically significant results.  I include it solely for sake of comparison.  
 
                                                 
103 See Appendix D - Tests of Bias Effect from ITT and IDEA for a results of these tests. 
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Table 4-4 Outcomes of OLS Regression of Police Organization on Repression (model 3a.1) 
  
Regression on repression indicators using Police modes of Organization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   w/o USA with USA w/o USA with USA 
VARIABLES CIRI PTS ITT police 
repression 
ITT police 
repression 
IDEA 
police 
repression 
IDEA 
police 
repression 
       
Centralized -0.0483 0.00224 -1.980 -2.978 -1.275 -1.620* 
 (0.585) (0.181) (2.390) (2.545) (0.870) (0.938) 
Polity IV score 0.0627*** -0.0266*** 0.104 0.117 0.0119 0.0150 
 (0.0135) (0.00709) (0.139) (0.140) (0.0275) (0.0279) 
Constant 4.764*** 2.467*** 7.046*** 8.007*** 3.103*** 3.452*** 
 (0.519) (0.168) (2.011) (2.177) (0.781) (0.848) 
       
Observations 2,234 2,838 614 619 1,296 1,306 
Number of ccode 138 143 126 127 138 139 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In light of the likely bias effect involving the United States in the IDEA database, I compute 
outcomes with and without the observations in the United States.  The different outcomes are 
depicted for IDEA data in columns 5 and 6.  Even after dropping the United States, the 
contradictory effects remain, but they are attenuated.  This suggests that the bias is still present, 
though not in such an egregious way as it was for the sample that included the United States.  In 
light of the bias associated with the United States, I drop it from the sample for the tests of the 
simultaneous models. 
 
 Results from Tests of Model 3a.2. Simultaneous model (steps 1 and 2) 
 Tests of the simultaneous models provide very strong statistically and substantive support 
for a relationship between centralization and civil war onset, but in the opposite direction of my 
prediction that centralization should increase the probability of civil war through the intervening 
process of repression.  Holding control variables at their means and ranging the centralization 
score from zero to one, I find statistically significant results from all onset databases, regardless 
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of the source of the repression data.104  The graphs below depict the effects of increasing 
centralization on the probability of civil war onset for police repression derived from both ITT 
and IDEA data, using the Sambanis onset dataset, and are representative of outcomes derived 
from the use of the other onset databases.    
 
Figure 4-2 Effect of Increasing Centralization on the Probability of Civil War Onset, with 
Repression as an Intermediate Process 
 
 
 
 
 In light of the outcomes of tests of both the Step 1 model and the simultaneous models, I 
must reject my hypothesis that centralization increases the probability of civil war onset, through 
the intermediate process of repression.  Moreover, the tests produced outcomes completely 
opposed to what I predicted.   One explanation for the contradictory findings may lie in the 
sampling bias associated with my measures of police repression even after dropping the United 
States, as I discussed in the previous section.   It is very possible that states with centralized 
police forces that experience civil war onsets are inaccessible to media or other human rights 
monitors. 
 
                                                 
104 See Appendix D - Outcomes for Grievance Hypothesis (simultaneous models). 
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 Results for Greed Hypothesis (Model 3b)   
 The hypothesis associated with these models predicted that increasing centralization of 
police decreases the probability of civil war onset, though the marginal effect decreases as police 
capacity increases.  This hypothesis can restated in terms of marginal effects in two different 
ways: 
 
The discrete change of centralization on the probability of civil war onset should be 
negative for all values of police capacity, but should be most negative at low values of 
police capacity, and approach zero at high values of police capacity 
 
The marginal effect of police capacity should be negative for all values of police 
centralization, but should be most negative for centralized police forces. 
 
The following table depicts the predictions and outcomes.  The term “diminish” in this table 
means that values will decrease in absolute values, i.e. become closer to zero, and “amplify” 
means to increases in absolute value, i.e. become further from zero. 
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Table 4-5 Outcomes of tests of hypothesis 3b 
 Indicators of police capacity 
Police per capita Police per area 
Predicted discrete change of 
centralization on the probability of civil 
war onset for all values of police 
capacity 
Negative Negative 
CW datasets with concurring results None All were negative, but 
none statistically 
significant 
Predicted change in discrete change of 
centralization as police capacity 
increases   
Diminish Diminish 
CW datasets with concurring results None None 
Predicted marginal effect of police 
capacity on the probability of civil war 
onset for all values of centralization 
Negative Negative 
CW datasets with concurring results None None 
Predicted change in marginal effect of 
police capacity as police centralize 
Amplify Amplify 
CW datasets with concurring results None None 
 
 
 Discrete Change of Centralization 
 Outcomes for tests of the discrete effect of centralization vary according to the indicator 
of police capacity.  The use of police per capita measures directly contradicts my hypothesis by 
yielding positive discrete changes of centralization for all onset datasets, though only the use of 
the Fearon and Laitin and Toft onset databases yielded statistically significant results for values 
of police per capita centered around its mean.  These outcomes appear in the figure below. 
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Figure 4-3 Discrete Change of Centralization as Police per Capita Varies 
 
 
 
The graphs above also indicate that marginal effects, at least in the statistically significant 
regions, do not appear to reduce to zero as I predicted.  The discrete change of centralization 
does flatten out as police capita increases, suggesting that while centralization appears to 
increase the probability of civil war onset for a range of values of police per capita, at higher 
values of police per capita the change is fairly constant. 
 In contrast, the use of police per area measures does yield the expected discrete effect 
with the use of all onset databases, though none generate statistically significant results.  Below 
are graphs depicting the outcomes, again using the Fearon and Laitin and Toft onset data. 
 
Figure 4-4 Discrete change of centralization as police per area varies 
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 Marginal Effects of Police Capacity 
None of the tests of the marginal effects of police capacity yielded statistically signicant 
results.  Graphs are available in Appendix D - Graphs for Greed Models. 
 
 Taking into account the aforementioned outcomes, I must conclude that hypothesis 3b is 
unsubstantiated.  Most tests yielded statistically insignificant results, and those finding that were 
significant exhibited outcomes that were in complete opposition to what I expected. Most 
surprising was the contrasting outcomes when using police per capita and police per area 
measures of police capacity, though some of the difference may be due to missing data.  While 
both police per area and police per capita drew upon the police strength data, the area and 
population data had missing observations for different states because the area and population 
data came from different sources.  In other words, the states missing area data were not usually 
those missing population data, and vice versa. 
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 Conclusion 
 I proposed that the level of organizational centralization of a state’s police forces should 
affect the probability of civil war onset in two conflicting ways, depending on the underlying 
causal theory for civil war.  From a grievance perspective, increasing centralization should 
increase the probability of civil war onset through the intervening process of repression.  I tested 
this hypothesis with two simultaneous equations capturing the relationship between 
centralization and repression, and centralization and civil war onset, and the results directly 
contradicted my hypothesis.  Predicted probabilities were low (>0.03) and decreased as the 
centralization dummy increased from zero to one, rather than increase as I predicted.   Outcomes 
from the tests were surprisingly consistent, regardless of the specific measure of police capacity 
or police repression.     
 The other hypothesis based on a greed based explanations for civil war onset predicted 
that increasing centralization should decrease the probability of civil war onset because 
centralized police forces should be more effective, though the effect of centralization should be 
conditional on police capacity.  As police capacity increases, the marginal effect of centralization 
should diminish.  I found little support for this hypothesis when using police per capita measures 
of capacity and none using police per area measures.  The use of two onset databases generated 
positive discrete changes from centralization that remained steady despite the values of police 
per capita.  This outcome contradicts hypothesis 3b in two ways.  The first is that the marginal 
effect is the opposite sign to that which the hypothesis predicts.  The second is that the marginal 
effect does not reduce to zero as police per capita increases.   
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Chapter 5 - Police in War 
 The previous chapters have all addressed the impact of various attributes of a state’s 
police force on the probability of civil war onset.  In this chapter, I propose another way police 
can influence civil wars, except I restrict my analysis to the subset of civil wars considered 
reoccurrences of a previous civil war.  I define a reoccurrence as a civil war that resumes 
between the same principal combatants over the same stakes (Toft 2010).  Reoccurrence merits 
special attention because it may result from police conduct during the previous war.  While the 
police and military occupy different spheres within a state’s coercive function, their roles often 
overlap in civil wars (Bayley and Perito 2010: 75), and I propose that the experience of police 
serving in what are typically military functions during a civil war can increase the chances that 
post-war peace will not hold.   In this chapter I present a hypothesis describing how the 
expansion of police activities into the military realm should affect the likelihood that civil war 
reoccurs.  I then test my hypothesis by applying it to two case studies.   
 
 Reoccurrence in Theory 
 To establish a theory of how police service in what are typically military roles during a 
civil war could increase the probability of reoccurrence, I first summarize the prevalent findings 
surrounding reoccurrence more broadly.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, reoccurrence is a special 
case of onset, and as such all the other causal explanations should still apply.105 Nevertheless, a 
few causal factors are particularly relevant to reoccurrences.  First, civil war reoccurrence is less 
likely when the previous war ends in a clear military victory for either side (Fortna 2004).   For 
wars that end in negotiated settlements, civil war is less likely to occur if the peace agreements 
contain both “carrots and sticks.”  An important stick is a provision that allows for adequate 
security forces to effectively suppress violent uprisings (Toft 2010).  The characteristics of the 
war may also matter.  Longer civil wars are less likely to experience reoccurrence, though wars 
that produce a high numbers of casualties experience a higher risk of reoccurrence (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004).  Finally, much like it did for civil war onset, repression may also 
play a role in civil war reoccurrence.  Regime use of repression during a civil war can increase 
                                                 
105 See Chapter 1 - Civil War Onset for common explanations for civil war onset. 
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the salience of group boundaries, which is an important pre-condition for the creation of violent 
opposition groups that might later challenge the state (Gurr 1981: 251).  Additionally, the very 
experience of undergoing a civil war may induce states to employ repression more frequently in 
the aftermath in an effort to forestall another civil war.   
 
 Distinctions between the Police and the Military 
 The next step is to establish the limits of typical limits of military and police functions.   
Although the police and military both possess coercive capacity and their roles can overlap 
during civil war, in nearly every country these organizations remain distinct in regard to mission, 
organization, and relationship to society (Hill 2009).  Police are internally focused whereas the 
military is more generally focused on defeating external threats (Bayley 1985).  Police forces 
also differ from the military in that they operate in small groups, and are widely diffused 
throughout civilian society.  Thus, a state’s inhabitants are much more likely to interact with the 
police than the military.  In contrast, military forces find it difficult to act in continuously 
dispersed small units and hence, are ill-suited to meet the needs of policing a society (Silver 
2005: 13).   Moreover, police tend to operate within a legal-repressive framework with stringent 
rules on the use of coercion.   The military is not constrained in the same way as the police and is 
more likely to respond to internal threats with excessive force (Crelinsten and Schmid 1992).  
The military expects to take and inflict casualties and, consequently, employs a level of 
ruthlessness the police cannot (Bittner 1972).   
 The differences between the police and military are evident in the paucity of coups police 
forces instigate in comparison to the military.  At first glance, the imbalance is surprising. Police 
should represent a plausible coup force since they also possess coercive capabilities.  
Nevertheless, in practice it turns out that military forces are almost always the organization that 
instigates coups.  One explanation for this trend is that the decentralized nature of police work 
inhibits the levels of organization and cooperation the police would need to present a plausible 
threat to the leader.  Similarly, police generally do not possess the sufficiently powerful 
weaponry to overthrow the forces loyal to the leader (Hills 2009). 
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 Why Police Fighting as Military Should Matter 
 The final step is to link police conduct to reoccurrence by answering the question whether 
a police incursion into what is normally the province of the military during a civil war should 
matter?  I contend that it does for a number of reasons, but foremost because it predisposes the 
police to engage in repression.  Police encroachment into military functions during a civil war 
should increase the probability of reoccurrence because it can lead the police to engage in more 
acts of repression in the war’s aftermath.  Serving in a military capacity offers more opportunity 
for the police to encounter violent resistance, which should lead to greater levels of police 
repression in response – a sort of microcosm of the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness.”106   As a 
result, we should expect that greater levels of repression should increase the likelihood of the 
police becoming predisposed to engaging in repression during the post-war period.107   The 
greater prevalence of police repression in the post-war environment should increase the 
probability of reoccurrence for all the reasons I provide in Chapter 2. 
 In addition, police service in military capacities could prevent the clear government 
victory that tends to prevent reoccurrence.  At first glance, such police conduct could be 
beneficial.  The military may be overwhelmed or simply not available, and the police can serve 
as a useful surrogate to prevent what could otherwise result in rebel success.  Nevertheless, I 
argue that while the use of police as military in civil wars may have some short term benefits, 
over the long term the consequences should be negative.  First, any contribution the police may 
make is probably not that beneficial.  The police simply may not be very proficient at military 
tasks.  Just as the military is ill-suited for police work, the police are ill-suited for military work 
by virtue of their training, equipment, and protocols for the use of force.  Additionally,  a 
government’s decision to routinely employ the police as proxies for its military can “let the 
military off the hook” for what should be its responsibility to conduct counterinsurgency 
operations – an occurrence that has been common in Afghanistan since 2004 (Bayley and Perito 
2010: 24).  By relegating their responsibility to fight insurgency to the police, the military can 
experience an atrophy of its counterinsurgency competencies.  A decline in perceived 
                                                 
106 See Chapter 3 - Repression in Theory for an explanation of this law. 
107 Past use of repression is a strong indicator of future use (Davenport 2005).   This argument also draws on the 
hypotheses I introduce in Chapter 3 that link repression to civil war onset. 
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counterinsurgency capacity could play into the strategic calculus of aspiring rebels and possibly 
encourage violent resistance to the state.108 
 Finally, the use of police as military, even in the short term, can increase the probability 
of reoccurrence by causing the police to neglect their more traditional law enforcement 
responsibilities.  Post-war environments place great strains on state institutions, including the 
police.  The failure of the police to adequately provide security can amplify any lingering sense 
of hostility among the populace and contribute to reoccurrence of civil war (Doyle and Sambanis 
2000).  Police forces that are unable to provide law and order among the populace could also 
induce the populace to turn to other non-state sources of security, which contributes to an 
environment more conducive to collective violent resistance to the state.  In light of these 
arguments, I offer the following hypothesis:109 
 
H4: An increasing use of police by in military functions during a civil war increases the 
probability of civil war reoccurrence. 
 
 Research Design 
 Putting my hypothesis to the test involves determining what constitutes excessive police 
involvement in what are typically military activities.  Conceptually, police involvement in civil 
wars would entail police operating in modes well beyond the typical law enforcement 
responsibilities.  Large N quantitative operationalization of such involvement would be a 
challenging endeavor, involving some subjective determination of whether a particular state’s 
police force surpassed its mandate within a given civil war.110   
                                                 
108 See Chapter for a description of how perceived capabilities can effect aspiring rebels’ perceptions of the utility of 
war. 
109 Readers will note that I have not created a corollary hypothesis relating police conduct to civil war onset.  The 
reason is that during times of peace, there are no military functions in which police forces could plausibly 
participate. 
110 The process would ideally entail creation of an interval measure such as percentage of the police force involved 
in battle or the proportion of battle involving police forces.  Moreover, one would have to determine what 
constitutes atypical police involvement since police forces are often targets in civil wars (Bayley and Perito 2010).  
As a less preferable option, one could employ a dichotomous measure indicating whether police involvement. 
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 As a solution to overcoming the quantitative operationalization challenges, I employ 
Process Tracing case studies.  This technique allows me to explore the ways the several causal 
processes I identify in the previous section may contribute to civil war reoccurrence.  Case study 
research is particularly beneficial for weighing the relevance of competing explanations, 
especially when the explanations do not lend themselves to quantitative operationalization.111  
Process tracing is a specific research technique for case studies and involves closely studying the 
unfolding of events within a case over time to determine whether the dynamics of the event 
reflect the same causal processes found in other cases (Collier 1993: 115).   
I deviate from this definition of process tracing in that my goal is not to draw general 
conclusions regarding my hypotheses.  In other words, I am not conducting “theory confirming 
case studies” (Lijphart 1971).  Instead, my goal is simply to determine whether the causal 
processes described in my hypotheses actually took place.  My method is more accurately 
categorized as “theory guided case studies” to explain or interpret a single event (Levy 2008: 4).  
Admittedly, my chosen method limits the external validity of any of my findings, but my more 
modest goal is simply to shed light on how police conduct during a civil war may affect 
reoccurrence.    
I consider my independent variable to be an indication whether the police engaged in 
tasks more appropriate to the military during the civil war.  I establish that a positive value for 
the independent variable requires that an organization that meets the definition of the term 
“police” deliberately conduct combat operations more typical of a military organization or that 
the police engage in conduct that significantly exceeds their traditional mandate.  Because there 
are instances wherein military forces are responsible for policing functions, even in peacetime, I 
only choose cases from those countries that possess police forces that are organizationally 
separate from the military.  I consider police activities to exceed their typical limits under two 
conditions.  The first is when police fall under the direct control of the military.  For the police to 
constitute a distinct element of the security sector, they must actually be distinct.  When an army 
gains operational control of the police, even while the police maintain their typical structure, the 
police become an adjunct of the military, which alters the relationship of the police with the state 
                                                                                                                                                             
crossed some critical threshold.  Both of these options would be difficult and time consuming even if adequate data 
was available. 
111 See note above. 
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and society.  The other condition relates to use of force.  Police normally operate under 
guidelines requiring the minimum use of force to restore order.  On the other hand, the military is 
under no such restriction.  Their mission is to employ maximum force to defeat the enemy as 
quickly as possible (Crelinston and Schmid 1992; Weiss 2011).  Thus, I determine that police 
violate their typical mandate when they adopt or operate under military style rules on the use of 
force.   
The dependent variable is a positive measure of the outbreak of a reoccurrence of civil 
war.  I rely upon a definition of reoccurrence from Toft (2010) as a civil war that resumes 
between the same principal combatants over the same stakes.  Because Toft does not establish a 
time limit for a subsequent war to be considered a reoccurrence, I use sixteen years (Hegre et al 
2001). 
 
 Case Selection 
I conduct process tracing on two cases based on ex ante values of the independent and 
dependent variables.  Specifically, I select a case wherein police fought as military and civil war 
reoccurred, and I draw a case wherein the police fought as military and a civil war did not occur, 
under the limitation that cases include adequate information about the police forces in service at 
the times of the civil wars.112 
In the language of social science, I select two cases for which the key independent 
variable is constant, but the dependent variable takes on different values.  In doing so, I follow 
the guideline that when the number of cases is small, researchers should always strive to include 
variation on the dependent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  The small number of 
cases and my selection criteria undeniably limit the generalizability of the any causal inferences I 
draw from analysis of these cases, but I consider these cases to be appropriate for the study’s 
objectives.  My decision to include an observation of non-reoccurrence may seem odd insofar as 
I deliberately contravene my own hypothesis.  The reason I do so is that I have no reason to 
expect that police encroachment into military functions during a civil war has a deterministic 
                                                 
112 I considered including a case where the police did not fight as military, and civil war still reoccurred, but I 
decided not to because none of my research indicates that police fighting as military was a necessary cause of civil 
war. 
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effect on reoccurrence.  At most, any effect is probabilistic.  My use of a case with a negative 
outcome should help shed light on the circumstances under which police conduct can contribute 
to reoccurrence, and those under which it cannot.   
With these considerations in mind, I draw my cases from the Sambanis (2004) onset 
dataset.113  I choose the series of civil wars that occurred between the government of Guatemala 
and a confederation of guerillas groups as my case wherein the police fought as military and civil 
war reoccurred.  My choice for the case in which the use of police did not lead to reoccurrence is 
the Greek Civil War.  My primary reason for selecting the Guatemalan case is that it constitutes 
one of the clearest examples wherein the civil wars reoccurred among the same combatants in a 
relatively short time period.  The reason for this criterion is that my hypothesis rests on the 
premise that repressive police conduct should have the greatest effect among the former 
combatants, who should hold the strongest animosity against the government.  I chose the Greek 
Civil War for two reasons.  First, the last civil war ended in 1949, so I can confidently conclude 
that no additional reoccurrence took place.  Second, this case is unique in that it actually consists 
of a series of three civil wars that appear to offer both support and refutation of my hypothesis.114  
Police served as military in all three phases, but the phases had very different outcomes.  Police 
conduct in one phase appears to have led to reoccurrence, but not in others. 
 In the following sections I present the two case studies individually.  My general 
approach is to provide a description of the background of each state’s police force from the time 
of origin to the time of the civil wars under scrutiny.  I then describe the major developments of 
                                                 
113 Sambanis does not explicitly differentiate between subsequent wars and reoccurrences, so I apply Toft’s (2010) 
definition to Sambanis’s dataset.  Several of the databases I employ for observations of civil war onset also include 
separate observations of civil war reoccurrence.  Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Toft (2010) both explicitly code 
reoccurrences.  The authors address civil war reoccurrence in terms of peacebuilding success after 2, 5, 10 yrs.  The 
authors use this data to compile indices for strict and lenient standard for peacebuilding success, yielding 71 lenient 
failures and 81 strict failures among the 124 civil wars.   Of note, the authors’ standard for the level of conflict that 
constitutes a failure is well below their own threshold for civil war.  Toft considers a civil war to have reoccurred if 
war resumes between the same principal combatants over the same stakes, which results in 19 observations of 
reoccurrence from her 130 observations of onset.  I can also draw observation of reoccurrences from databases that 
do not explicitly denoate them if a series of wars occurred between similar combatants within what I deem to be a 
reasonable time frame. 
114 I depart somewhat from Sambanis’s coding of the time domain.  He only includes two wars. 
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the civil wars, along with how the police participated in them.  I next put my hypothesis to the 
test by presenting and answering a series of questions intended to demonstrate how well the 
elements of the hypothesis apply to the cases.  I conclude each case study with an overall 
assessment of the validity of my hypothesis.  
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 Case Study #1.  Guatemala 
My hypothesis predicts that police forces that fight as military during a civil war incur a 
predisposition to engage in repression after the war, thereby increasing the probability of a 
reoccurrence.  The first case study to evaluate the validity of my hypothesis covers the series of 
civil wars that occurred in Guatemala in the 1960s and 70s.  This case serves as the example 
wherein police fought as military during a civil war, and civil war reoccurred.   
 Case Study Characteristics 
I rely upon the Sambanis (2004) dataset for the temporal boundaries of the wars in this 
case.115  Sambanis determines that a series of two civil wars occurred between Guatemalan 
government forces and similar insurgent groups from 1966-1972 and 1978-1994, respectively.  
His decision to divide the wars into two phases stands in contrast to scholars who tend to treat 
the wars as continuous.  Additionally, others employ start years that vary from 1960 to 1968.116  
Many of the differences stem from the choice of operational definition of civil war.  Sambanis 
determines that an internal conflict constitutes a civil war when the battle deaths exceed 500, 
which precludes earlier, less lethal internal violent episodes that occurred in Guatemala.  
Sambanis’s coding rules also explain his decision to split the conflict into two phases since 
deaths resulting from both rebel activity and government terror diminished greatly in the 
interregnum (Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer 1999).  I must also note that the series of civil wars in 
Guatemala do not represent a perfect example of a reoccurrence because the principal rebel 
combatant groups that opposed the government seem to be different, but I do not let this 
consideration prevent me from treating the second civil war as a reoccurrence.   Many of 
combatant groups in the second war were formed around similar issues from remnants of the first 
war’s combatant  (Jones 1991).    
 
  
                                                 
115 This dataset is essentially an update to Doyle and Sambanis (2000). 
116 COW uses 1966, Toft (2010) uses 1960, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) use 1966, and PRIO uses 1963. 
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Background of Guatemalan Police.117 
The Guatemalan police trace their roots to independence from Spain in1821.  A 
Congressional decree that year created a requirement for local leaders to establish auxiliary 
forces to monitor delinquent behavior in their municipalities.  During the middle of the 19th 
century, a paid police force akin to a night watch emerged in Guatemala City.  Through the end 
of the 19th century, an increasing number of towns established police forces.  Responsibility for 
managing the country’s police forces alternated between the Ministries of Interior and Defense, 
finally ending at the Interior Ministry, where it has remained since.   The modern version of the 
Guatemalan police force came into being pursuant to Government Decree 901-Police Ordinance.  
This document consolidated various urban police forces into the National Police (Policía 
Nacional, or PN) in 1925.  It also created police stations in all the country’s departments, which 
were subject to the control of the Directorate General, an office within the Ministry of Interior.  
The primary purpose of the PN was social control and control of regime opponents.  This was 
particularly evident during the Ubico dictatorship (1931-1944), who employed the police as his 
private army to suppress challenges to his rule (LaCharite 1973).   
The police experienced a number of changes during the “revolutionary” era of 1944-1954 
under Presidents Arévalo and Arbenz.  In an effort to change the repressive character of the PN, 
President Arévalo changed their name to the Guardia Civil, and very few former members of the 
PN were allowed to join the new force.  Additionally, the new constitution forbade militarization 
of the police except in extreme circumstances. 
These changes proved to be short-lived.  After overthrowing President Arbenz, new 
President Armas set about to undo the many changes of the revolutionary period.  His efforts 
involved two imperatives: maintaining a stable climate for private, transnational investment and 
the elimination of popular resistance (Aguilera Peralta 1983; Jones 1991).   Armas’s efforts also 
extended to the police in the guise of “Presidential Decree 332 – Organic Law of the Police.”  
This decree returned the police to its role as a repressive tool of the state.  It also established the 
Policía Nacional Ambulante [Travelling Police], later to become the Policía Nacional Militaria 
(PMA).  The decree established police corps headquarters throughout Guatemala, mirroring the 
                                                 
117 The following description of the background of the Guatemalan police relies heavily on the work of the Archivo 
Histórico de la Policía Nacional (AHPN).  Unless otherwise noted, the AHPN serves the reference document for the 
Police Background section.   
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military’s territorial division of the country (LaCharite 1973).  In another set of ordinances, 
Armas created a secret police force known as the Judicial Police that had the mission of 
apprehending suspected communists (Huggins 1998).  Also in existence at the time was the 
Guardia de Hacienda [Treasury Police], which initially had the mission of customs and revenue 
enforcement, but would undergo a change of mission in the 1960s (Amnesty International 1981; 
Das 2006). 
During this time period, the United States began to provide assistance to the PN.  The 
United States viewed a more effective Guatemalan police force as an important mechanism to 
identify communist subversives, though they would require much improvement.  An initial 
assessment by the United States in 1965 considered the 3000 man PN to be seriously deficient, 
enjoying little respect or cooperation from the Guatemalan citizenry.  Moreover, traditional 
police functions had fallen to the wayside.  The police force had become almost wholly 
subordinate to the army by 1965, with a primary focus on preventing subversion and communist 
attacks (Holden 2004).  The low quality of the police force was enabled by the army, which 
viewed an effective police corps as a threat to its own dominance and frequently compelled 
presidents to change police directors to keep the police in a state of organizational turmoil 
(LaCharite 1973; McClintock 1985). 
 
 1st Guatemalan War 
The first civil war (1966-1972) had its roots in the overthrow of Arbenz.  Though the 
Guatemalan army retained a prominent position during the Arbenz presidency, its members’ 
attitudes towards the president were mixed, as evidenced by their unwillingness to lend Arbenz 
their support when he faced the coup challenge from Armas.  What support Arbenz did enjoy 
came from the younger officers (Jones 1991).  Members of this group had become frustrated 
with the corruption of their military commanders and civilian leaders who succeeded Arbenz.  
Their frustrations were exacerbated by their indignation at the use of Guatemalan territory as a 
training ground for Cuban exiles intending to overthrow Cuban communist leader Fidel Castro.  
The officers’ frustrations culminated in a coup attempt in 1960 to overthrow the Ygídoras 
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regime.118  Although the coup failed, two of its key leaders were determined to continue 
resistance and formed the Movimiento Rebelde 13 de Noviembre (MR-13).  In 1962, following a 
proclamation of its goal of overthrowing the Ydígoras regime, the group embarked upon a series 
of attacks on government facilities (Aguillera Peralta and Beverly 1980; Gott 1971).  
Concurrently, another group, known as the Movimiento 20 de Octubre, also led by a 1960 coup 
participant, began guerillas activities.  The Guatemalan army quickly crushed the resistance by 
both groups, causing the survivors to retreat to the eastern highlands to regroup (Gott 1971).   
In 1962, while recuperating from their defeat, these two groups joined forces with the 
Guatemalan Workers’ Party (PGT by its Spanish title) to form the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes 
(FAR).  The PGT was the Guatemalan communist party, which had been outlawed since 1945.  
Prior to joining the FAR, the PGT had attempted armed struggle in the eastern part of the 
country, but quickly suffered defeat (Aguilera Peralta and Beverly 1980).   The FAR served as an 
umbrella organization for its members to plan and coordinate their activities (Gott 1971).  With 
the PGT serving as its political influence, the FAR was primarily a guerilla movement with a 
socialist orientation.  Beginning in 1963, the FAR embarked on a strategy of rural foco.119  This 
strategy manifested itself in a series of small scale attacks on government patrols.  The FAR was 
able to gain success mostly due to army and police incompetence and lack of preparation 
(Aguilera Peralta and Beverly 1980).  The relative level of success the FAR achieved was 
significant enough that the army lost confidence in Ydígoras and deposed him in a coup in 1963 
(Aguilera Peralta 1983). 
 
 
End of 1st Gautemalan War. 
The success of the FAR was short-lived, and its eventual defeat had two main causes.  
The first relates to the 1966 presidential elections.  That year, Guatemalans elected Julio Méndez 
Montenegro, a former law professor, as president.  His election marked a deviation from a long 
line of army officers who served as president before and after.  The election had the paradoxical 
                                                 
118 Ygídoras won the election in 1958, following the interim rule of Miguel Pasarelli, who replaced Armas following 
his assassination in 1957. 
119 A focismo strategy centered on building support among the rural population in preparation for a general armed 
uprising (Hey 1995: 35). 
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effect of undercutting the FAR’s political basis since Mendez endorsed many of their positions.  
It also led to a rift between the PGT and the other elements of the FAR, culminating in the PGT 
splitting from the group in 1968 (Gott 1971).   
The second major contributing factor to the defeat of the FAR was a focused 
counterinsurgency campaign by the army, beginning in 1966, in the rural area of rebel 
operations.  Accompanying the campaign was greatly increased assistance by the United States 
to both the Guatemalan police and military (Holden 2004; McClintock 1985).   Though 
ostensibly the election of a non-army member represented a break from military’s hold on 
political power, Mendez had to cut a deal with the army to gain their continued support for his 
rule.  Mendez agreed to give the army near impunity in the conduct of the counterinsurgency, 
thereby paving the way for an enormous increase in the levels of state terror (Handy 1984).   
With the acquiescence of Mendez in hand, the army embarked on brutal but effective campaign 
in the eastern highlands, led by Colonel Osorio Anañas.   By the end of 1968, the guerillas were 
all but defeated through a combination of their own deaths and capture, as well as a loss of 
support from the region’s inhabitants (Aguillera Peralta and Beverly 1980; Bell, Kobrak, and 
Spirer 1999).  The loss of support was a direct result of the government campaign of terror 
directed at inhabitants to deter them from supporting the guerillas.  The level of government 
terror practiced during this time period was particularly high and indiscriminate.   In addition 
irregular clandestine anti-communist death squads began to complement the efforts of the formal 
security forces.  Some of the members of the death squads were agents of regular security forces 
and some were truly irregulars (Aguillera Peralta 1980).   
 
 Conduct During 1st Guatemalan War 
 During the war, the police essentially became a surrogate for the military.  The police 
lost any relationship with a responsibility to protect its citizens and instead became an arm of 
state terror within the prevailing doctrine of national security (Das 2006: 341).  The relationship 
was bolstered by the tendency of the Guatemalan army to encroach into policing functions.  This 
encroachment was a function of several factors.  During that period of time, Guatemala 
experienced no external threat due to the presence of regional security arrangements, so the army 
was able to focus on internal threats.  The army also came to view the insurgency as a threat to 
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its own existence.  Guerilla activities eventually increased in scope and scale to the point where 
the army came to see them as a communist effort to overthrow the existing power structures 
under which the army enjoyed great benefits (Jones 1991).  The fight against subversion also 
provided the army with an excuse for the further militarization of the Guatemalan government, 
which resulted in greater state repression.  Maintaining military rule demanded a mode of 
domination of the Guatemalan society based on repression because the military dominated 
government lacked democratic legitimacy and did not institute progressive policies such as 
wealth redistribution or social reform (Aguillera Peralta 1983). 
The police abetted the army’s encroachment by undergoing organizational changes in the 
early and mid 1960s to foster better cooperation.  In 1965, the police created district headquarters 
to ensure greater integration with the army in dealing with the ongoing rebellion.  These 
headquarters were staffed with army officers and had authority over the local police corps.  
There is strong evidence that police corps also possessed “dirty squads” to detain and kill 
individuals accused of subversion (Hey 1995). 
Notwithstanding the relegation of the police to the army’s control during that time period, 
both organizations did occupy separate roles within the greater national security effort.  The PN 
were particularly active in the cities, especially in Guatemala City (Amnesty International 1981).  
Among all the member of the Guatemalan security sector, the PN most often responded to and 
investigated incidents of guerilla attacks or terrorism (LaCharite 1973).120  The PN worked 
closely with the PMA in the cities and the regular army in the rural areas (Amnesty International 
1981).  The Treasury Police came to gain responsibility for protection of the borders in an effort 
to intercept attempted infiltrators (Amnesty International 1981; AHPN 2010).  The Judicial 
Police, known as the National Police Detectives after 1970, shared responsibility with the Army 
for identification and apprehension of suspected subversives.  The Judicial Police were 
responsible for the urban areas, whereas the military was responsible for the rural areas (Adams 
1969; Weaver 1970; LaCharite 1973).  The styles of violence also varied between the police and 
army.  Army repression was more expansive and even reportedly included such activities as 
wholesale bombing of villages and napalm strikes (McClintock 1985).  In contrast, police 
                                                 
120 LaCharite makes this determination from conducting content analysis of “El Imparcial”, the leading newspaper 
in Guatemala City at the time. 
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repression tended more towards individual killings and disappearances (Amnesty International 
1981).   
 
 The Reoccurrence of the Guatemalan Civil War 
Though the guerillas were essentially defeated by 1968, conflict did not end completely.  
The FAR made two efforts between 1968 and 1972 to regain the initiative, but both suffered 
defeat at the hands of government forces.  These actions coincided with the assumption of the 
presidency by Araña Osorio, the leader of the counterinsurgency campaign from 1966-1968.  
The combination of resurgent guerilla activities and legal resistance to his rule caused Araña to 
declare a “state of siege” that lasted until 1972 (Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer 1999), though the style 
of government terror during this time was more discriminate and death squads were less 
prominent.   Government use of terror appears to have greatly reduced in the years after 1972 
following the defeat of the FAR and the arrest of the leaders of the PGT, and most instances of 
terror were limited to selective assassinations (Aguilera Peralta and Beverly 1980).  The period 
of relatively low conflict related fatalities endured through the presidency of Kjell Eugenio 
Laugerud García (1974-1978).   
Sambanis (2004) marks the reoccurrence of civil war in Guatemala as taking place in 
1978, mostly based on increased casualties resulting from government terror campaigns.  
Nevertheless, low levels of violence by both the state and the guerillas preceded and fueled the 
1978 reoccurrence.  During the interwar period, a number of processes were underway that 
would lead to the increased violence in 1978.  Chief among these was increased popular 
organization and resistance to the government.  Key to the organization was the high inflation 
that occurred in the mid-70s that disproportionately affected the poor.  Another important event 
was the earthquake of 1976, which brought together the middle classes and the urban poor in 
common cause.  Finally, a number of changes that President Fernando Romeo Lucas García 
enacted upon taking office in 1978 led to mass, though peaceful resistance (Jones 1991).  A 
consequence of the unrest leading up to 1978 was a return of the death squads and a 
corresponding increase in fatalities resulting from their activities (Aguilera Peralta and Beverly 
1980; Bell, Kobrak, and Spirer 1999).   
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During the same time period, a number of groups that would eventually turn to guerilla 
warfare entered the scene.  For each of these groups, police use of terror contributed in some way 
to their decision to resort to violent resistance to the state.  One of the most important was the 
Guerilla Army of the Poor (denoted by its Spanish acronym EGP).  This group first appeared in 
the western highlands in 1972 (Handy 1984).  Its participants were former members of the FAR, 
and drew important lessons from the FAR’s earlier experiences.  No longer did they rely upon a 
foco based strategy.  Instead, they slowly built a popular following among the Maya Indians who 
populated that part of Guatemala.  The EGP did not engage in their first violent activity until 
1975, when they assassinated a landowner whom the local Maya viewed as particularly 
rapacious.  The Guatemalan army retaliated by embarking on a terror campaign focused on 
punishing supporters of the EGP, instead of the EGP themselves.  Rather than discourage those 
who supported EGP, the army’s actions only increased the Maya sympathy and willingness to 
continue to support the EGP (Handy 1984).   
Another splinter group from the original FAR, the Organization of People in Arms 
(ORPA), emerged during this time period in a different area of the western highlands.  The 
ORPA’s members were over 90% Indian, and it also garnered recruits as a result of army 
repression (Handy 1984).  The PGT also reemerged by the start of 1980.  Though the re-
emergence of the PGT cannot be tied as directly to state terror as can the origin of the other 
groups, the timing of the PGT’s return suggests it would not have entered the scene were it not 
for the presence of the other insurgent groups, who were motivated by state terror.  By 1981, the 
various groups had achieved a level of success that the Guatemalan army came to fear for the 
existence of the regime (Jones 1991).   
The greater success of this second wave of guerillas is due in large part to their superior 
appreciation of Guatemalan demographic and social characteristics.  Guatemala at that time 
consisted predominately of two ethnic groups: the ladino and the Indian, of which the Indians 
constituted a slight majority.  The term “ladino” is as much a social construct as it it an ethnic 
category and generally refers to a Spanish speaking white or mestizo.  The Indians consisted of 
various Maya groups (Early 1974).   The first wave of guerillas consisting of the FAR and PGT, 
considered the Indian population as unfit to serve as supporters.  Instead, the FAR and PGT 
attempted to appeal to the “petit bourgeoisie,” which was comprised of the students and small 
landowners.  The government terror campaign easily convinced the FAR’s intended groups of 
  
122 
 
supporters to remain abstain from the conflict.  The new groups of guerillas did not repeat the 
mistakes of their predecessors and focuses on mass organization of the Indian population from 
the start (Aguilera-Peralta and Beverly 1980; Barry 1989). 
A number of other acts of state terror were also significant in generating Indian support 
for the insurgency.  One was the Panzos massacre in 1978.   Indians from the western highlands 
had gathered in that town to protest appropriation of their land.  The army responded to the 
protest by surrounding it and firing into the crowd, resulting in over 100 deaths (Handy 1984).  
Another significant event was the burning of the Spanish embassy in 1980.  A group of Indians 
had occupied the Spanish embassy to protest their repressive treatment by the government.  Over 
the objections of the Spanish ambassador, Guatemalan police stormed the building.  The ensuing 
actions led to the deaths of 38 people.  Spain considered these actions so egregious that it broke 
off foreign relations with Guatemala (Handy 1984; Jones 1991; Hey 1995).   The Army 
responded to the incident by occupying the village that was home to many of the protesters.  The 
ensuing heavy-handed actions of the army and the police force assault of the Spanish embassy 
proved to be the major impetus for entire Indian communities to join the guerillas (Handy 1984). 
 
 Analysis of Validity of Hypothesis 4 
Having described the background of the Guatemalan police and their participation in the 
series of civil wars, the next step is to assess how well my hypothesis holds up in this case. 
To recap, my hypothesis proposes that increased police participation in military functions during 
a civil war causes the police to become predisposed to the use of repression, which increases the 
probability of civil war reoccurrence.  Since this is a two part hypothesis, a test of its validity 
requires analysis of each part, specifically: did the experience of the police in the first war 
increase its propensity to engage in repression? And, did the increased repression contribute in a 
meaningful way to the second civil war?  I address the hypothesis by posing and answering the 
following series of questions. 
 
Did police serve as military during the first civil war?  I find that the Guatemalan police 
engaged in military style practices during the war, while remaining focused on police 
responsibilities and functions.  I make this qualified conclusion because the relationship between 
  
123 
 
the Guatemalan police and military does not lend itself to a differentiation based on roles.  The 
Guatemalan police were a wholly subordinate organization of the army, but retained their own 
internal organization and functions.  A better criterion to determine whether the Guatemalan 
police performed in the manner of the military relates to the use of force, and by this measure the 
Guatemalan police exhibited a clear pattern of adopting military style practices.  One can make 
the counterargument that any police activity that satisfies their universal requirement to maintain 
order constitutes a conceptually valid police activity.  Nevertheless, accepting this premise 
means that there can be no real distinction between the police and military except in their 
division of labor with regard to threats.  Police would have an inward focus and the military an 
outward focus, and otherwise be identical.  Relationship with society, presence, and all the other 
factors I note elsewhere in the study would not matter. 
I argue that police and military differ by their restraints on the use of force.  According to 
their ideal types, a military can be proactive in the use of violence when faced with threats, with 
no expectation of due process or individual rights from the targets of the violence.  In contrast, 
the police should be reactive and only employ the minimum necessary level of force.  The 
behavior of the Guatemalan police during the first civil war both validates its status as a distinct 
agent as well as confirms that it exceeded its traditional mandate.  For example, the most 
common police response to guerilla acts in cities was an investigation (LaCharité 1973).  That 
the police chose to investigate indicates that they viewed their role as different from the Army, 
who did not perform such activities.  On the other hand, the investigations could lead to 
assassinations and disappearances – activities that entail a level of violence and lack of due 
process more appropriate for the role of the military.  This pattern is also evident during the 
police response to the protests at the Spanish embassy.  The police engaged in some amount of 
negotiation with the protestors, which is what we would expect from a police force. 
Nevertheless, the police ultimately chose to conduct an assault of the embassy, which is a clear 
example of the police adopting a military style tactic. 
 
Did the police participation in military activities lead to an increased propensity to 
employ repression?  Police repression most likely increased during the war, but whether the 
police became predisposed to repression as a result of their conduct during the preceding civil 
war is less obvious.  Although it is difficult to separate police acts of terror from other 
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perpetrators, one can reasonably assume that police acts of repression during the war increased in 
proportion to the number of army acts of terror, which greatly multiplied.  The activities of the 
death squads also serve as an indicator of police repression.  While the relationship between the 
police and the death squads is not certain, at least some of the groups appear to have been 
composed of police officers (Amnesty International 1981; McClintock 1985).    
Nevertheless, the elevated levels of police repression were temporary.  Measures of 
citizen fatalities resulting from government terror decreased noticeably during the interwar 
period, suggesting that any police propensity to engage in repression would have become latent 
as the threat of insurgency subsided.  Moreover, the police may have become accustomed to 
engaging in repression long before the first civil war.  Though the reform of the revolutionary 
period may have had some success in purging the police force of its repressive tendencies, the 
policies President Armas enacted during the counter-revolution enabled the practices to reemerge 
well before the time of the civil wars. 
 
Did police repression contribute to the reoccurrence?   The evidence strongly suggests 
that police directly and indirectly contributed to the probability of civil war reoccurrence by 
increasing the level of support the Indians provided the guerillas.  The political emergence of the 
Guatemalan Indians in the early and mid 1970s provided much of the base of support for the 
guerillas, as well as many of their members.  While this political development has other 
explanations, government policies of terror and repression were clear contributing factors.  For 
instance, the actions of the police in storming the Spanish embassy in 1980 were a major factor 
in tipping Indian support of the guerillas from passive to active.  Less sensational repression in 
urban areas, presumably by police, also increased Indian support for the guerillas.121  Many 
Indians were migrant workers, so the repression of trade unions damaged the Indians’ means of 
livelihood, which left them few options other than joining the guerillas (Hey 1995).   
 
 Overall Assessment of the Guatemala Case Study 
All in all, I find mixed support for my hypothesis based on the case of the Guatemalan 
civil wars in the 1960s and 70s.  What is generally beyond dispute is that the Guatemalan police 
                                                 
121 I make this assumption because the police generally had responsibility for the urban areas. 
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were repressive and acted under the direct control of the army.  It is also clear that after a 
decrease in violence following the eradication of the FAR and PGT by 1972, levels of violence 
increased noticeably after 1978.  Less clear are the causal links between these events.  Whether 
the expanded role of the police during the war contributed to a propensity to engage in repression 
is difficult to discern, especially since state repression noticeably decreased following the first 
war.  Similarly, the division of labor between the police and military during the war actually 
narrowed the scope of the police to urban areas rather than expanding it to new functions as my 
hypothesis suggests.  The fact that much of the guerilla activity occurred in areas outside the 
typical responsibility of the police only complicates the matter because it is hard to attribute the 
repression that occurred there to the police.  Nevertheless, while police repression may not have 
constituted a major portion of state terror, it appears to have played a major part in galvanizing 
support for the insurgency through the storming of the Spanish embassy.  Though the number of 
casualties resulting from the incident was small, the symbolic effect proved to be much larger. 
I do not find support for my other argument that the use of police in military functions 
allowed the military’s counterinsurgency skills to wither.  In fact, the narrowing of police 
responsibilities that resulted from the military’s command of the police most likely increased the 
military’s effectiveness.  Lack of evidence makes it difficult to determine whether the police 
were ineffective at performing functions more typically associated with the military.  The 
storming of the Spanish embassy was effective in that it ended the protest, but the heavy-
handedness of its execution suggests it was not the police’s forte.  A better trained police force 
may have been able to evict the protestors without causing so much damage. 
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 Case Study #2 The Greek Civil Wars 
 The second case study involves a series of civil wars that occurred in Greece in the 
1940s.  This case differs from the first in that the Greek police fought as infantry throughout the 
civil wars, but their conduct during the final phase did not lead to a reoccurrence of civil war as it 
had in Guatemala.  In presenting and analyzing this case, I follow the same format I used in the 
previous case study. 
 Background of the Greek Police 
 From the time of Greek independence in 1829 until the present, the predominant police 
organization in Greece has been the Gendarmerie (Chorofylake in Greek).122  After a short period 
of time during which municipalities were responsible for maintaining their own police forces, the 
Royal Decree of 1833 established a national level Gendarmerie.  This force was based on the 
French model and served as an auxiliary of the army to assist local police in the maintenance of 
order.  Over the ensuing years, the Gendarmerie gradually took over responsibility for all 
policing in Greece except for the large cities of Athens and Piraeus, which gained municipal 
police forces in 1849.  In 1893, the Greek government transferred all police responsibilities to 
the army, including that of Athens and Pireaus.  Though it answered to the Army, the 
Gendarmerie retained its distinct organizational form and responsibility for patrolling the rural 
areas.  In 1906, a subsequent law transferred all responsibility for policing from the Greek army 
to the Gendarmerie.  Legislation in 1920 authorized the creation of municipal police forces in 
Greece’s four largest cities, and these municipal forces came into existence over the remainder of 
the decade.  From 1929 onward, the Gendarmerie and four city police forces shared 
responsibility for maintaining order in Greece, all under the direct authority of the Deputy 
Minister of the Interior.  The Greek police generally kept this organizational form throughout the 
20th century. 
 
                                                 
122 Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph detailing the development of the Greek police until the 1920s is an 
amalgamation of information provided by Cramer (1964), Kurian (1989), and Das (2006).  Due to the congruence of 
the descriptions among these three sources, it is difficult to denote individual citations.  
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 Greek Police and a History of Repression 
 The Gendarmerie earned a reputation for repression well before the civil war period of 
the 1940s.  Two events that proved to be significant for establishing a Gendarmerie pattern of 
repression were the emergence of the labor movement in the 1920s and the assumption of power 
by Metaxas in 1936.  The emergence of a Greek labor movement was somewhat coincident to 
the rise of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) in the early 1920s.  The Greek labor movement 
operated in a relatively benign environment at the beginning of the 20th century, due in part to 
the concurrent Greek experiment with a republican form of government after having existed 
primarily as an authoritarian leaning constitutional monarchy (O’Ballance 1966).  Nevertheless, 
the labor movement took on an increasingly militant tone following the Russian Revolution and 
transformed into more of a front for the KKE (Seferiades 2005).  Though in retrospect, the 
movement was never much of a threat to the stability of Greece, government leaders at the time 
considered it the vanguard of a communist effort to overthrow their country and were determined 
to contain it (Samatas 1986).   
The government attempted to contain the labor movement in two ways.  The first was 
through enactment of legislation that afforded the government extraordinary powers to suppress 
labor activities.  The second was the deliberate use of the Gendarmerie to violently respond to 
unrest.  The most important family of legislation was the Idonymo Laws that “legalized state 
anticommunism terror” (26).  The Gendarmerie had long been characterized by their rightist 
inclinations, and thus needed little incentive to take on a seemingly communist-dominated labor 
challenge (Das 2006).  The Gendarmerie were also predisposed to respond with violence due to 
their relatively small size and great dispersion.  The Gendarmerie attempted to compensate for 
this unfavorable force ratio by applying overwhelming force, and this style of response persisted 
despite improvements in Gendarmerie capabilities.  The Gendarmerie continued to employ such 
violent tactics even though British advisor-led organizational and operational improvements and 
enhanced intelligence capabilities offered the option of more nuanced responses.  In fact, by the 
end of the 1920s, the Gendarmerie responded with violence to nearly a third of all labor 
demonstrations (Saferiades 2005: 71-2). 
 The other event that influenced the Gendarmerie pattern of repression was the Metaxas 
dictatorship.  In 1936 Iaonnis Metaxas, former Army Chief of Staff and member of the 
monarchist Popular Front, emerged as prime minister.   In anticipation of planned nation-wide 
  
128 
 
strikes by labor activists, Metaxas was able to convince the king of Greece to grant him 
dictatorial powers to combat what he viewed as a communist campaign to overthrow the current 
regime (Gerolymatos 2004).  Metaxas directed the Gendarmerie to establish control over Greek 
society by conducting systematic surveillance of all citizens.  One particularly effective way the 
Gendarmerie did so was to operate a program of civic-mindedness certificates.  This program 
allowed the government to identify and reward those citizens who were loyal to the government.  
Individuals not in possession of a certificate could not obtain public jobs or permits for other 
forms of employment (Samatas 1986). 
 
 1st Greek Civil War 
 Metaxas’s rule ended with the Axis invasion and subsequent occupation of Greece in 
1940.  This period of time marked the roots of the ensuing three phases of civil war, as well as 
set the pattern of interactions between the Greek police and their eventual foes.  The king and the 
government, along with most of the army, left Greece and formed a government in exile.  As a 
result, the resistance movements that emerged in occupied Greece operated outside the influence 
of the government-in-exile.  The resistance started as many scattered groups, but eventually 
coalesced around a few key organizations.  Chief among these groups were the National 
Liberation front (EAM) and the National Democratic Greek League (EDES).  The EAM was a 
leftist organization that attracted followers from across the political spectrum, but had a strong 
affiliation with the KKE (Iatrides 1995).  The military wing of the EAM was the National 
People’s Liberation Army (ELAS).  The EDES was a coalition of republican minded Greeks 
dedicated to preventing the return of the king.  One of its leaders was Napolean Zervas, who 
would come to play a prominent role with the Greek police after the war.  The EAM was the 
most effective of these organizations, and their efforts to reign in banditry and punish 
collaborators made them popular with common Greeks (Fleischer 1985).  A frequent target of 
the EAM/ELAS was the Gendarmerie (Mazower 2000), whom the Germans occupation forces 
continued to employ to suppress Leftists and the KKE.  After securing Greece, the Germans 
removed the top leadership of the Gendarmerie, but left the rank and file police intact.   
Differences among the EAM and EDES over the future of the country after the 
anticipated liberation led to the first phase of civil war in 1943.  The two groups began battling 
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each other even as they both separately fought the occupation forces.  Concerns that the civil war 
would detract from their need to tie down German units in Greece led the British to coordinate a 
cease fire between the EAM and ELAS in 1944.  The EAM acquiesced to the Greek 
government-in-exile and agreed to subordinate the ELAS to the British-led war effort 
(Gerolymatos 2004).  A provisional government composed of the Greek government-in-exile and 
the EAM took power in Greece following the departure of the Germans.  At the time of 
liberation in the fall of 1944, the EAM controlled much of the Greek countryside.  The EAM had 
used the summer of 1944 to consolidate its hold there, and had even incorporated its own police 
force, the Civil Guard, to maintain order (Mazower 2000).  The EAM/ELAS also used its power 
to wage a “Red Terror” of retribution on wartime collaborators – a campaign that would come to 
haunt the EAM once the balance of power turned (O’Ballance 1966). 
The formal Greek government had strong backing from the British, but only effectively 
ruled in the cities.  One of the major concerns of provisional Prime Minister Papandreau and his 
British backers was consolidating its rule by reestablishing the army and police forces, which 
would entail disarming the ELAS.  The EAM insisted on a complete purge of the security 
services to ensure no collaborators remained. However, a desire to rapidly create security 
services (in part to combat the power of the ELAS) left Papandreau reluctant to agree to the 
demands of the EAM (Iatrides 1995).   
 
 The Second Greek Civil War (December 1944) 
 By November 1944, the situation between the Greek government and the EAM was 
tense, but both sides were still open to negotiations (Iatrides 1972).  The stability broke down, 
however, when Papandreau gave in to British pressure and opted to attempt to disarm the EAM.   
In protest, the EAM called for a general strike.   In December 1944, one of the protests turned 
violent.  Frightened Greek police fired into the crowd, killing “scores” (Iatrides 1995: 323), thus 
marking the beginning of the second phase of civil war – the “December Uprising” 
(Dekemvriana).  Conflict intensified the next day during the funeral procession for the victims.  
Police and members of the right wing militia group “X” fired on marchers from overlooking 
rooftops.  ELAS members fired back, and by the end of the day 40 people were dead.  
Concurrent with the events of the funeral, the EAM initiated a series of attack across Athens, and 
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a frequent target was police stations.  The typical ELAS tactic was to seize the station and 
execute all of the occupants (Gerolymatos 2004).  The EAM also took the opportunity to resume 
reprisals against war-time collaborators (a high priority of which were Gendarmerie members) 
and X (militia) facilities in other areas of Greece.  British troops were called in to re-establish 
order, and the ELAS declared a truce on December 28th (Mazower 2000).  The formal end of the 
conflict was marked by the signing of the Varkiza agreement the following February.   
 
 Varkiza Agreement 
 In addition to marking the formal cessation of hostilities of the Dekemvriana, the major 
achievement of the Varkiza agreement was the disarmament of the EAM/ELAS.  The agreement 
should have been a major step towards peace and stability in Greece, but instead it enabled the 
onset of a period known as the “White Terror.”  By turning in their weapons, EAM/ELAS 
members opened themselves up to retribution by the police and right-wing extremist 
organizations.  During the time between the agreement and the end of 1945, various Rightist 
oriented groups “engaged in wholesale persecution of anyone suspected of left-wing sympathies” 
(Roubatis 1987: 18).  Additionally, the behavior of the ELAS during the uprising had discredited 
them in the eyes of many Greeks, which made their persecution more acceptable (Iatrides 1995).   
The Greek police forces were at the forefront of the government campaign of persecution 
for a number of reasons.  For one, the police were the “most exclusively and zealously anti-
communist of the Greek security forces” (Close 1985: 129).  The police had been the primary 
anti-communist instrument for a long time, but were especially active during the Metaxas regime 
and during the occupation.  Second, the police had been a frequent target of EAM/ELAS 
reprisals during the war and on through the Dekemvriana, and thus had strong incentive to repay 
the EAM in kind.  Finally, the Gendarmerie underwent a period of rapid growth after the Varkiza 
agreement.  This growth not only diluted the quality of recruits, it allowed in many former 
collaborators, which only exacerbated the antagonisms with the EAM.  
 The relationship of the Greek government with the Rightist extremist organizations that 
constituted the main proponents of the White Terror is unclear.  There is evidence that members 
of the police force were also active in X – one of the most prolific of the groups and one that 
clearly supported the current regime.  Regardless of any formal involvement in the groups, the 
  
131 
 
Greek government as a minimum tolerated their existence.  The government may have had little 
choice.  The Greek police force was not sufficient, and the threat the ELAS posed caused the 
government to reach out to militia organizations (Mazower 2000). 
  
 Roots of Second Conflict (Third Phase of Civil War) 
 The event commonly viewed as the start of the third round of civil war occurred on 
March 30th, 1946 when EAM forces attacked a Gendarmerie outpost in a small village in the 
mountainous region of northeast Greece.  In response to the White Terror, former ELAS 
members had begun organizing in the mountains of northern Greece to conduct supply raids and 
to exact revenge against the right-wing militias.   Other Greeks with leftist sympathies sought 
refuge from repression with the ELAS guerillas as well (Gerolymatos 2004).  Earlier in 
February, the leader of the KKE had announced that its members must respond to the White 
Terror with force.  By this time the communist party had come to fully dominate the EAM.  The 
KKE had long sought such influence, and the severity of EAM/ELAS actions during the 
Dekemvriania had caused many of its moderate members to abandon it (Iatrides 1972).  
Nevertheless, it appears that the KKE had not fully committed to civil war at that time, and the 
attack on the Gendarmerie outpost may have just represented an isolated incident.  The KKE 
likely did not take serious action towards large-scale fighting until fall 1946, and did not 
completely abandon the political process until June 1947 (Fleischer 1985).     
A major contributing factor to the increased fighting was the repressive policies pursued 
by the conservative-monarchist government of Constantine Tsaldaris, who had come to power in 
the March 1946 elections (Jones 1989).  Tsaldaris had appointed Napoleon Zervas, former leader 
of the EDES, as Minister of Public Order.  Zervas used his position to direct the Greek police to 
implement mass arrests, executions, exiles, and arbitrary punishments.  Tsaldaris and Zervas 
relied heavily on the Gendarmerie to fight the guerillas in the time between March and the onset 
of major communist military operations in 1947, in part because the army at the time was 
untrained and filled with what the regime considered leftist sympathizers.  The Gendarmerie 
absorbed responsibility for the curbing the Leftist reaction to the White Terror, and the tactics 
they employed led the Gendarmerie to be feared as much as the right-wing militants (Close 
2002).  The Gendarmerie also engaged in political intimidation by terrorizing Leftists and 
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Centrists voters during the time leading up to the September 1946 plebiscite on whether to 
reinstall the monarchy (Close 1985).  By summer 1947, the campaign of government repression 
was so severe that the KKE was faced with a decision between “revolution or oblivion” (Iatrides 
1995: 10), and the KKE chose revolution.  By fall 1947, a full-scale civil war by any definition 
was underway in Greece. 
 
 Police Conduct During the Third Greek Civil War 
 The Gendarmerie participation in the third Greek civil war began as it had occurred in the 
previous phase with the Gendarmerie serving as the principal force responsible for protecting 
Greek villages.  During much of 1946, the Gendarmerie served as static defensive forces in the 
villages, though its effectiveness was dampened because of limited capacity and lack of a 
directed mission to pursue the guerillas into their sanctuaries (Needham 1971).  In response to 
the increasingly drastic KKE practices, Zervas reorganized the Gendarmerie into infantry 
battalion like units to improve their effectiveness (Close 1985).  In spite of Zervas’s efforts, the 
Gendarmerie were unsuccessful in quelling the growing insurgency.  In fact, both American and 
British advisors sent word to their supervisors that Greek government behavior seemed to be 
creating more guerillas than it was killing or capturing (Roubatis 1987).  U.S. advisors were able 
to convince the Greeks to hand over primary responsibility for fighting the guerillas to the army 
by summer 1947, which coincided with the KKE’s decision to abandon guerilla warfare and 
instead fight conventionally.  To support this new style of campaign, the Gendarmerie formed 
mobile forces that operated under the command of the army.  The mobile forces would sweep 
into villages prior to an army attack and arrest suspected communists and sympathizers to 
prevent the KKE forces from gaining early warning of the pending attack.  Following the attack, 
the Gendarmerie would assist local auxiliary army units with “mopping up” and remain behind 
to prevent guerilla re-infiltration (Needham 1971: 41).   
Concurrent with the transition of the onus for fighting the communists to the military was 
an increase in the Gendarmerie practice of preventative arrests and executions, much of which 
enjoyed legal sanction.  Greek legislation that took effect during the war extended extraordinary 
power to the police to arrest and search suspected communists.  July 1947 alone saw the arrests 
of over 15,000 Greek citizens (Roubatis 1987: 38).  Additionally, the police gained the power to 
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license small business, which allowed the police to impose economic punishment on those they 
considered a threat (Close 2002).   Though police repressive measures may have induced some 
previously uncommitted Greeks to join the insurgency, the measures seem to have been 
effective.  The KKE’s call to its members to rise up against the government in 1947 may have 
failed because so many of its members were already in government detention by that time 
(Iatrides 1995: 14). 
 
 End of the War 
A number of events coincided to spell defeat for the communists.  The first was the loss 
of support from Yugoslavia.  In 1949, Soviet Premier Stalin ordered Yugoslavian leader Tito to 
cease his support for the Greek insurgency.  Stalin’s pronouncement was likely a consequence of 
American and British support for the Greek government.  Stalin realized the Americans would 
never accept a communist Greece, so he saw no benefit in wasting his effort there (Jones 1989).  
Faced with the prospect of fighting without the material support and sanctuary from Yugoslavia, 
the KKE leadership elected to engage in a conventional fight to secure a quick victory against the 
Greek army before their supplies ran out.  The KKE gamble failed, and the Greek army 
consistently prevailed in the conventional battles (Gerolymatos 2004).  In October 1949, the 
KKE announced a cease fire, and by December all armed conflict effectively ceased.  Despite a 
threat by the KKE to resume the struggle when conditions were appropriate, Greece never again 
experienced another civil war (Jones 1989). 
 
 Analysis of Validity of Hypothesis 
 As in the analysis of the Guatemala case study, I test the validity of my hypothesis 
regarding police conduct during civil war by answering a series of questions.  The questions 
mirror those I used for the Guatemalan case, with the exception that I add the counterfactual 
question of why civil war did not reoccur after 1949.  I focus on the second and third phases of 
the Greek civil war.  I treat the third phase as a reoccurrence of the second, then determine why a 
fourth phases never occurred, despite the fact that police exceeded their typical role during the 
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third phase of war.  In an effort to avoid confusion, I will refer to the second phase of civil war 
(Dekemvriana) as the “initial phase” and the third phase as the “reoccurrence.” 
 
 The Dekemvriana and Reoccurrence 
Did police serve as military during the initial civil war?  There can be no doubt that the 
Greek Gendarmerie served in what were typically military functions during all three phases of 
Greek Civil War.  At the very least, they were treated as military targets by the guerillas, a role 
that befell the police since the occupation.  Nevertheless, the extent of Gendarmerie involvement 
in military style conduct did not end with simply being targets.  The occupying powers relied 
heavily on the Gendarmerie to maintain order and suppress Leftists, and the new Greek 
government continued to use them this way during the Dekemvriana.  Though this phase of civil 
war was relatively brief, the Gendarmerie handled the bulk of the fighting for the Greek forces, 
mainly due to the ineffectiveness of the Greek army at the time, and because the ELAS made 
Gendarmerie stations in Athens their primary target during the uprising.    
   
Did the police participation in military activities during the Dekenvriana lead to an 
increased propensity to employ violence?   Police participation in military activities during the 
war does not appear to have been the principal catalyst for a police tendency to rely on 
repression, but it did predispose the police to view Leftists as a serious threat to the regime.  It is 
difficult to attribute any predisposition among the Gendarmerie toward employing repression 
specifically to their experience during the Dekemvriana.  The Gendarmerie had been engaging in 
repressive activities well before then. What is more plausible is that their experience during the 
war caused them to exaggerate the threat the EAM posed following the Varkiza agreement. The 
experience of many members of the Gendarmerie as targets of the ELAS during the war and the 
Dekemvriana caused the Gendarmerie to become the most vehemently anticommunist of the 
Greek security forces and to accept the predominate view that any Leftist movement was a threat 
to Greek stability (Close 1985).   
 
Did police repression contribute to the reoccurrence?  Police use of repression very likely 
contributed to the third phase of civil war.  Though the exact level of police participation is 
uncertain, at the very least the police tolerated the persecution Leftists suffered following the 
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Varkiza agreement, if not openly participated in it.  I base this judgment on evidence surrounding 
the effect of Greek government repression more broadly.   There is a nearly universal agreement 
among the source material on the Greek civil wars that the treatment the EAM endured during 
the White Terror was a significant causal factor in influencing the EAM and KKE to abandon the 
political process and resort to revolution.123  Thus, answering the question of the effect of police 
repression on reoccurrence involves determining the level of Gendarmerie participation in the 
campaign against the Leftists.  The purveyors of the White Terror were most often clandestine 
right-wing militia groups, the most prominent of which was “X.”  While, unsurprisingly, the 
clandestine nature of the groups makes determination of the involvement of the Greek police 
difficult, it appears that strong ties existed among them.  Moreover, irrespective any official 
involvement, the police at a minimum abetted the White Terror by their inability or 
unwillingness to curtail it.  This behavior was evident as early as the clash with the EAM 
marchers that led to the Dekemvriana, during which the police appeared to have been complicit 
with X snipers positioned along the protest route (Iatrides 1972).  
    
 The Third and Final Phase 
I pose and discuss the same questions in regard to the third and final phase of the Greek 
Civil War (reoccurrence).  In doing so, I point out similarities and differences with the initial 
phase. 
 
Did police serve as military during the reoccurrence of civil war?  The primacy of the 
Gendarmerie as the Greek fighting force continued during the third phase of civil war, though the 
military assumed the bulk of the fighting after 1947 as a number of factors obviated the need for 
the Gendarmerie to fulfill that function.  The army became more effective due to American aid.  
American advisors sensed this development and convinced their Greek counterparts to transfer 
responsibility for the war to the military.  Additionally, the KKE switched to conventional 
                                                 
123 I could not find a single source that did not acknowledge the role of rightist oppression towards inducing the 
Leftists to resort to violence.  This explanation was present even in western biased works such as O’Ballance (1966) 
and Jones (1989).   
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tactics, which required a level of firepower and other capabilities the Gendarmerie did not 
possess.   
Did the police participation in military activities lead to an increased propensity of 
employ repression?   The experience of the police in fighting as infantry during the third phase of 
civil war does not appear to have caused the police to become predisposed to engaging in 
repression.  No subsequent civil war broke out after 1949, but the question remains whether this 
period of peace occurred because the police were less repressive, or whether it occurred in spite 
of police behavior.   The bulk of the evidence indicates that the former alternative appears to 
have been most plausible.  Police activity in the post-civil war era tended to fall within the legal-
bureaucratic framework of the “Emergency Laws” that remained in effect until the 1970s.  Gone 
were the instances of violent police response to Leftist dissent like had occurred during the labor 
protests before World War II.  Similarly absent were the extrajudicial killings of EAM and KKE 
adherents the police had conducted during the civil war period.  Thus, the question remaining 
concerns to what extent the change in the mode of police repression contributed to the absence of 
a reoccurrence – leading us to the next section. 
 
Why didn’t violence reoccur?  One of the primary reasons that civil war did not reoccur 
in Greece after 1949 was that political (rather than physical) repression appears to have been 
more effective in preventing reoccurrence.124  Though the war had ended, the government’s 
policy of persecuting suspected Leftists continued. The impetus for ongoing persecution was the 
government’s perceived need to consolidate the Greek anticommunist state by ensuring mass 
loyalty and politically excluding what remained of the Left (Samatas 1986).  A major change 
from the wartime practices was that repression was mostly non-violent and occurred under a 
legal-bureaucratic guise.  The basis for the persecution was emergency legislation, passed during 
                                                 
124 Police activities during the final phase of civil war likely ceased to be factor over time.   Hegre et al (2001) 
determine that the deleterious effects of experiencing a previous civil war disappear after 16 years, so I assume that 
the effects of police conduct follow a similar timeline.  Applied to the Greek civil war, that would mean that I must 
determine why civil war did not occur through at least 1955.  Nevertheless, I curtail this timeline to January 1952 
since it marks the approval of a new constitution and the election of Papagos-two events that solidified conservative 
rule of Greece and affirmed the ongoing persecution of the Left (Iatrides 1995). 
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the civil wars but still in effect, that greatly expanded police powers.  The effectiveness of the 
political repression was abetted by a number of factors distinct to the post-war Greek 
environment.  For one, the decision of the KKE to turn to conventional military tactics caused it 
to suffer a high number of casualties.  Had the KKE leadership even wanted to revert to a 
military struggle after 1949, it would probably have not been able to (Jones 1989).  The end of 
hostilities also allowed the Greek army to focus its efforts on internal threats.  The United States 
viewed a KKE resurgence as a greater threat to Greece than an external invasion, so American 
advisors focused their efforts on improving the Greek army’s ability to maintain internal stability 
(Roubatis 1987).  Finally, destruction resulting from the civil war allowed the Greek government 
to establish a high level of social control.  The economy was in shambles, and many Greeks were 
dependent on foreign aid.  This dependence allowed the Greek government, via the police, to 
harness economic tools to ensure loyalty to the state.  Greek citizens needed to possess a “civic-
mindedness certificate” to gain access to public jobs or benefits (Samatas 1986), thereby further 
politically and economically alienating anyone the police did not deem to be sufficiently loyal. 
The differences between police conduct during the time of the White Terror and after 
1949 raises the question of whether the police conduct during the later time period truly 
represents “repression” in the ways I have defined and employed it in other chapters of this 
study.  I contend that police behavior after the war represented a different form of persecution.  
For instance, the most common mode of state repressive violence in the period after the civil war 
was execution resulting from sentences proscribed by special military tribunals.  While the 
outcomes of a court ordered death sentence and a covert police assassination are the same 
(death), the two events are qualitatively different.  The execution presumably involved some 
measure of due process, and is more akin to the politically oriented definition of repression 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) employ in their study of the effect of repression on civil war.125  An 
assassination offers the target no opportunity to present a defense. 
 
 
                                                 
125 Paradoxically, though I criticize their definition of repression in another section of this paper, the Greek 
experience post-1949 lends support to their findings. 
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 Overall Assessment of the Greece Case Study  
 I find both direct and indirect support for my hypothesis 4 from the events surrounding 
the series of Greek civil wars lasting from 1944-1949.  The strongest evidence comes from the 
Dekemvriana, the second phase of civil war.  During that phase, the Gendarmerie clearly 
fulfilled a military role.  They were the primary target of the ELAS guerillas and were the only 
effective Greek fighting force available to defend against the uprising.  Though many members 
of the Gendarmerie were already predisposed to repressive behavior from their experiences 
during the occupation, their brutal treatment by the ELAS during the uprising only served to 
sharpen their animosity towards Leftists and heighten their need for retribution.  The 
Gendarmerie took advantage of the ELAS disarmament following the Virkiza agreement to 
engage in and abet the White Terror – a campaign of violence directed at EAM/ELAS members.  
Though it was not the only reason the EAM/KKE decided to abandon their political efforts and 
resort to revolution, their treatment during the White Terror offers a compelling explanation for 
their choice of this path. 
The experience of the police in the third and final stage also offers support for my 
hypothesis, but in a counterfactual way since a civil war did not reoccur.  At first, the 
Gendarmerie fought as military like they had during the previous phase.  As the war progressed, 
however, the Gendarmerie ceded their role to the military, thereby allowing the Gendarmerie to 
shift their focus to less lethal forms of repression.  This lessened role also allowed the 
Gendarmerie to establish an expansive system of surveillance of the Greek populace – a role they 
perfected in the post-war era.  In fact, pervasive surveillance and political repression became so 
effective that by the 1960s the Greek government no longer needed to take political prisoners; 
deterrence alone was sufficient (Samatas 1986; Close 2002).   The absence of a recurrent civil 
war offers partial support for a portion of my hypothesis.  Part of the chain of logic linking police 
conduct in war to an increased probability of reoccurrence is the premise that increasing police 
repression increases the probability of civil war.  The converse of this premise is that decreasing 
police repression reduces the probability of civil war onset.  Though I do not posit that police 
repression is a necessary cause of civil war, a reduction in police repression that corresponds to a 
period of civil peace lends some credence to my argument by offering support for its converse. 
 The two other casual mechanisms I proposed found mixed support.  Consistent with my 
proposal, the police were generally unqualified to serve as the primary fighting force, which 
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likely prolonged the war.  From an organizational or equipment perspective, the Gendarmerie 
should have been effective.  Zervas had reorganized the Gendarmerie into infantry like battalions 
with similar style weapons (Needham 1972), but this change was inadequate because the 
ineffectiveness of the Gendarmerie stemmed mostly from weak personnel and misuse.  The 
biggest personnel problems appear to have been lack of quality control due to a perceived need 
by the Greek government for their rapid growth, exacerbated by selection of officers based solely 
on political leanings (Close 1985).  The misuse stemmed from the relatively small size of the 
Gendarmerie in comparison with the task of securing all of the Greek countryside (Close 2002).  
On the other hand, the use of the police did not cause the military’s competency to erode.  In 
contrast to my proposition, the use of the Gendarmerie to defend the villages against the 
communists allowed the Greek to grow and improve without the extra burden of having to fight 
at the same time.   
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 Parting thoughts on the Case Studies 
I have assessed the validity of my hypothesis as it applies to the individual cases in their 
respective conclusions, so I will not repeat them here.  My intention for this section is to identify 
some general trends that emerge from both cases, as well as discuss how the cases fit in with 
hypothesis from other chapters of this study.   
 Although the focus of this chapter was the effect of police fighting as military on civil 
war reoccurrence, the case studies do shed light on a number of topics that I address in other 
sections of this study.  The first topic is the role of police repression versus repression by other 
government agents.  While the police almost certainly employed repression during the series of 
Guatemalan civil wars, the army was responsible for the vast majority of state terror, which was 
an important inducement for the Indians to join the guerilla movements that participated in the 
second civil war.  This relationship is similar to what I found in studying the effects of police 
repression in Chapter 3, wherein I determined that increasing levels of police repression were 
less important than increasing levels of overall government repression.  While I did not isolate 
and test the effects of military repression in Chapter 3, militaries are particularly suited to engage 
in repression, so it is not unreasonable to assume that military acts of repression constituted a 
significant portion of overall government acts.  In contrast, the police were the primary 
repressive instruments in Greece, dating from the time of the anti-labor movement in the 1920s.  
Of interest in the Greek case is that most police were Gendarmes, an organization type that 
muddles the distinction between police and military.  Gendarmerie in general, and the Greek 
gendarmerie during the period of interest in particular, maintain a more martial style organization 
and possess heavier weapons that their typical urban counterparts (Lutterbeck 2004).  
Additionally, they are less tied to a geographic location, so their relationship with society is 
different as well.126  During the 1940s, only four Greek cities possessed municipal police forces.  
Whether the Greek experience after World War Two would have been different if fewer of their 
police were in the Gendarmerie organizations makes an interesting counterfactual proposition. 
A second observation relates to police centralization.  In chapter 4, I proposed that 
increasing police centralization increases the probability of civil war onset through the 
                                                 
126 See Chapter 4 - Greed and Police Organization for a discussion of the relationship between gendarmerie and 
society.   
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intermediate process of repression.  I see strong evidence for this hypothesis in the wars in 
Guatemala, which has maintained a centralized police force since the 1930s when President 
Ubico reorganized the force to better control the population and contain challenges to his 
authority.  Ubico’s actions represent a clear example of a leader seeking to reduce monitoring 
costs by eliminating layers of authority between himself and his agent. Centralization also 
enabled state use of terror by improving coordination with the army, though a more suitable term 
might be “co-option.”  The creation of district headquarters, manned by the army, to better 
manage joint police-army operations would have been more difficult if the police had a 
decentralized organization.  Centralization did not seem to be a major contributing cause to 
police repression in Greece.  Rather, the absence of an army in the earlier periods of the civil 
wars appears to have been more important because it encouraged Gendarmerie use of repression 
in an effort to offset their numerical imbalance with the enemy.  The Greek Gendarmerie would 
likely have felt compelled to resort to more drastic tactics regardless of their organizational type. 
As a final note on centralization, Bayley’s (1985) conclusion that police organizational types 
tend to remain constant over time finds support in these two cases.  In Guatemala, the basic 
organizational type endured through the revolutionary era in Guatemala even when President 
Arévalo sought to reform the police force.  In Greece, the basic organizational form remained 
intact despite multiple regime types, including occupation by an external power.     
The final topic relates to rugged terrain.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) contend that rugged 
terrain is a significant factor in enabling violent resistance to the state because it inhibits 
movement of government coercive forces.127  The Guatemalan and Greek civil wars both offer 
strong support for Fearon and Laitin’s arguments.  Both wars in Guatemala began in remote 
areas: the first in the eastern highlands and the second in the western highlands. Moreover, 
guerillas groups sought refuge in the rugged areas after their defeat at the hands of the 
government.  While the guerillas’ use of remote terrain appears to have aided their military 
efforts, it also may have unexpectedly helped them garner direct and indirect support.  The 
remote nature of the terrain is very likely to have been a factor in the army’s decision to focus 
efforts on terrorizing the guerillas’ support network rather than chase the guerillas through the 
                                                 
127 In keeping with their findings, many of my quantitative models include a measure of percent rugged terrain as a 
control variable. 
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highlands.  Unfortunately for the government, their campaign of terror directed at the Indians 
only paradoxically served to increase the Indians support for the insurgency.  Rugged terrain also 
played a major part in the Greek civil wars.  The ELAS began their resistance to the occupation-
collaboration government in the rugged areas of Greece, and by the end of the war controlled 
most of the areas outside the major cities.  Similarly, the EAM/KKE sought refuge in the hills 
during the White Terror, and the KKE conventional army formed there as well.  In the Greek 
case, the rugged hills of northern Greece also provided the benefit of a shared border with 
Yugoslavia, which was a major supplier of aid to the Greek guerillas.   
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 The overarching purpose of this paper is to give the role of police in civil war onset its 
proper due, a task that, to the best of my determination, extant studies have failed to do.  
Indicative of the shortcomings in the extant work is a troubling trend of treating the police as a 
reflection of state capacity, rather than as an agent with its own distinct attributes.  Treating 
police this way offers no opportunity for the police to exercise any degree of agency or 
autonomy from the central state authority.  The most egregious example of this trend has been to 
conflate the police and the military, lumping them into the more encompassing “security sector.”  
This conflation has the effect of causing the police to appear as surrogates of the military, with 
the two organizations distinguished only by their geographic orientation: the military looks 
outward and the police look inward.  Viewing the police and military in this way ignores the 
many other differences between them− most importantly, their contrasting relationship with their 
state’s citizens.  In short, police perform their typical functions amongst society with the minimal 
level of force necessary to maintain order.  On the other hand, the military operates with fewer 
restrictions on their use of force and tends to exist more separately from society.   
  In an effort to address the shortcomings in extant literature, this study looked at a 
number of police attributes, both individually and in combination, to explore how a state’s police 
force could affect the probability that the state experiences an outbreak of civil war.  In doing so, 
I drew from a wide variety of disciplines including international relations, comparative politics, 
history, and police sociology, especially the multiple principal-agent model.  I applied this model 
with both the state central authority and society serving as principals to the police’s agent.  Use 
of this model allows inclusion of considerations of how police interests may differ from those of 
the principals, as well as how well the police can shirk the interests of the principals.    
 In this chapter I provide a summary of the overall study’s major arguments and findings.  
I then describe how the findings contribute to the greater study of police and civil war.  I next 
discuss how this study suggests areas for further study.  I conclude with recommendations for 
policy makers. 
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 Summary of Major Arguments and Findings 
 This paper was organized into an introductory chapter, followed by four substantive 
chapters.  I relied heavily on quantitative analysis because it allowed me to test my theories 
across a broad time and country domain most effectively.  The one exception is a chapter of case 
studies.  I changed methodologies because the variables I employed in that chapter did not lend 
themselves to quantitative operationalization.    
 The substantive portion begins with Chapter 2, which looked at the role of police 
capacity on civil war onset.  I offered the hypothesis that increasing police capacity should 
decrease the probability of civil war.  The proposition that state capacity should affect the 
likelihood of civil war is not novel.  What is more, other authors have indirectly allowed for 
police capacity to affect civil war.  Nevertheless, to best of my knowledge, no one has tested how 
police may impart a unique impact on the onset of civil war across as large time and country 
sample.  In remedying the shortfall, I determined that the datasets previous authors had employed 
for police capacity were inadequate.  As a result, I developed my own database by combining a 
number of existing datasets on police strength.  I conceptualized police capacity as actual 
capacity and visible capacity, with the major difference between them being that visual capacity 
relates to the perception of police capacity held by aspiring rebels, whereas actual capacity 
indicates the actual ability of the police force to defeat a violent challenge and can include 
information unavailable to the rebels.  I found that my measure of visible capacity has a 
decreasing effect on the probability of civil war onset, with relatively high levels of statistical 
significance for the lower 75th percentile values of police capacity.    In light of these results, I 
can conclude that the data exhibits strong support for this hypothesis.  I also proposed that police 
visible capacity should have less effect in anocracies and in states with a previous history of civil 
violence.  I found mixed support for the basic premise that increasing visible capacity reduces 
the probability of civil war onset because with some onset databases, increasing police per capita 
increases the probability of civil war.  Tests of the marginal effects of police capacity as 
anocratization varies did not yield results that were sufficiently statistically significant.   On the 
other hand, tests of the discrete change of anocratization did exhibit statistically significant 
results.  For given values of police per capita, states with anocratic regime types experience a 
higher probability of civil war onset, though this finding is consistent with previous studies that 
link anocracy to increased risk of civil war onset.  I found support for the first element of the 
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hypothesis concerning the effect of previous levels of violence.  Increasing police capacity 
reduced the probability of civil war onset, regardless of the previous levels of internal violence.  
Moreover, higher levels of previous internal violence increased the probability of civil war onset 
in all cases, but this finding is not novel.  Nevertheless, tests of the marginal effects of police 
capacity as levels of violence vary did not yield sufficiently statistically significant results.  Thus, 
I must deem this hypothesis unsubstantiated. 
 Chapter 3 addressed the role repression on civil war onset.  I examined both police 
repression itself and police repression in relation to repression by all other government actors.  I 
proposed that higher levels of both forms of repression should increase the probability of civil 
war.   Using two different databases for repression, I found that increasing police repression 
increased the probability of civil war onset, but only the use of a few datasets generated 
statistically significant results.  My second test entailed the use of a ratio variable of police 
repression to repression by all other government actors.  I predicted that a higher ratio of police 
repression should lead to a greater probability of civil war because the effects should be felt more 
strongly in society.  The outcomes were mixed and highly dependent on the choices for 
indicators for repression and civil war onset databases.  I also predicted that the marginal effects 
of the repression ratios should be highest at low levels of repression by all other government 
actors, but tests contradicted my hypothesis and revealed that for the most part, marginal effects 
were higher as repression by all other actors increased, suggesting that aggregate repression may 
be more important than police repression. 
 Chapter 4 moved beyond simple measures of police strength and addressed how the 
organizational modes of a state’s police forces could influence the probability of civil war onset.  
I offered two contrasting hypotheses regarding the impact of police organization.  Drawing upon 
a grievance school of civil war explanation, I proposed that greater police centralization should 
increase the likelihood that police engage in repression, thereby increasing the probability of 
civil war.  Conversely, I drew upon the greed school of explanation and proposed that increasing 
centralization should allow police to deter aspiring rebels in a more efficient manner, though the 
effect of increased centralization should diminish as police capacity increases.  I modeled the 
grievance hypothesis as a set of equations that portrayed the simultaneous effect of centralization 
on repression and civil war onset.  Tests of the simultaneous model yielded consistently 
statistically significant, negative effects of greater police centralization on the probability of civil 
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war onset, which directly contradicts my hypothesis.  I found no support for my second 
hypothesis that increasing centralization leads to more effective police, mostly due to statistically 
insignificant results.  Moreover, the few tests that did yield statistically significant results 
directly contradicted my hypothesis.   
 The fifth and final substantive chapter explored how police conduct during one civil war 
may influence the prospect that civil war reoccurs.  This chapter represents the methodological 
exception because it contained case studies rather than quantitative tests of cross-national time 
series data.   I proposed that the experience of police serving as military during a civil war 
increases the probability that a civil war reoccurs because it predisposed the police force to 
employ violence.  I analyzed the validity of this hypothesis by employing process tracing cases 
studies of civil wars in Guatemala in the 1960s and 70s and in Greece in the 1940s.  The 
Guatemalan case represents the example wherein police performed military functions during one 
war and civil war reoccurred.  Police repression offered a compelling explanation for 
reoccurrence in this case because it drove passive bystanders to become active participants.   The 
Greek case actually encompassed three civil wars, though I focused on the final two.  Police 
were the primary fighting force during the second war.  This experience likely increased the 
propensity of the police to view even peaceful Leftist activists as existential threats to the state.  
This perception led the police to tolerate and perhaps to participate in a campaign of terror 
directed at Leftist, which almost certainly caused the Leftists to abandon the political process and 
turn to revolution.  The recurrent war marked the final episode of violence, however, most likely 
due to the army’s assumption of responsibility for fighting.  The police initially fought as 
military during this recurrent civil war, but ceded responsibility for fighting to the military as the 
army became more effective.  This shift in responsibility allowed the police to turn their attention 
away from physical repression and instead direct their energies towards legally sanctioned 
political repression.  This shift appears to have been one of the primary reasons that an additional 
civil war never took place. 
 The introductory chapter suggested that there may be some time specific factors at play in 
the data under analysis because most of the datasets largely covered the Cold War era.  Bearing 
in mind the hypotheses presented in the preceding chapters, properly addressing the topic of 
period effects involves determining which Cold War specific factors influenced the ability of 
police to either prevent or cause civil war.  With regard to capacity to prevent, the most 
  
147 
 
prominent period effect was to reduce the capacity of police forces in states that sided with the 
West due to the increased aid the rebels in those countries received from the Soviet Union 
(Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).   Though the exact impact of Soviet aid is difficult to determine, it 
is a reasonable to assume that the increased support improved the rebels’ capacity to some 
extent, thereby increasing both their actual and perceived ability to successfully challenge the 
police.  Since the actual and visible capacities of a state’s police force exist in comparison to 
those of aspiring rebels, the increased Soviet aid had an overall effect of reducing police 
capacity.  With regard to repression, police should have been more repressive during the Cold 
War.  The higher number of civil wars occurring during the Cold War era should have led to 
higher levels of state repression in response to threats to their power (Davenport 1995).  Police 
organization should be unaffected by period effects.  Police organizations tend to endure 
regardless of internal threat levels (Bayley 1985).  What may be more a factor for organization 
was the number of states gaining independence during that era.  Most new states adopted 
centralized police forces that reflected the centralized nature of their governments.128 
 Contributions to the Study of Police and Civil War 
 The previous section described how the individual chapters of this study have contributed 
to its greater purpose of giving the role of police in civil war onset its proper due.  This section 
provides the broader implications of the findings and discusses what they could mean for the 
study of police more generally. 
 At the risk of stating the obvious, my first broad conclusion is that policing is not a 
concept that lends itself to simple analysis.  Although tests of police per capita and police per 
area both generated meaningful results, numbers alone are inadequate measure of police 
capacity.  One reason is that police typically operate in small numbers, dispersed throughout the 
population.129  A better measure of police capacity would capture within-state variation (a point 
to which I return in the next section).  The complex nature of police supports the findings of 
previous authors that a state’s police force reflects its own unique circumstances (Bayley 1985; 
Marenin 1985; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005).  One cannot understand a police force without 
                                                 
128 This statement is based on my own observations while coding police organizations. 
129 On the other hand, this type of analysis may not be suitable for the military either, which could explain why 
Hendrix (2010) and others failed to find a relationship between size of military and civil war onset. 
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situating it in relation to the central state authority and society.  While the multiple-principal 
agent model has its limitations, it proved to be a useful tool for modeling this relationship.    
The one variable that consistently exhibited a statistically significant effect was regime 
type.   For instance, being an anocracy is still the strongest predictor of civil war.   Additionally, 
my best results often came from including regime type related variables as interaction terms.  
While I found that increasing the size of a state’s police tends to reduce the probability of civil 
war onset, the number required to reduce the probability to zero depended mainly on whether a 
state was an anocracy.  This outcome is not surprising given the host of other problems that 
anocracies face.  This type of regime tends to be the weakest form of government (Bäck and 
Hadenius 2008).  Anocracies experiences greater levels of repression (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 
1993) and suffer more civil wars (Hegre et al 2001; Hendrix 2010) than autocracies and 
democracies.   
 This study provided strong support for Bayley’s (1985) finding that police organizations 
are highly resistant to change.  Most of the states in my sample (1940-2000) maintained the same 
police organization, despite experiencing such momentous events as the onset and ebb of the 
Cold War, internal wars, and regime changes.  States that did experience a change generally 
became more centralized.  The one prominent exception was Romania, which created a local 
police force to complement the national police force after the fall of the communist regime (Das 
2006).   
 Suggestions for Further Study 
 In the course of conducting this study, a number of topics emerged that merit scholars’ 
further attention.  The first relates to unit of analysis.  As this study has demonstrated, state level 
data on police is an inadequate measure of police capacity.  Moreover, it carries a high risk of 
inducing an ecological fallacy.130  For instance, urban and rural areas may not require the same 
per capita number of police, but simple police per capita measures do not allow for this 
distinction.  A superior indicator would measure police strength at a much more precise level. 
 In the same vein, a needed line of inquiry would develop a better measure of police 
intelligence capacity.  It is one of the three major elements of police capacity and is a critical 
                                                 
130 The ecological fallacy comes from improperly drawing inferences about individual characteristics from group 
characteristics (Przeworski and Tuene 1970: 60). 
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distinction between the roles of the police and the military.  While it is easy to draw a conceptual 
boundary between intelligence capacity and the other two elements, developing a distinct 
indicator for police intelligence capacity is challenging.  Future studies should attempt to create a 
measure of police intelligence capacity that is not based on measures such as size or budgets that 
can indicate other concepts.  Also, in an effort to avoid multicollinearity, the new measure of 
intelligence capacity should not duplicate indicators of regime characteristics such as respect for 
individual rights. 
 Another area demanding attention relates to police autonomy.  Specification of autonomy 
is difficult because it can be related to other regime characteristics.131   Nevertheless, the marked 
difference between the police forces in Los Angeles and New York City regarding propensity to 
employ violence suggests that autonomy can act independently of regime characteristics.  Both 
cities are strong democracies, governed by mayors, in a highly democratic country, but the Los 
Angeles police employ violence much more often– a difference that Chevigny (1995) attributes 
to the low level of accountability citizens of Los Angeles can impose on their police. 
 Another area demanding greater attention is societal acceptance of repression.  Davenport 
(1995; 2004; 2007) has probably done the most work on the topic, but runs into the same 
problems that any study of cultural traits encounter, namely – operationalization.  Davenport 
proxies social acceptance of violence by magnitude of threat.  His choice is understandable, but 
is underspecified because it could indicate any number of other concepts.  Consideration of 
cultural factors may also serve as a means to overcome the hegemony of regime type as an 
explanation for civil war.  For example, Chevigny (1995) finds that another significant 
determinant of the repressive tendencies of the Los Angeles police is the high level of tolerance 
for police repression among Los Angeles citizens and political elites.132 
                                                 
131 In fact, I originally intended to include a chapter devoted to autonomy, but opted not to because autonomy 
continually became bound up with regime type. 
132 My own experience can attest to differences in acceptance of police repression even among strong democracies.  
In the summer of 1993, while I was in my early twenties, I had the opportunity to travel outside the United States for 
the first time and spend a month with a U.S. Army unit in Germany.   Soon after arrival, one of the soldiers who had 
been in Germany a while gave me the admonition that if the German police stopped me, don’t run.  If I did run and 
they caught me, he warned me to just lay there are take my beating because Germans had a different outlook on 
police brutality.  Fortunately, I never had the occasion to put his admonition to the test, but the general agreement I 
found among Americans regarding the warning suggests it had some validity. 
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 The final suggested topic for further study concerns the question of whether a region 
suffering from significant violence warrants a non-militarized police force.  Bayley and Perito 
(2010) recommend that when an area suffers from levels of violence approaching civil war, 
police should not carry the onus of responsibility for fighting the insurgency.  Instead, the 
military should bear the brunt of defeating the insurgency and free up the police to perform their 
usual functions.  While this recommendation seems reasonable, it ignores the consideration that 
unless the military simply eradicates all the insurgents and their supporters, the conditions that 
led to the civil war may still be present after the war.  Consequently, much like occurred in 
Greece, the police could still be targets and have to fight back, regardless of their intentions.  A 
beneficial area of study would be to focus on whether there are any discernible tipping points or 
triggers to mark the time when a region has achieved a sufficient level of security to merit non-
militarized law enforcement.  A corollary area of study would address whether leaving the 
military in an area too long could create resentments and exacerbate the already precarious post-
war circumstances. 
 Recommendations for Policy Makers 
 I close this study with a discussion of its implications for policy makers.   I do so from 
the perspective of a hypothetical advisor to a government aid agency wishing to assist a troubled 
state develop a capable police force.   To avoid offering “one size fits all” solutions, I present 
recommendation in the form of trade-offs of risks and opportunities.   Of note, underlying all the 
recommendations is the assumption that the police should not be the primary change agents 
within a state.  The purpose of the police is to maintain order and preserve the status quo, which 
makes police a poor choice to drive such fundamental changes within a state such as 
democratization (Marenin 1996). 
The first policy recommendation stems from a conclusion that police development cannot 
occur in a vacuum.  This consideration is especially important for states that receive outside aid 
because donors may focus on the police at the expense of other recipient state institutions, which 
can allow the police to become too strong.  In the language of the principal-agent model, the 
state as principal loses its monitoring ability because it can no longer provide adequate incentives 
to influence its agent’s behavior.  The telling example of this problem occurred in Central 
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America.  U.S. aid to the countries’ police and military forces allowed these institutions to 
become strong enough to evade effective oversight from the state and society, creating “armies 
without nations” (Holden 2004).  This is not to say that the police should not be a vital part of a 
state’s development plan.  An important element of state building is security.  Economic and 
political development will occur more slowly, if at all, in insecure environments (Tilly 1985; 
North 1990; Bates 2010), so police must possess a reasonable level of coercive capacity.  Policy 
makers will need to reconcile these competing considerations as they determine how to best 
situate police development in the greater development plan. 
At the same time, policy makers cannot forget about society, as well as the relationship 
between society and the state.  If the police exist at the nexus between the state and society 
(Marenin 1985), a police force must reflect the attributes of its two principals.  For instance, 
states with a highly centralized government likely require a highly centralized police force 
because the sub-national polities are probably not capable of providing effective oversight of the 
police.  Consequently, police will not be able to decentralize until the state central authority 
divests power.  A related issue concerns the penetration of the state into areas where it has not 
done so previously.  The historical trend has been for inhabitants of those areas to violently resist 
the growth of the power of the state, suggesting they will almost certainly resent the presence 
and imposition of a police force (Cohen, Brown, and Organski 1981).  To expect the inhabitants 
to welcome the police and the loss of autonomy the police represent is unrealistic. Policy makers 
should plan for the possibility that police expansion may result in violence.   
Another recommendation reflecting the police-state-society relationship concerns size of 
police.  The findings of this study regarding the relationship between police size and civil war 
onset suggest only two general guidelines.  One is that absent any other considerations, a greater 
number of police per capita and per area are more likely to prevent civil war.   Additionally, 
anocracies need more police, although more police in anocracies also generates risks.  
Anocracies are particularly ripe for police abuses of power and stand to lose the most from 
corrupt and repressive police practices. 
Because states and aid agencies cannot expect to determine a correct size for a recipient 
state’s police force at the outset, they must be prepared to shift police resources as they learn 
more about the outcomes of their choices.  One way to do so is to establish a gendarmerie force, 
which by their organization, equipment, and training are suited for nationwide redeployment.  
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Nevertheless, state and aid agencies must bear in mind that gendarmerie also come with risks due 
to their militarized nature.  The mobility of gendarmerie causes their relationship with the 
policed society to be looser, so the ability of the society to monitor police becomes more 
difficult.    
 
With that recommendation, I end this study.  My goal was to give the role of police in 
civil war onset its proper consideration.  Comparative political science has generally overlooked 
the role of police (Bayley 1985; Marenin 1985), and I hope that I made a step towards remedying 
this inattention.  While my findings were not as robust as I would have liked, I think I have 
successfully advanced the body of knowledge relating police and civil war by at least giving 
police their due theoretically.  I also hope that I have made a compelling argument that, while the 
police and military both share space within the coercive sector, they are different organizations 
with distinct responsibilities.  Most importantly, they have very different relationships with 
society, and states should strive to keep them separate.  The case studies in this paper provide 
clear examples of the cost of not doing so.   
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Appendix A - Description of Dependent Variables 
 My primary dependent variable throughout this study is Civil War Onset (Onset).   My 
conceptual definition for civil war is “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized 
sovereign entity between two parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities” 
(Kalyvas 2006).  I opt for this definition because it is general enough to include the many 
competing definitions of civil war mentioned by studies that differ mainly on quantitative 
threshold issues (Sambanis 2004).  A civil war onset, therefore, is the event marking the 
beginning of a conflict that qualifies as a civil war.   
 I elect to draw from existing datasets to the maximum extent possible.  I mitigate for the 
idiosyncratic biases present in individual databases by drawing from five different sources.  My 
selection guidelines include prevalence in the civil war literature and maximal temporal domain.  
I also seek to select datasets that exhibit a variety of in their operationalization criteria for civil 
war.  Below I offer a description of each of the five databases.  The paragraph heading includes 
each dataset’s moniker I employ throughout this paper.  Abbreviations are in parentheses. 
 
 COW  
 One source of variation among civil war datasets is the threshold of casualties.  The first 
four of the datasets I employ share a common casualty threshold.  Among these four, the most 
prevalent in the civil war literature is the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State War Dataset 
(v4.0) (Sarkees, Reid and Wayman 2010).   The COW definition of civil war can be summarized 
as military action internal to the metropole, requiring the active participation of the national 
government, with effective resistance by both sides. State violence should be sustained and 
reciprocated and casualties should exceed 1,000 in a given 12 month period (Small and Singer 
1982).133  The temporal domain is 1816-2007.  The COW divides intrastate wars into three 
general types depending upon the status of the combatants: wars of the government of the state 
against a non-state entity, wars of the government of a regional subunit against a non-state entity, 
and intercommunal wars.  I choose to only include the first category since the focus of my study 
is the role of police on civil war onset, and police do not factor into the other two categories of 
                                                 
133 The elaboration of this definition relies on Sambanis (2004) and Sarkees (2010). 
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civil war.  I also choose to eliminate “internationalized” civil wars since the presence of a third 
party state alters the relationship of a state’s police force to its society and to the state central 
authority.  Following my aforementioned methodology results in 113 observations of civil war 
onset that occur between 1940 and 2007.  I restrict myself to this timeframe for purposes of 
comparison since the other datasets do not contain data for wars that occurred before 1940, nor 
do most of the independent variables include observations before that time.    
 Sambanis  
 A second dataset developed by Sambanis (2004) is an update to a commonly used dataset 
developed by Doyle and Sambanis (2000).  The Sambanis alters the COW definition according 
to a number of factors, chief among them that a civil war onset can occur when at least 500 
casualties occur in the first year.   Using this definition, Sambanis develops an original dataset of 
119 civil wars onset that occurred between 1945 and 1999.   
 Fearon and Laitin (FL) 
 The third dataset comes from Fearon and Laitin (2003).  These authors consider civil 
wars as having met the following criteria:   
(1) They involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, 
nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a 
region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 
1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed 
on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is in-tended to 
rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition. 
 
Again, this dataset is very similar to the COW Intrastate War Dataset.  The primary difference is 
that Fearon and Laitin include of wars of independence.  The authors’ justification for including 
these types of wars is that other datasets that exclude successful wars of independence as valid 
observations of a civil war do consider unsuccessful attempts to be valid instances of onset.  
Fearon and Laitin consider this distinction to be arbitrary.  By applying their own criteria, Fearon 
and Laitin generate 114 observations of civil war onset between 1945 and 1999.  
 Toft   
 The fourth dataset that shares the common COW casualty threshold is the “Civil War 
Dataset” (Toft 2010).  This dataset is the most recent dataset and has a time domain of 1940 to 
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2008.   Toft employs the Correlates of War definition for civil war.  Toft draws upon each of the 
aforementioned civil war datasets, but differs in that she includes instances of wars of 
independence, she holds to the threshold of 1000 casualties more strictly, and she disaggregates 
episodes into new onsets differently.  Toft’s methods result in 134 cases of civil war onset. 
 PRIO   
 The final dataset on civil war is the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/ Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2010 (Harbom, Lotta, and 
Wallensteen 2010; Gleditsch et al 2002).  This dataset is distinct in that it utilizes a threshold of 
violence is 25 deaths for onsets of “minor armed conflicts”− far lower than the threshold of 1000 
deaths per year the other studies employ.   The PRIO dataset contains annual observations of 
intrastate armed conflict for all states in the international system, as defined by Gleditsch and 
Ward (1999), between 1946-2009.  Armed conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”   Intrastate wars 
can consist of internal armed conflict without intervention from other states or internationalized 
internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition 
group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. The 
UCDP/PRIO datasets includes 331 observations of intrastate war onsets between 1946 and 2009. 
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Appendix B - Supporting Information for Chapter 2 
 Statistical Comparisons of Sampling Bias 
 This section contains a description of the possible bias effects resulting from use of 
certain independent variables, stemming from reduced sample size due to missing data.  To 
determine if any bias effect results, I compare the means and standard deviations of the 
unconstrained sample to the means and standard deviations of the restricted samples.  I then draw 
upon extant theory to discern any bias effects from any resulting differences in means and 
standard deviations. 
Bias Effects of Including Police Capacity Data 
 This sub-section addresses possible bias resulting from inclusion of data on police 
capacity.  The table below depicts summary statistics of the quinquennial average polity IV score 
(polity5) for unconstrained dataset.  T is measured in quinquennials. 
 
Table B-1 Polity5 Statistics for Unconstrained Sample 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
polity  overall | -.6238209   7.398527        -10         10 |     N =    1258 
        between |      6.411547        -10         10 |     n =     167 
        within  |     3.681265  -12.42382   13.25618 |     T = 7.53293 
 
 
 The next two tables depict the summary statistics for the polity measure of those country-
years with corresponding police data.  The first table is for police per capita and the second table 
is for police per area.   
Table B-2 Polity Statistics when including Police per capita 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
polity   overall |  2.217546   7.514041        -10         10 |     N =     455 
         between |             6.951734        -10         10 |     n =     137 
         within  |             3.171809  -13.38245   13.41755 |     T = 3.32117 
 
 
Table B-3 Polity Statistics when including Police per Area 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
polity  overall  |  2.196966   7.462801        -10         10 |     N =     467 
        between  |             6.868447        -10         10 |     n =     138 
        within   |             3.223377  -13.40303   13.39697 |     T = 3.38406 
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 It is evident that the countries with corresponding measures of police capacity are more 
democratic, as the mean value increases from 0.6 to 2.2, though the effect of any bias resulting 
from inclusion of police measures is unclear.  While higher levels of democracy are associated 
with low levels of civil war, it is possible that the increase in mean values could represent a shift 
from autocracy to anocracy, which are associated with higher levels of civil wars.    Standard 
deviations do not exhibit much change, thus the amount of variation in the scores remains 
relatively constant even though the mean values increases.  If there had been an increase in the 
within country measures of standard deviation, it could have indicated a bias because the process 
of democratization serves to increases the probability of civil war onset (Hegre et al 2001).    
 
 This table depicts the summary statistics for a measure of energy consumption per capita. 
The source of energy data is the Primary Energy Consumption (PEC) measure from the COW 
National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987). 
 
Table B-4 Encap Statistics for Unconstrained Sample 
Variable         |       Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
development   overall  |  3.246447    8.69467  -.0857143   116.9046 |     N =    1353 
              between  |       8.658087  -.0857143    83.45844 |    n =     193 
         within   |              3.984572  -27.72583   53.5437 | T-bar = 7.01036 
 
 
 The next two tables depict the effect of including development on the two measures of 
police capacity.   While the effect on the means is minimal, standard deviation between countries 
reduces, indicating a bias towards countries that are closer to the mean.  The bias effect of this 
clustering is unclear since it indicates an exclusion of countries with both higher and lower levels 
of development.   On the other hand, standard deviations within countries increases, indicating a 
bias towards developing countries- a phenomena associated with a lower risk of civil war 
(Fearon and Laitin 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).   
 
Table B-5 Encap Statistics when Including Police per capita 
Variable         |       Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
development  overall |  3.929305   8.327966          0   81.72714 |     N =     475 
          between |      6.337399          0   43.98705 |     n =     150 
          within  |      5.093125  -27.04297   54.22655 |     T = 3.16667 
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Table B-6 Encap Statistics when Including Police per area 
Variable         |       Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
development   overall |  3.841276   8.283921          0   81.72714 |   N =     471 
          between |      6.316462          0   43.98705 |   n =     148 
         within  |      5.037809    -27.131   54.13852 |   T = 3.18243 
 
 
Bias effects of including the MAR variable 
 The following tables represent the effect on polity score statistics that result from 
restricting the sample to only those country-years with corresponding MAR data and police per 
capita data.  The first table depicts the statistical for measures of police per capita and the second 
for measures of police per area.  The overall effect is to reduce the mean and bring it closer to the 
mean of the unconstrained sample.  Standard deviations remain relatively unchanged.  The effect 
of this shift in means is mixed.  If the shift represents a move away from democratic states, then 
it should represent a bias towards more civil war prone countries.  If it represents a move of 
anocracies towards autocracy, then it should indicate a bias towards less civil war. 
 
Table B-7 Polity Statistics when Including  MAR variable and Police per capita measure on 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
polity  overall  |  1.556796   7.389224        -10         10 |     N =     309 
         between |             6.676888         -9         10 |     n =      92 
         within  |             3.228032  -8.893204    12.7568 |     T =  3.3587 
 
 
Table B-8 Polity Statistics when Including MAR variable and Police per area Measure 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
polity  overall  |  1.529383   7.385494        -10         10 |     N =     308 
         between |             6.615229         -9         10 |     n =      91 
         within  |             3.233285  -8.920617   12.72938 |     T = 3.38462 
 
 
 The next two tables represent the summary statistics on energy consumption per capita 
for country years with corresponding values for police capacity and MAR scores.  Overall means 
reduce only slightly.  Both overall and between standard deviations decrease − indicating a 
cluster of country-scores towards the mean.  Again, any resulting bias effect is unclear since 
states with both high and low scores appear to have dropped out.  Within country standard 
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deviations is similar to the unconstrained dataset, suggesting no bias towards developing 
countries. 
  
Table B-9 Encap Statistics when Including MAR and Police per capita 
Variable          |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
development   overall |  3.049861   6.426241          0   59.45317 |     N =     315 
        between |      4.851339          0   40.51031 |      n =      95 
          within  |      3.161653  -24.32209   21.99272 |      T = 3.31579 
 
 
Table B-10 Encap Statistics when Including MAR and Police per area Measure 
Variable          |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
development   overall |  3.021894    6.41727          0   59.45317 |     N =     314 
          between |       4.772506         0   40.51031 |     n =      94 
          within  |       3.1667    -24.35006 21.96476 |    T = 3.34043 
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 Effect on Sample of Including Police Capacity 
 The following tables depict the reduction in sample sizes of the onset databases resulting 
from inclusion of the police capacity data.  The table below depicts the differences between the 
original number of onsets and those onset country-years with corresponding police strength data.   
 
Table B-11 Onset databases with corresponding Police Data 
Database 
(1950 and later) 
Original 
number  
of 
onsets 
Onsets with 
matching 
UNCTS and 
ICPSR 
police 
strength data 
COW 105 6 
Doyle and 
Sambanis 
135 13 
Fearon and Laitin 101 7 
PRIO 314 22 
Toft 108 10 
 
 The following table depicts the sample sizes resulting from the use of quinquennial police 
capacity data in column 2 and the resulting sample sizes from the use of the additional police 
strength sources in column 3.  A comparison between column 3 and column 2 of the following 
table represent the differences between using yearly and quinquennial data. 
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Table B-12 Onset Sample size with Additional Police Capacity Data 
Database 
(1950 and later) 
Original 
number  
of onsets by 
quinquennial 
Onsets with 
matching 
quinquennial 
UN police strength 
data  
Onsets with 
additional police 
data* 
COW 98 23 25 
Doyle and Sambanis 125 35 42 
Fearon and Laitin 97 31 34 
PRIO 249 66 81 
Toft 93 30 31 
* The additional sources are the Das (2006) and Newman, Bouloukos, and Cohen (1993) 
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 Description of Variables Contained in the Capacity Models 
  
 Below are the models reflecting the hypotheses pertaining to the effects of police 
capacity on civil war onset.  I first list the models, and then provide a table describing the 
variables. 
 
The models below depict hypothesis 1a.  All variables are measured in quinquennials (t=5).   
 
 Model 1.a.1:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per capita)it + β2 (extractive capacity)it   
    +  β3 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β4 (military per capita)it 
 
 Model 1a.2:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per area)it + β2 (extractive capacity)it   
    +  β3 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β4 (military per area)it 
 
These models depict hypothesis 1b. 
 
 Model 1.b.1:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per capita)it + β2(anocracy)it  
   + β3(anocracy * police per capita)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   +  β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per capita)it 
 
 
 Model 1.b.2:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per area)it + β2(anocracy)it  
   + β3(anocracy * police per area)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   +  β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per area)it 
 
 
The models below depict hypothesis 1c: 
 
 
 Model 1.c.1:  onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per capita)it + β2(past civil strife)it  
   + β3(police per capita * past civil stife)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   + β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per capita)it 
 
 
 Model 1.c.2:  onsetit = onsetit = β0 + β1 (police per area)it + β2(past civil strife)it  
   + β3(police per area * past civil stife)it +  β4 (extractive capacity)it  
   + β5 (bureaucratic quality)it  + β6(military per area)it 
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Table B-13 Variables for Capacity Hypotheses  
 
Variable label Variable concept Measure Source 
Onset Civil War onset Dummy for onset that 
time period 
Various (See Annex A) 
Police per capita Police capacity Police per 1000 
inhabitants 
Various 
Police per area Police capacity Police per 1000 sq kms Various 
Extractive capacity state capacity RPC  RPC 
Bureaucratic quality Regime instability 2(durable/0.5) Polity IV 
Military per capita Military capacity Military per 1000 
inhabitant 
COW 
Military per area Military capacity Military per 1000 sq 
kms 
COW 
anocracy Anocracy Dummy for Polity IV 
score <6 and >-6 
Polity IV 
Past civil strife Rebel learning of police 
capacity 
Lagged MAR score MAR 
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 Correlation matrices  
 
Table B-14 Correlations among potential control variables 
 
police per 
1000 
inhabitants 
Police per 
1000 sq 
km 
Extractive 
Capacity 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
Military 
personnel per 
1000 
inhabitants 
Military 
personnel 
per 1000 sq 
km 
ln of 
gdp per 
cap 
real GDP 
per capita 
police per 1000 
inhabitants 1               
Police per 1000 sq km 0.19 1             
Extractive Capacity 0.14 -0.04 1           
Bureaucratic quality -0.04 -0.02 -0.1 1         
Military personnel per 
1000 inhabitants 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.01 1       
Military personnel per 
1000 sq km 0.01 0.8 -0.06 -0.03 0.24 1     
ln of gdp per cap 0.13 0.14 0.11 -0.2 0.13 0.13 1   
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Table B-15 Correlations among independent variables in models 
 
Police per 
1000 
inhabitants, 
quinquennial 
average 
Police per 1000 
sq kms, 
quinquennial 
average 
Extractive 
capacity,quinquennial 
average 
Bureaucratic 
quality, 
quinquennial 
maximum 
military 
personnel per 
1000 
inhabitants, 
quinquennial 
average 
military 
personnel per 
1000 sq kms, 
quinquennial 
average 
dummy 
for 
anocracy 
Lag of 
MAR 
score 
Police per 1000 
inhabitants, quinquennial 
average 1               
Police per 1000 sq kms, 
quinquennial average 0.17 1             
Extractive 
capacity,quinquennial 
average 0.17 -0.03 1           
Bureaucratic quality, 
quinquennial maximum -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 1         
military personnel per 
1000 inhabitants, 
quinquennial average 0.18 0.16 0.08 -0.11 1       
military personnel per 
1000 sq kms, 
quinquennial average 0.02 0.86 -0.06 -0.06 0.25 1     
dummy for anocracy -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.39 -0.14 0.09 1   
Lag of MAR score -0.11 -0.07 0.01 0.15 0.02 -0.06 0.03 1 
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 Comparison of annual and quinquennial time domains 
Figure B-1 Graphs of comparison of the use of annual and quinquennial time domains 
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183 
 
 Regression Outcomes for Police Capacity 
The following tables depict regression outcomes using various interactions with measures of police capacity. The column in 
each table represents the outcome derived from using the specified civil war onset database. 
Table B-16 Regresion outcome using police per capita measure of police capacity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and 
Laitin 
PRIO Toft 
      
Police per 1000 inhabitants, quinquennial average -0.108 -0.214 -0.148 -0.0697 -0.121 
 (0.125) (0.175) (0.153) (0.0854) (0.170) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average 0.122 0.133 0.177 -0.0535 0.00626 
 (0.239) (0.216) (0.217) (0.197) (0.264) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.813*** 0.946*** 0.820*** 0.453** 0.569** 
 (0.234) (0.201) (0.216) (0.184) (0.249) 
military personnel per 1000 inhabitants, 
quinquennial average 
-0.00101 -0.0111 -0.0255 -0.00626 -
0.0528* 
 (0.0176) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0182) (0.0296
) 
Constant -1.829*** -1.277*** -1.486*** -0.846*** -
1.285** 
 (0.448) (0.436) (0.446) (0.320) (0.549) 
      
Observations 434 367 369 434 434 
Number of ccode 123 120 120 123 123 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-17 Regression outcome using a police per area measure of police capacity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
Police per 1000 sq kms, quinquennial average -0.000542 -0.00165 -0.000517 -0.000382 -0.000266 
 (0.000626) (0.00126) (0.000528) (0.000272) (0.000443) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average 0.0404 0.0113 0.0112 -0.0881 -0.122 
 (0.248) (0.190) (0.207) (0.201) (0.257) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.771*** 0.883*** 0.763*** 0.433** 0.500** 
 (0.211) (0.183) (0.189) (0.172) (0.195) 
military personnel per 1000 sq kms, 
quinquennial average 
-2.13e-05 -2.90e-05 -8.39e-05 3.64e-05 -0.000760** 
 (0.000126) (0.000177) (9.56e-05) (4.01e-05) (0.000323) 
Constant -1.844*** -1.350*** -1.572*** -0.934*** -1.330*** 
 (0.295) (0.221) (0.228) (0.248) (0.267) 
      
Observations 435 368 370 435 435 
Number of ccode 123 120 120 123 123 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-18 Regression outcomes using police per area, conditional on regime type 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
Interaction of police per capita and anocracy dummy 0.464*** 0.466** 0.594*** 0.0792 0.383** 
 (0.129) (0.212) (0.169) (0.148) (0.177) 
Police per 1000 inhabitants, quinquennial average -0.436*** -0.501** -0.577*** -0.0979 -0.340** 
 (0.127) (0.199) (0.160) (0.144) (0.167) 
dummy for anocracy -0.600* -0.315 -0.423 0.161 -0.335 
 (0.334) (0.428) (0.329) (0.353) (0.428) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average 0.0825 0.0131 0.125 0.00425 -0.0549 
 (0.260) (0.227) (0.238) (0.200) (0.277) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.668** 0.716*** 0.571** 0.337* 0.400 
 (0.263) (0.239) (0.243) (0.205) (0.301) 
military personnel per 1000 inhabitants, quinquennial 
average 
-0.00425 -0.0212 -0.0391 -0.00894 -0.0664** 
 (0.0224) (0.0230) (0.0242) (0.0192) (0.0323) 
Constant -1.289*** -0.787** -0.875*** -0.893** -0.886** 
 (0.377) (0.332) (0.339) (0.391) (0.382) 
      
Observations 432 365 367 432 432 
Number of ccode 123 120 120 123 123 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-19 Regression results using police per area, conditional on regime type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
Interaction of police per area and anocracy dummy 0.000467 0.00107 0.000852 -0.000781 0.000548 
 (0.000781) (0.00219) (0.000937) (0.000543) (0.00119) 
Police per 1000 sq kms, quinquennial average -0.000688 -0.00238 -0.000987 -0.000171 -0.000370 
 (0.000741) (0.00241) (0.000881) (0.000146) (0.000652) 
dummy for anocracy 0.105 0.422 0.360 0.538** 0.319 
 (0.310) (0.342) (0.294) (0.263) (0.334) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average 0.0926 0.0592 0.0241 -0.0239 -0.0669 
 (0.244) (0.211) (0.206) (0.204) (0.259) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.655*** 0.669*** 0.546** 0.296 0.331 
 (0.248) (0.224) (0.218) (0.205) (0.265) 
military personnel per 1000 sq kms, quinquennial average -2.19e-05 -5.47e-05 -9.27e-05 8.80e-05 -0.000814* 
 (0.000130) (0.000192) (0.000105) (9.11e-05) (0.000474) 
Constant -1.897*** -1.434*** -1.608*** -1.133*** -1.430*** 
 (0.306) (0.307) (0.252) (0.266) (0.285) 
      
Observations 433 366 368 433 433 
Number of ccode 123 120 120 123 123 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-20 Regression outcomes using police per capitaconditional on levels of previous internal violence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
Interaction of police per capita and lag of MAR -0.00753 0.0204 0.0736 0.0160 0.0310 
 (0.0341) (0.0642) (0.0539) (0.0359) (0.0373) 
Police per 1000 inhabitants, quinquennial average -0.0134 -0.295 -0.318* -0.162 -0.182 
 (0.0576) (0.204) (0.164) (0.116) (0.173) 
Lag of MAR score 0.226*** 0.0965 -0.0292 0.130* 0.0231 
 (0.0751) (0.0987) (0.0893) (0.0772) (0.0764) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average 0.169 0.539** 0.455 -0.164 0.281 
 (0.379) (0.271) (0.315) (0.280) (0.359) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.651** 0.761*** 0.672*** 0.240 0.430 
 (0.315) (0.224) (0.239) (0.231) (0.272) 
military personnel per 1000 inhabitants, quinquennial 
average 
-0.00183 -0.0208 -0.0392 -0.00117 -0.0578* 
 (0.0192) (0.0225) (0.0249) (0.0219) (0.0344) 
Constant -2.506*** -1.584*** -1.408*** -0.781* -1.411** 
 (0.454) (0.491) (0.438) (0.409) (0.568) 
      
Observations 304 255 259 304 304 
Number of ccode 93 85 86 93 93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-21 Regression outcomes using police per area, conditional on levels of previous internal violence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
Interaction of police per area and lag of MAR 0.000597** 0.000444 0.000327* 0.000327 0.000407* 
 (0.000291) (0.000378) (0.000197) (0.000201) (0.000227) 
Police per 1000 sq kms, quinquennial average -0.00441* -0.00392 -0.00169 -0.00236*** -0.00142 
 (0.00226) (0.00264) (0.00128) (0.000787) (0.00197) 
Lag of MAR score 0.170*** 0.115* 0.0469 0.124** 0.0377 
 (0.0567) (0.0607) (0.0522) (0.0534) (0.0562) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average 0.130 0.320 0.335 -0.283 0.141 
 (0.397) (0.257) (0.282) (0.282) (0.339) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.602* 0.710*** 0.620*** 0.228 0.382 
 (0.313) (0.212) (0.221) (0.217) (0.249) 
military personnel per 1000 sq kms, quinquennial 
average 
0.000187 3.85e-05 -8.04e-05 0.000205 -0.000754 
 (0.000234) (0.000272) (0.000156) (0.000130) (0.000648) 
Constant -2.163*** -1.629*** -1.773*** -0.792*** -1.522*** 
 (0.399) (0.296) (0.326) (0.303) (0.365) 
      
Observations 304 255 259 304 304 
Number of ccode 93 85 86 93 93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Outcome Graphs for Police Capacity Models 
 The section provides the graphs that result from tests of the various indictors of police 
capacity, using the different civil war onset databases. 
 
Figure B-2 Effect of Simple Measures of Police Capacity on Civil War Onset 
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Figure B-3 Predicted probabilities of police capacity, interacted with the square of Polity 
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Figure B-4 Discrete change of anocracy as police capacity changes  
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Figure B-5 Marginal effects of police capacity, as anocracy varies 
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Figure B-6 Predicted probabilities of police capacity, interacted with the lagged MAR score  
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Figure B-7 Marginal effects of the lagged MAR score, as police capacity varies 
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Figure B-8 Marginal effects of police capacity as the lagged MAR score varies 
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Appendix C - Supporting Information for Chapter 3 
 Description of CIRI and PTS Datasets 
CIRI  
 The CIRI dataset provides country-year scores for a number of indicators of human rights 
abuses for an average of 200 countries for the years 1981-2010, for a total of 4072 observations.  
The measure that most closely aligns with my definition of repression is the “Physical Integrity 
Index,” which is an aggregate measure of its associated elements that include “Disappearance,” 
“Extrajudicial Killings,” “Political Imprisonment,” and “Torture.”  The Physical Integrity Index 
ranges from “0” for no government respect for human rights to “8” for full government respect 
for human rights.  With the exception of “Political Imprisonment,” each of these elements is an 
activity in which police forces are capable of engaging, and all of the elements plausibly 
constitute examples of “gross discrimination.”   Imprisonment is more of a judicial rather than 
police activity (Reiner 2000:3), so its inclusion as an indicator of police acts of repression runs 
the risk of being spurious.  Nevertheless, I still employ the Physical Integrity Index as my 
indicator of repression because any measurement error that results from inclusion of the 
“Political Imprisonment” indicator is more than offset by the benefits of avoiding the complexity 
of individually employing all of the three more valid sub-elements as explanatory variables.   
PTS 
 Like the CIRI, the PTS dataset measures state sponsored violations of physical integrity 
rights.   Where the datasets differ is that the PTS does not disaggregate violations into sub-
categories.  Additionally, the PTS measures standards based rankings of government abuses, 
whereas the CIRI assesses the frequency and type of government abuses (Wood and Gibney 
2010: 376).  The PTS has a larger time domain than the CIRI, ranging from 1976-2010 for 187 
countries.  The PTS offers two scores, depending on whether the source of data was Amnesty 
International or the United States Department of State, as well as a combined score.  In contrast 
to the CIRI, the PTS employs a higher score for increasing human rights violations, with “5” 
being the worst score and “0” being the best.  The PTS contains 4600 observations for Amnesty 
International data, 5600 observations from the State Department data, and 5600 observations 
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from the combined dataset.   The average number of country observations per year is 146, 
including both Amnesty International and U.S. State Department data.   Among the three PTS 
datasets, I chose to employ the combined scores because it generates no loss of data and reduces 
the impact of systemic error from each of the sources.    
 
 
 Effect of Inclusion of Repression Variables on Sample Sizes of Onset 
Databases 
 One drawback of my choice of indicators of police repression is that their relatively small 
time domain greatly reduces the sample sizes of the civil war onset databases.  The table below 
depicts the reductive effects the various measures of repression impart on the sample sizes of the 
civil war onset databases.  The second column depicts the original size of the onset databases.  
The remaining columns to the right depict the resulting sample sizes of onsets after dropping 
those observations that do not correspond to a matching repression measure.  Each column 
heading depicts the name of the repression datasets along with its temporal domain. 
 
Table C-1 Effect on Sample Sizes of Onset Databases 
Dataset Original sample size 
(temporal domain) 
CIRI 
(1981-2010) 
PTS 
(1976-2010) 
ITT 
(1995-2005) 
IDEA 
(1990-2004) 
COW 
113 
(1940-2007) 
57 68 22 36 
Sambanis 
119 
(1945-1999) 
48 75 14 46 
Fearon and Laitin 
114 
(1945-1999) 
39 58 8 30 
PRIO 
331 
(1946-2009) 
178 217 75 122 
Toft 
134 
(1940-2008) 
30 46 10 24 
 
 The larger number of observations remaining for the PRIO database is not surprising 
since it began with a larger number of unconstrained observations and it covers a temporal 
domain that matches up well with the repression measures.  What is most interesting is the effect 
on the Toft database.  In its original form, this database is the largest of those that use 1000 
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deaths as a threshold, as well as the database that contains the most recent data.  In spite of these 
characteristics, the Toft database matches up the least well to the repression measures.  This 
outcome is especially puzzling since Toft builds upon the other databases to construct her own.  
One explanation may rest on the fact that many of the observations of civil war onsets in the Toft 
database correspond to states with missing data in repression datasets.  My only conclusion is 
that whatever coding rules that Toft employed to determine an observation of civil war onset 
tends to privilege those states that tend to be absent in repression datasets. 
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 Correlation Matrix for Candidates for Control Variables 
 
Table C-2 Correlations among candidates for control variables for the effect of repression on civil war onset 
 
CIRI PTS 
ITT total 
repression 
ITT police 
repression  
ITT 
repression 
by others 
ITT 
ratio 
IDEA total 
repression  
IDEA 
police 
repression 
IDEA 
repression 
by others IDEA ratio 
Polity IV 
score 
Square of 
Polity IV Threat 
GDP per 
capita 
ln of gdp 
per cap 
CIRI 1                             
PTS -0.85 1                           
ITT total 
repression -0.36 0.3 1                         
ITT police 
repression  -0.2 0.16 0.83 1                       
ITT 
repression 
by others -0.4 0.34 0.93 0.57 1                     
ITT ratio 0.12 
-
0.12 0.04 0.29 -0.14 1                   
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CIRI PTS 
ITT total 
repression 
ITT police 
repression  
ITT 
repression 
by others 
ITT 
ratio 
IDEA total 
repression  
IDEA 
police 
repression 
IDEA 
repression 
by others IDEA ratio 
Polity IV 
score 
Square of 
Polity IV Threat 
GDP per 
capita 
ln of gdp 
per cap 
IDEA total 
repression  -0.18 0.21 0.38 0.22 0.42 -0.05 1                 
IDEA 
police 
repression -0.12 0.15 0.41 0.33 0.39 -0.01 0.8 1               
IDEA 
repression 
by others -0.17 0.2 0.29 0.11 0.35 -0.07 0.92 0.51 1             
IDEA ratio 0.11 
-
0.09 0.17 0.28 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.49 -0.13 1           
Polity IV 
score 0.39 
-
0.36 -0.1 0.07 -0.2 0.19 0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.23 1         
Square of 
Polity IV 0.44 
-
0.45 -0.05 0 -0.07 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.1 0.11 0.21 1       
Threat -0.36 0.4 0.05 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 1     
GDP per 
capita 0.5 
-
0.47 -0.05 0 -0.07 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.11 0.32 0.47 -0.13 1   
ln of gdp 
per cap 0.47 
-
0.47 0 0.08 -0.06 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.45 0.46 -0.16 0.85 1 
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 Description of Variable contained in repression models. 
This section provides a full description of the variables contain in the models relating 
repression and civil war.  I first list the models, and then provide a description of the variables. 
 
Model 2a. Onsetit = β0 + β1 (police repression)it + β2 (peace_years)it  
+  β3 (lag of threat)it  + β4 (square of Polity IV)it  
+  β4 (Polity IV)it  
 
 
 The next set of models also includes measures of police repression from the ITT and 
IDEA databases, but this time using a ratio of police acts of repression to overall government 
acts of repression  
 
 Model 2b.  Onsetit = β0 + β1 (proportion of police acts of repression)it  
+ β2 (police repression)it + β3 (
1(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠)it)  
+ β3 peace_yearsit  +  β4 (lag of threat)it  + β5 (square of Polity IV)it  
+ β6 (Polity IV)it  
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Table C-3 Repression model variable descriptions 
 
Variable labels Variable concepts Measure Source 
Police repression Police repression 
Number of acts of police 
torture per country-year 
ITT 
Number of acts of police 
repression per country-
year 
IDEA 
Repression by all other 
Repression by all other 
government agents 
Number of acts of torture 
by all other government 
agents per country-year 
ITT 
Number of acts of 
repression by all other 
government agents per 
country-year 
IDEA 
peace years lingering grievances 
𝒆
−�
𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍𝒘𝒂𝒓
𝟖 � 
onset dataset 
dependent 
lag of threat previous internal 
violence 
PITF Revolutionary War 
Magnitude Scale 
PITF 
square of Polity IV anocracy Polity IV score squared Polity IV 
Polity IV democratization Polity IV score Polity IV 
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 Regression Outcomes for Repression Models 
The following tables are regression outcomes from testing the various repression 
indicators on the probability of civil war onset.  Each chart depicts the effect of one repression 
indicator on several civil war onset databases.   
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Table C-4 Regression with CIRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
CIRI -0.275*** -0.253*** -0.221*** -0.310*** -0.254*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0421) (0.0401) (0.0352) (0.0462) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 0.687***     
 (0.230)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  0.629    
  (0.433)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon 
and Laitin 
  0.379   
   (0.539)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    1.294***  
    (0.222)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     0.635 
     (0.473) 
lag of Threat 0.150* 0.161 0.118 0.154* -0.143 
 (0.0887) (0.199) (0.179) (0.0914) (0.119) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00536** -0.00942*** -0.0120*** -0.00154 -0.00567** 
 (0.00240) (0.00258) (0.00279) (0.00200) (0.00254) 
Polity IV score 0.000987 0.0122 0.0137 0.0245** -0.00538 
 (0.0117) (0.0131) (0.0146) (0.0104) (0.0133) 
Constant -1.153*** -0.664*** -0.633*** -0.679*** -1.364*** 
 (0.172) (0.231) (0.232) (0.161) (0.184) 
      
Observations 3,521 2,053 2,087 3,453 3,574 
Number of ccode 163 148 147 160 162 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-5 Regression with PTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
PTS 0.655*** 0.747*** 0.659*** 0.607*** 0.577*** 
 (0.0872) (0.106) (0.101) (0.0684) (0.0875) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 0.504**     
 (0.254)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  0.386    
  (0.390)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and 
Laitin 
  0.414   
   (0.400)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    0.998***  
    (0.202)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     0.860** 
     (0.376) 
lag of Threat 0.0973 0.145 -0.0319 0.157* -0.219** 
 (0.0822) (0.117) (0.135) (0.0831) (0.0877) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00542** -0.00668*** -0.00977*** -0.00111 -0.00253 
 (0.00246) (0.00242) (0.00291) (0.00184) (0.00213) 
Polity IV score 0.00452 0.0226* 0.0175 0.0123 -0.00375 
 (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0146) (0.00886) (0.0109) 
Constant -4.149*** -3.937*** -3.517*** -3.550*** -4.137*** 
 (0.293) (0.323) (0.313) (0.248) (0.294) 
      
Observations 4,233 2,678 2,628 4,096 4,251 
Number of ccode 165 155 151 163 166 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
213 
 
Table C-6 Regression with ITT total 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
ITT total repression 0.0133*** 0.00269 0.00612 0.0119*** 0.00650** 
 (0.00316) (0.00660) (0.00717) (0.00334) (0.00291) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 1.304**     
 (0.552)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  2.297***    
  (0.577)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and Laitin   0.758   
   (1.186)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    1.898***  
    (0.295)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     0.850* 
     (0.485) 
lag of Threat 0.325** -0.336 0.715** 0.248* 0.0634 
 (0.150) (0.275) (0.287) (0.132) (0.140) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00808* -0.0231*** -0.0159* -0.00267 -0.0104* 
 (0.00491) (0.00597) (0.00964) (0.00249) (0.00597) 
Polity IV score -0.0179 0.0272 0.0522 -0.00395 -0.0176 
 (0.0237) (0.0365) (0.0652) (0.0116) (0.0285) 
Constant -2.431*** -2.021*** -2.364*** -2.275*** -2.442*** 
 (0.214) (0.258) (0.391) (0.200) (0.192) 
      
Observations 1,462 578 572 1,345 1,474 
Number of ccode 143 127 121 138 144 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-7 Regression with IDEA total  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
ITT total repression 0.0133*** 0.00269 0.00612 0.0119*** 0.00650** 
 (0.00316) (0.00660) (0.00717) (0.00334) (0.00291) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 1.304**     
 (0.552)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  2.297***    
  (0.577)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and Laitin   0.758   
   (1.186)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    1.898***  
    (0.295)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     0.850* 
     (0.485) 
lag of Threat 0.325** -0.336 0.715** 0.248* 0.0634 
 (0.150) (0.275) (0.287) (0.132) (0.140) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00808* -0.0231*** -0.0159* -0.00267 -0.0104* 
 (0.00491) (0.00597) (0.00964) (0.00249) (0.00597) 
Polity IV score -0.0179 0.0272 0.0522 -0.00395 -0.0176 
 (0.0237) (0.0365) (0.0652) (0.0116) (0.0285) 
Constant -2.431*** -2.021*** -2.364*** -2.275*** -2.442*** 
 (0.214) (0.258) (0.391) (0.200) (0.192) 
      
Observations 1,462 578 572 1,345 1,474 
Number of ccode 143 127 121 138 144 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-8 Regression with ITT police 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
ITT police repression 0.0322*** 0.00639 0.0245 0.0184** 0.00903** 
 (0.00792) (0.0219) (0.0178) (0.00858) (0.00353) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 1.535***     
 (0.511)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  2.323***    
  (0.583)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and 
Laitin 
  0.765   
   (1.226)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    1.998***  
    (0.307)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     0.936* 
     (0.559) 
lag of Threat 0.354** -0.333 0.736** 0.242* 0.0577 
 (0.137) (0.280) (0.290) (0.128) (0.153) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00651 -0.0229*** -0.0155 -0.00141 -0.00928* 
 (0.00417) (0.00610) (0.00950) (0.00260) (0.00490) 
Polity IV score -0.0304 0.0252 0.0461 -0.0137 -0.0225 
 (0.0224) (0.0361) (0.0647) (0.0111) (0.0267) 
Constant -2.468*** -2.032*** -2.456*** -2.247*** -2.404*** 
 (0.218) (0.252) (0.464) (0.201) (0.189) 
      
Observations 1,462 578 572 1,345 1,474 
Number of ccode 143 127 121 138 144 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-9 Regression with IDEA police 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
IDEA police repression 0.0267** 0.0269 0.0448* 0.0283** 0.0290* 
 (0.0121) (0.0171) (0.0257) (0.0116) (0.0170) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 0.983***     
 (0.332)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  0.956**    
  (0.449)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and Laitin   -0.648   
   (0.874)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    1.117***  
    (0.315)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     1.508*** 
     (0.493) 
lag of Threat 0.246** 0.182 0.249 0.176 -0.0491 
 (0.105) (0.158) (0.220) (0.119) (0.107) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00848*** -0.0118*** -0.0135*** -0.00436** -0.00849*** 
 (0.00284) (0.00268) (0.00288) (0.00213) (0.00303) 
Polity IV score -0.0169 -0.0396** -0.0400** -0.0177 -0.0373** 
 (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0175) (0.0108) (0.0170) 
Constant -2.026*** -1.626*** -1.566*** -1.650*** -2.288*** 
 (0.161) (0.171) (0.177) (0.157) (0.167) 
      
Observations 2,108 1,195 1,170 1,923 2,079 
Number of ccode 159 146 142 154 160 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-10 Regression with ITT ratio and constituent terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
ITT ratio -0.0244 0.163*** 0.230*** -0.00257 -0.0339 
 (0.0791) (0.0490) (0.0785) (0.0570) (0.0891) 
ITT police repression 0.0170* -0.0107 0.0391 0.00320 0.00706 
 (0.00915) (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0111) (0.00485) 
inverse of ITT repression by others -2.932** -3.585*** -7.119*** -1.192* -0.0634 
 (1.455) (1.123) (2.664) (0.686) (0.871) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 1.595***     
 (0.568)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  2.556***    
  (0.707)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and Laitin   3.033*   
   (1.676)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    2.026***  
    (0.334)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     0.923** 
     (0.451) 
lag of Threat 0.301* -0.364 1.599*** 0.302* 0.0347 
 (0.166) (0.292) (0.300) (0.158) (0.137) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00593 -0.0271** -0.0138 -0.00107 -0.00911* 
 (0.00495) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.00270) (0.00471) 
Polity IV score -0.00709 0.0279 0.106 0.00616 -0.0109 
 (0.0249) (0.0496) (0.116) (0.0122) (0.0289) 
Constant -1.845*** -1.495*** -3.443*** -1.842*** -2.258*** 
 (0.342) (0.285) (0.876) (0.260) (0.296) 
      
Observations 1,011 393 388 912 1,022 
Number of ccode 134 113 107 130 135 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-11 Regression with IDEA ratio and constituent terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
IDEA ratio 0.0321 -0.136 -0.184 -0.00982 -0.0734 
 (0.0339) (0.0978) (0.125) (0.0321) (0.113) 
IDEA police repression -0.00595 0.0230 0.0707** 0.00222 0.0128 
 (0.0232) (0.0202) (0.0292) (0.0141) (0.0231) 
inverse of IDEA repression by others -0.581** -0.595* -0.188 -0.471** -0.734 
 (0.250) (0.321) (0.429) (0.229) (0.537) 
Decay function of peace years, using COW 0.992***     
 (0.360)     
Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis  -0.101    
  (0.568)    
Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and Laitin   0.0293   
   (0.683)   
Decay function of peace years, using PRIO    1.197***  
    (0.378)  
Decay function of peace years, using Toft     1.223** 
     (0.557) 
lag of Threat 0.284** 0.231 0.0887 0.233 0.0525 
 (0.136) (0.145) (0.248) (0.143) (0.0998) 
Square of Polity IV -0.00714** -0.00898*** -0.00997** -0.00481* -0.00713* 
 (0.00285) (0.00308) (0.00391) (0.00258) (0.00390) 
Polity IV score -0.0118 -0.0411* -0.0576** -0.00490 -0.0276 
 (0.0189) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0135) (0.0213) 
Constant -1.545*** -1.038*** -1.454*** -1.070*** -1.824*** 
 (0.272) (0.316) (0.385) (0.226) (0.344) 
      
Observations 916 472 468 774 906 
Number of ccode 144 120 118 138 144 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Outcome Graphs for Repression Models 
The following graphs depict the outcomes of testing the various combinations of 
repression indicators and civil war onset databases. 
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Figure C-1 Effects of police repression on civil war onset 
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Figure C-2 Effects of total government repression on civil war onset, using ITT and IDEA 
data 
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Figure C-3 Effects of total government repression on civil war onset, using CIRI and PTS 
data 
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Figure C-4 Effects of repression ratios on civil war onset 
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Appendix D - Supporting Information for Chapter 4 
 Description of variables contained in organization models 
In this section I provide a description of the models and variables reflecting my 
hypotheses relating police mode of organization and civil war onset.  I first list the models, then 
describe the variables. 
 
This model depicts step 1 of H3a: the effects of centralization on repression 
Model 3a.1 repressionit  = β0 + β1 (centralization)it + β2(regime type)it  
 
These models depict a simultaneous test of steps 1and 2: the effect of centralization on 
repression and civil war onset. 
 
Model 3a2.  repressionit  = β0 + β1 (centralization)it  
+ β2(regime type)it  
  
 onsetit = β0 + β1 (centralization)it + β2 peace_yearsit  
+  β3 (lag of threat)it  + β4 (square of Polity IV)it  
+  β4 (Polity IV)it  
 
 
These models depict H3b: the effect of centralization, interacted with police capacity, on civil 
war onset. 
 
 Model 3b.1  onsetit = β0 + β1 (centralization it)(police per capitait)  
   + β2 (centralization)it + β3(police per capita)it  
   + β5 (extractive capacity)it +  β6 (bureaucratic quality)it  
    + β7 (military per capita)it 
 
 Model 3b.1  onsetit = β0 + β1 (centralization it)(police per areait)  
   + β2 (centralization)it + β3(police per area)it  
   + β5 (extractive capacity)it +  β6 (bureaucratic quality)it  
    + β7 (military per area)it 
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Table D-1 Description of Variables Contained in the 3a Models 
Variable label Variable concept Measure Source 
Onset Civil war onset Dummy for onset during that 
time period 
Various.  See Annex 
A 
Centralization Highly centralized 
police organization 
Dummy for highly centralized Various 
Regime type Democratization Polity IV score Polity IV 
peace years lingering grievances 
𝑒−�
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑟
8 � 
onset dataset 
dependent 
lag of threat previous internal 
violence 
PITF Revolutionary War 
Magnitude Scale 
PITF 
square of Polity IV anocracy Polity IV score squared Polity IV 
Polity IV democratization Polity IV score Polity IV 
 
Table D-2 Description of Variables Contained in 3b Models 
 
Variable label Variable concept Measure Source 
Onset Civil war onset Dummy for onset 
during that time period 
Various.  See Annex A 
Centralization Highly centralized police 
organization 
Dummy for highly 
centralized 
Various 
Police per capita Police capacity Police per 1000 
inhabitants 
Various 
Police per area Police capacity Police per 1000 sq kms Various 
Extractive capacity state capacity RPC  RPC 
Bureaucratic quality Regime instability 2(durable/0.5) Polity IV 
Military per capita Military capacity Military per 1000 
inhabitant 
COW 
Military per area Military capacity Military per 1000 sq 
kms 
COW 
anocracy Anocracy Dummy for Polity IV 
score <6 and >-6 
Polity IV 
Past civil strife Rebel learning of police 
capacity 
Lagged MAR score MAR 
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Table D-3 Effects on Civil War Onset Sample Size when matched with Police Organization 
Data 
 With matching org data 
Database Beginning 
number of 
onsets using 
quinquennial 
data 
Total  highly 
centralized 
police 
decentralized 
police 
COW 98 19 14 5 
Doyle and 
Sambanis 
125 34 27 7 
Fearon and 
Laitin 
97 27 18 9 
PRIO 249 59 42 17 
Toft 93 23 17 6 
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 Tests of Bias Effect from ITT and IDEA 
Since many of the high police repression scores occurred in the United States, I attempt 
to determine the extent of any media bias the IDEA dataset by comparing the mean values of the 
various measures of repression in the United States to the overall mean of the sample. 
Table D-4 Comparison of Mean Scores of Repression 
 CIRI PTS ITT Police IDEA Police 
US 7.3 1.13 29.5 14.9 
Overall sample  4.9 2.4 5.75 2.3 
 
A comparison of means suggests that bias resulting from media access has a strong effect 
on the contradictory findings.  As depicted in Table D-4, the CIRI and PTS measures indicate 
that the United States has a lower average level of repression than the rest of the world.  In 
contrast, the ITT and IDEA police repression measures I created indicate that the United States 
has far greater levels of police repression than the world averages.  Since it is theoretically 
possible that the United States could have higher police repression levels, but lower overall 
levels, I compute the means of the ITT and IDEA total repression measures, and the United 
States still has higher scores than the rest of the world.134  
  
  
                                                 
134 The US had a mean ITT total score of 80 and the world 13.  The US had an IDEA total score of 56 and the world 
4. 
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 Regression Outcomes for tests of Police Organization 
 The following tables depict the regression outcomes for the various tests of the effects of 
police organization on the probability of civil war onset.  I omit a table depicting the effects of 
police organization on repression since I already present it in Chapter 4.  See Table 4-4 for 
results.   
Outcomes for Grievance Hypothesis (simultaneous models) 
These tables depict the outcomes from conducting a cmp regression on the joint effects of 
police organization on repression and civil war onset. 
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Table D-5 Simultaneous regression using COW onset data and IDEA repression data 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset COW Centralized -0.117 -0.110  
  (0.122) (0.122)  
 Decay function of peace years, using COW 1.069*** 1.062***  
  (0.226) (0.227)  
 lag of Threat 0.319*** 0.328***  
  (0.0607) (0.0606)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00508*** -0.00489***  
  (0.00149) (0.00150)  
 Polity IV score -0.0100 -0.0101  
  (0.00792) (0.00787)  
 Constant -2.103*** -2.118***  
  (0.133) (0.134)  
IDEA police  
repression 
Centralized -1.802***  -1.807*** 
  (0.324)  (0.324) 
 Polity IV score 0.0488***  0.0484*** 
  (0.0178)  (0.0179) 
 Constant 3.490***  3.495*** 
  (0.308)  (0.308) 
lnsig_2 Constant 1.417***   
  (0.0655)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.124*   
  (0.0698)   
lnsig_1 Constant   1.417*** 
    (0.0656) 
     
 Observations 5,497 5,423 1,296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
234 
 
Table D-6 Simultaneous regression using COW onset data and ITT repression data 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset COW Centralized -0.0991 -0.110  
  (0.123) (0.122)  
 Decay function of peace years, using COW 1.079*** 1.062***  
  (0.225) (0.227)  
 lag of Threat 0.325*** 0.328***  
  (0.0603) (0.0606)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00494*** -0.00489***  
  (0.00150) (0.00150)  
 Polity IV score -0.00953 -0.0101  
  (0.00793) (0.00787)  
 Constant -2.112*** -2.118***  
  (0.133) (0.134)  
ITT police  
repression 
Centralized -1.979  -1.983 
  (1.230)  (1.218) 
 Polity IV score 0.129*  0.117* 
  (0.0726)  (0.0684) 
 Constant 6.993***  7.053*** 
  (1.045)  (1.013) 
lnsig_2 Constant 2.581***   
  (0.198)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.435***   
  (0.135)   
lnsig_1 Constant   2.581*** 
    (0.199) 
     
 Observations 5,458 5,423 614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D-7 Simultaneous regression using Fearon and Latin onset data and IDEA repression data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset Fearon and Laitin Centralized -0.115 -0.115  
  (0.112) (0.112)  
 Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and Laitin 0.906*** 0.889***  
  (0.266) (0.269)  
 lag of Threat 0.184** 0.210**  
  (0.0936) (0.0949)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00598*** -0.00584***  
  (0.00143) (0.00144)  
 Polity IV score -0.00384 -0.00424  
  (0.00715) (0.00712)  
 Constant -1.835*** -1.848***  
  (0.128) (0.127)  
IDEA police repression Centralized -1.802***  -1.807*** 
  (0.323)  (0.324) 
 Polity IV score 0.0503***  0.0484*** 
  (0.0177)  (0.0179) 
 Constant 3.480***  3.495*** 
  (0.306)  (0.308) 
lnsig_2 Constant 1.416***   
  (0.0655)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.154*   
  (0.0810)   
lnsig_1 Constant   1.417*** 
    (0.0656) 
     
 Observations 5,010 4,745 1,296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D-8 Simultaneous regression using Fearon and Laitin onset data and ITT repression data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset Fearon and Laitin  Centralized -0.0944 -0.115  
  (0.113) (0.112)  
 Decay function of peace years, using Fearon and Laitin 0.874*** 0.889***  
  (0.266) (0.269)  
 lag of Threat 0.217** 0.210**  
  (0.0943) (0.0949)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00576*** -0.00584***  
  (0.00143) (0.00144)  
 Polity IV score -0.00316 -0.00424  
  (0.00715) (0.00712)  
 Constant -1.853*** -1.848***  
  (0.127) (0.127)  
ITT police  
repression 
Centralized -2.110*  -1.983 
  (1.190)  (1.218) 
 Polity IV score 0.113*  0.117* 
  (0.0675)  (0.0684) 
 Constant 7.219***  7.053*** 
  (1.008)  (1.013) 
lnsig_2 Constant 2.583***   
  (0.199)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.457**   
  (0.180)   
lnsig_1 Constant   2.581*** 
    (0.199) 
     
 Observations 4,860 4,745 614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D-9 Simultaneous regression using PRIO onset data and IDEA repression data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset PRIO Centralized -0.0504 -0.0567  
  (0.0839) (0.0832)  
 Decay function of peace years, using PRIO 1.453*** 1.482***  
  (0.118) (0.120)  
 lag of Threat 0.178*** 0.179***  
  (0.0661) (0.0671)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00508*** -0.00489***  
  (0.00116) (0.00116)  
 Polity IV score -0.00119 -0.00114  
  (0.00517) (0.00515)  
 Constant -1.748*** -1.759***  
  (0.105) (0.105)  
IDEA police  
repression 
Centralized -1.785***  -1.807*** 
  (0.323)  (0.324) 
 Polity IV score 0.0499***  0.0484*** 
  (0.0179)  (0.0179) 
 Constant 3.462***  3.495*** 
  (0.306)  (0.308) 
lnsig_2 Constant 1.416***   
  (0.0656)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.146***   
  (0.0441)   
lnsig_1 Constant   1.417*** 
    (0.0656) 
     
 Observations 4,990 4,805 1,296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table D-10 Simultaneous regression using PRIO onset data and ITT repression data 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset PRIO Centralized -0.0342 -0.0567  
  (0.0849) (0.0832)  
 Decay function of peace years, using PRIO 1.447*** 1.482***  
  (0.119) (0.120)  
 lag of Threat 0.180*** 0.179***  
  (0.0664) (0.0671)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00485*** -0.00489***  
  (0.00116) (0.00116)  
 Polity IV score -0.000622 -0.00114  
  (0.00519) (0.00515)  
 Constant -1.764*** -1.759***  
  (0.106) (0.105)  
ITT police 
 repression 
Centralized -1.931  -1.983 
  (1.237)  (1.218) 
 Polity IV score 0.120*  0.117* 
  (0.0703)  (0.0684) 
 Constant 7.008***  7.053*** 
  (1.046)  (1.013) 
lnsig_2 Constant 2.583***   
  (0.199)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.418***   
  (0.146)   
lnsig_1 Constant   2.581*** 
    (0.199) 
     
 Observations 4,890 4,805 614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D-11 Simultaneous regression using Sambanis onset data and IDEA repression data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset Sambanis Centralized -0.105 -0.103  
  (0.111) (0.111)  
 Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis 0.861*** 0.840***  
  (0.250) (0.253)  
 lag of Threat 0.322*** 0.334***  
  (0.0966) (0.0996)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00634*** -0.00629***  
  (0.00150) (0.00149)  
 Polity IV score -0.00882 -0.00918  
  (0.00723) (0.00717)  
 Constant -1.814*** -1.819***  
  (0.128) (0.128)  
IDEA police 
 repression 
Centralized -1.797***  -1.807*** 
  (0.325)  (0.324) 
 Polity IV score 0.0495***  0.0484*** 
  (0.0178)  (0.0179) 
 Constant 3.479***  3.495*** 
  (0.308)  (0.308) 
lnsig_2 Constant 1.417***   
  (0.0655)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.0791   
  (0.0668)   
lnsig_1 Constant   1.417*** 
    (0.0656) 
     
 Observations 4,983 4,738 1,296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D-12 Simultaneous regression using Sambanis onset data and ITT repression data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
onsetSambanis Centralized -0.0992 -0.103  
  (0.111) (0.111)  
 Decay function of peace years, using Sambanis 0.840*** 0.840***  
  (0.252) (0.253)  
 lag of Threat 0.334*** 0.334***  
  (0.0992) (0.0996)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00626*** -0.00629***  
  (0.00149) (0.00149)  
 Polity IV score -0.00876 -0.00918  
  (0.00725) (0.00717)  
 Constant -1.819*** -1.819***  
  (0.128) (0.128)  
ITT police 
repression 
Centralized -1.990  -1.983 
  (1.218)  (1.218) 
 Polity IV score 0.117*  0.117* 
  (0.0685)  (0.0684) 
 Constant 7.082***  7.053*** 
  (1.016)  (1.013) 
lnsig_2 Constant 2.582***   
  (0.199)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.246   
  (0.209)   
lnsig_1 Constant   2.581*** 
    (0.199) 
     
 Observations 4,853 4,738 614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D-13 Simultaneous regression using Toft onset data and IDEA repression data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset Toft Centralized -0.0377 -0.0326  
  (0.118) (0.118)  
 Decay function of peace years, using Toft 1.350*** 1.338***  
  (0.218) (0.220)  
 lag of Threat 0.0806 0.104  
  (0.0921) (0.0981)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00335** -0.00324**  
  (0.00158) (0.00157)  
 Polity IV score -0.0122* -0.0124*  
  (0.00733) (0.00730)  
 Constant -2.182*** -2.191***  
  (0.137) (0.136)  
IDEA police 
 repression 
Centralized -1.809***  -1.807*** 
  (0.324)  (0.324) 
 Polity IV score 0.0487***  0.0484*** 
  (0.0178)  (0.0179) 
 Constant 3.500***  3.495*** 
  (0.308)  (0.308) 
lnsig_2 Constant 1.417***   
  (0.0656)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.118   
  (0.0783)   
lnsig_1 Constant   1.417*** 
    (0.0656) 
     
 Observations 5,294 5,184 1,296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D-14 Simultaneous regression using Toft  onset data and ITT repression data 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Simultaneous model Step 2 Step 1 
     
Onset Toft Centralized -0.0331 -0.0326  
  (0.118) (0.118)  
 Decay function of peace years, using Toft 1.336*** 1.338***  
  (0.221) (0.220)  
 lag of Threat 0.105 0.104  
  (0.0982) (0.0981)  
 Square of Polity IV -0.00324** -0.00324**  
  (0.00157) (0.00157)  
 Polity IV score -0.0124* -0.0124*  
  (0.00731) (0.00730)  
 Constant -2.191*** -2.191***  
  (0.136) (0.136)  
ITT police 
 repression 
Centralized -1.987  -1.983 
  (1.218)  (1.218) 
 Polity IV score 0.117*  0.117* 
  (0.0684)  (0.0684) 
 Constant 7.064***  7.053*** 
  (1.013)  (1.013) 
lnsig_2 Constant 2.581***   
  (0.199)   
atanhrho_12 Constant 0.0372   
  (0.0418)   
lnsig_1 Constant   2.581*** 
    (0.199) 
     
 Observations 5,225 5,184 614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Outcomes for Greed Hypotheses 
 The tables depict the outcomes of the greed hypotheses.  The first table contains 
regression outcomes for a police per capita measure of police capacity, and the second table 
contains outcomes for a police per area measure of police capacity.  The columns represent the 
various civil war onset databases that serve as indicators of the dependent variable. 
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Table D-15 Regression outcome for centralization, conditional on police per capita and area 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
Police per 1000 sq kms, quinquennial average 0.000148 0.000374 0.000153 -0.00111 0.00109 
 (0.00117) (0.00127) (0.000757) (0.000986) (0.00131) 
Centralized, quinquennial mode 0.125 0.374 -0.259 -0.327 0.0207 
 (0.398) (0.359) (0.302) (0.294) (0.343) 
interaction of centralization and police per area -0.00123 -0.00198 -0.000395 0.000522 -0.00118 
 (0.00105) (0.00136) (0.000820) (0.000985) (0.00133) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average -0.0545 -0.0596 -0.0571 0.00359 -0.254 
 (0.355) (0.237) (0.264) (0.233) (0.359) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.763*** 0.829*** 0.781*** 0.381* 0.532** 
 (0.237) (0.206) (0.223) (0.196) (0.239) 
military personnel per 1000 sq kms, quinquennial 
average 
1.36e-05 -7.85e-05 -0.000126 4.27e-05 -0.00112*** 
 (0.000150) (0.000201) (9.50e-05) (0.000123) (0.000346) 
Constant -1.847*** -1.666*** -1.427*** -0.723** -1.223*** 
 (0.549) (0.406) (0.346) (0.355) (0.444) 
      
Observations 337 336 337 337 337 
Number of ccode 110 109 110 110 110 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES COW Sambanis Fearon and Laitin PRIO Toft 
      
Police per 1000 inhabitants, quinquennial average -0.195** -0.301** -0.344*** -0.311*** -0.183 
 (0.0909) (0.140) (0.123) (0.0731) (0.134) 
Centralized, quinquennial mode -0.0771 0.0809 -0.334 -0.221 -0.0519 
 (0.352) (0.328) (0.268) (0.272) (0.297) 
Interaction of police per capita and anocracy dummy 0.185** 0.290** 0.372*** 0.270*** 0.245* 
 (0.0914) (0.122) (0.126) (0.0728) (0.134) 
Extractive capacity,quinquennial average -0.00528 -0.0218 0.0456 0.121 -0.207 
 (0.321) (0.244) (0.268) (0.226) (0.343) 
Bureaucratic quality, quinquennial maximum 0.581** 0.578** 0.523** 0.231 0.373 
 (0.257) (0.231) (0.255) (0.206) (0.285) 
military personnel per 1000 inhabitants, quinquennial 
average 
-0.00566 -0.0421 -0.0492* -0.00202 -0.0925*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0275) (0.0287) (0.0230) (0.0334) 
Constant -1.538*** -1.048** -0.912** -0.552 -0.876* 
 (0.521) (0.437) (0.368) (0.401) (0.451) 
      
Observations 335 334 335 335 335 
Number of ccode 110 109 110 110 110 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Outcomes Graphs for Organization Models 
 The following graphs depict the effects of changes in police organizational centralization 
on the probability of civil war onset.  I present first the graphs for the grievance models, then the 
graphs for the greed models. 
 
Graphs for Grievance Models 
 The graphs depict the outcomes from testing the simultaneous models of the effect of 
centralization on the probability of civil war onset, with repression as an intermediate process.   
 
Figure D-1 Effect of centralization using police repression 
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Figure D-2 Effect of centralization using overall government repression, measured by CIRI 
and PTS 
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 Graphs for Greed Models 
These graphs depict the effect of centralization, interacted with measures of police 
capacity.   
 
Figure D-3 Discrete change of centralization as police capacity varies 
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Figure D-4 Marginal effects of police per capita in the presence of centralization 
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